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Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. 
10-1150 
Ruling Below: Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Services, 628 FJd 1347 
(Fed. Cir. 2010) cert. granted, 10-1150,2011 WL 973139 (U.S. June 20, 2011). 
Prometheus is the sole and exclusive patent holder for two patents that claim methods for 
determining the optimal dosage of a drug used to treat gastrointestinal illnesses. Prometheus' 
developed and marketed a test kit based on these patents. As the district court articulated the 
patents, they are for a three step process: 1) administering the drug; 2) determining the levels of a 
certain substance in the patient's bloodstream; 3) based on that detelmination, warning the doctor 
if a dosage adjustment is required. Mayo, a one-time purchaser of Prometheus' test kits, now 
seeks to develop a similar test. Mayo claims the patents are for unpatentable subject matter and 
thus invalid. The district court agreed with Mayo, holding the patents invalid because they assert 
a claim over natural phenomena resulting from a process of the human body. On first appeal, the 
Federal Circuit applied the machine-or-transformation test in holding the district court erred in 
this determination. Subsequently, the Supreme Court decided this test was not definitive in Bilski 
. v. Kappos and remanded this case for further consideration. The Federal Circuit again concluded 
the district cOUli erred, holding that Prometheus' patents were tied to a particular application of a 
naturally occurring phenomenon and thus patentable. The Federal Circuit characterized the 
patents as describing a series of transformative steps that optimize efficacy and reduce toxicity 
for a particular treatment method. 
Question Presented: Whether 35 U.S.C. § 101 is satisfied by a patent claim that covers 
observed correlations between blood test results and patient health, so that the claim effectively. 
preempts all uses of the naturally occurring correlations, simply because well-known methods 
used to administer prescription drugs and test blood may involve "transformations" of body 
chemicals. 
PROMETHEUS LABORATORIES, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
MAYO COLLABORATIVE SERVICES (doing business as Mayo Medical Laboratories) 
and Mayo Clinic Rochester, Defendants-Appellees. 
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
Decided December 17, 2010 
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.] 
. LOURIE, Circuit Judge. 
This case returns to this court on remand 
from the Supreme Court for further 
consideration in light of the Court's decision 
in Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. --, 130 
S.Ct. 3218,' 177 L.Ed.2d 792 (2010). In 
Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. v. Mayo 
Collaborative Services, 581 F.3d 1336 
(Fed.Cir.2009), . we decided an appeal by 
Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. 
("Prometheus") from a final judgment of the 
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United States District Court for the Southern 
District Of California granting summary 
judgment of invalidity of U.S. Patents 
6,355,623 ("the '623 patent") and 6,680,302 
("the' 302 patent") under 35 U.S.C. § 101. 
We held that the district court erred as a 
matter of law in finding Prometheus's 
asserted medical treatment claims to be 
drawn to nonstatutory subject matter under 
this court's machine-or-transformation test, 
. which we had held in In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 
943· (Fed.Cir.2008), to be the definitive test 
for determining the patentability of a process 
under.§ 101. Following our decision in this 
case, the Supreme Court· held that the 
machine-or-transformation· test, although "a 
useful and important clue," was not the sole 
test for determining the patent eligibility of 
process claims. Based on that decision, the 
Court vacated and remanded our 
Prometheus decision. On remand, we again 
hold that Prometheus's asserted method 
claims are drawn to statutory subject matter, 
and we again reverse the district court's 
grant of summary judgment of invalidity 
under § 101. 
BACKGROUND 
Prometheus is the sole and exclusive 
licensee of the'623 and' 302 patents, which 
claim methods for determining the optimal 
dosage of thiopuririe drugs used to treat 
gastrointestinal and non-gastrointestinal 
autoimmune diseases. These drugs include 
6-mercaptopurine ("6-MP") and 
azathiopurine ("AZA"), a pro-drug that upon 
administration to a patient converts to 6-
MP, both of which are used to treat 
inflammatory bowel diseases ("IBD") such 
as Crohn's disease and ulcerative colitis .... 
Although drugs such as 6-MP and AZA 
have been used for years to treat 
autoimmune diseases, non-responsiveness 
and drug toxicity may complicate treatment 
in some patients. Accordingly, the patents 
claim methods that seek to optimize 
therapeutic efficacy while minimizing toxic 
side effects. As written, the claimed methods 
typically include two separately lettered 
steps: (a) "administering" a drug that 
provides 6-TG to a subject, and (b) 
"determining" the levels of the drug's 
metabolites, 6-TG and/or 6-MMP, in the 
subject. The measured metabolite levels are 
then compared to pre-determined metabolite 
levels, "wherein" the measured metabolite 
levels "indicate a need" to increase or 
decrease the level of drug to be administered 
so as to minimize toxicity and maximize 
treatment efficacy .... 
Claim 1 of the' 623 patent is representative 
of the independent claims asserted by 
Prometheus in this case: 
1. A method of optimizing 
therapeutic efficacy for treatment of 
an immune-mediated gastrointestinal 
disorder, comprising: 
(a) administering a drug providing 
6-thioguanine to a subject having 
said immune-mediated 
gastrointestinal disorder; and 
. (b) determining the level of 6-
thioguanine in said subject having 
said immune-mediated 
gastrointestinal disorder, 
wherein the level of 6-thioguanine 
less than about 230 pmol per 8x108 
red blood cells indicates a need to 
increase the amount of said drug 
subsequently administered to said 
subject and 
wherein the level of 6-thioguanine 
greater than about 400 pmol per 
8x108 red blood cells indicates a 
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need to decrease the amount of said 
drug subsequently administered to 
said subject.· 
'623 patent claim 1 (emphases added). 
Claim 1 of the '302 patent is substantially 
the same, with the addition of determining 6 
- MMP levels in addition to 6 - TG levels. 
Claim 46 of the '623 patent dispenses with 
the "administering" step and claims only the 
"determining" step: 
46. A method of optimizing 
therapeutic efficacy and reducing 
toxicity associated with treatment of 
an immune-mediated gastrointestinal 
disorder, comprising: 
(a) determining the level of 6-
thioguanine or 6-
methylmercaptopurine in a subject 
administered a drug selected from 
the group consisting of 6-
mercaptopurine, azathiop [u ]rine, 6:-
thioguanine, and 6-methyl-
mercaptoriboside, said subject 
having said hnmune-mediated 
gastrointestinal disorder, 
wherein the level of 6-thioguanine 
less than about 230 pmol per 8xl08 
red blood cells indicates a need to 
increase the[ ] amount of said drug 
subsequently administered to said 
subject, and 
wherein the level of 6-thioguanine 
greater than about 400 pmol per 
8xl08 red blood cells or a level of 6-
methylmercaptopurine greater than 
about 7000 pmol per 8xl08 red blood 
cells indicates a need to decrease the 
amount of said drug subsequently 
administered to said subject. 
'623 patent claim 46 (emphases added). 
Prometheus marketed a PROMETHEUS 
Thiopurine Metabolites test (formerly 
known as the PRO-PredictRx® Metabolites . 
test) that used the technology covered by the 
patents in suit. Mayo Collaborative Services 
and Mayo Clinic Rochester (collectively, 
"Mayo") formerly purchased and used 
Prometheus's test, but in 2004, Mayo 
announced that it intended to begin using 
internally at its clinics and selling to other 
hospitals its own test. Mayo's test measured 
the same metabolites as Prometheus's test, 
but Mayo's test used different levels to 
determine toxicity of 6-TG and 6-MMP. 
On June 15, 2004, Prometheus sued Mayo 
for infringement of .'till:3 and '302 
patents. Prometheus asserted independent 
claims 1, 7, 22, 25, and 46 of the' 623 patent 
and independent claim 1 of the'302 patent. 
Prometheus also asserted several dependent 
claims that require either that the 
measurement of the metabolites be 
performed using high pressure liquid 
chromatography, or that the thiopurine drug 
used be one of four specified drugs[.] Mayo 
rescinded its announcement shortly after 
Prometheus filed suit, and has yet to launch 
its test. 
On November 22, 2005, the district court 
held on cross-motions for summary 
judgment that Mayo's test literally infringed 
claim 7 of the' 623 patent. In its opinion, the 
court construed "indicates a need" to mean 
"a warning that an adjustment in dosage 
may be required." This construction did not 
require doctors to adjust drug dosage if the 
metabolite level reached the specified levels; 
rather, the court found the two "wherein" 
phrases to mean "that when the identified 
metabolites reach the specified level, the 
doctor is warned or notified that a dosage 
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adjustment may be required, if the doctor 
believes that is the proper procedure." 
On January 29, 2007, Mayo filed a motion 
for summary judgment of invalidity, arguing 
that the patents in suit are- invalid because 
they claim subject matter unpatentable under 
35 U.S.C. § 101. Specifically, Mayo 
contended that the patents impermissibly 
claim natural phenomena-the correlations 
between, on the one hand, thiopurine drug 
metabolite levels and, on the other hand, 
efficacy and toxicity-and that the claims 
wholly preempt use of the natural 
phenomena. 
On March 28, 2008, the district court 
granted Mayo's motion for summary 
judgment of invalidity under § 101. 
Prometheus _ Labs., Inc. v. Mayo 
Collaborative Servs., No. 04-CV-1200, 
2008WL 878910 (S.D.Cal. Mar. 28, 2008) 
("Invalidity Opinion "). First, the court 
found that the patents only claimed the 
correlations between certain thiopurine drug 
metabolite levels and therapeutic efficacy 
and toxicity. The court reasoned that, as 
construed in the November 2005 summary 
judgment order, the claims have three steps: 
(1) administering the drug to a subj ect, (2) 
determining metabolite levels, and (3) being 
warned that an adjustment in dosage may be 
required. The court stated that the fact that 
the inventors framed the claims as treatment 
methods does not render the claims patent-
eligible subject matter. Rather, the court 
found that the '" administering' and 
'determining' steps are merely necessary 
data-gathering steps for any use of the 
correlations" and that "as construed, the 
final step-the 'warning' step (i.e., the 
'wherein' clause)-is only a mental step." 
The court noted that the warning step does 
not require any actual change in dosage and 
that "it is the metabolite levels themselves 
that 'warn' the doctor that an adjustment in 
-dosage may be required." With this 
understanding of the claims, the court 
concluded that the claims recited the 
correlations between particular 
concentrations of 6-TG and 6-MMP and 
therapeutic efficacy or toxicity in patients 
taking AZA drugs. 
Second, the district court found that those 
correlations were natural phenomena, not 
patent-eligible inventions because the 
correlations resulted from a natural body 
process. The court stated that the inventors 
did not "invent" the claimed correlation; 
rather, "6-TG and 6-MMP are products of 
the natural metabolizing of thiopurine drugs, 
and the inventors merely observed the 
relationship between these naturally 
produced metabolites and therapeutic 
efficacy and toxicity." Finally, the court 
determined that "[b ]ecause the claims cover 
the correlations themselves, it follows that 
the claims 'wholly pre-empt' - the 
correlations." Thus, the court concluded that 
there was no genuine issue of material fact 
to be resolved as to whether the patents in 
suit were directed to statutory subject matter 
and found by clear and convincing evidence 
that the claims were invalid under § 10 l. On 
May 16, 2008, the district court entered final 
jUdgment, and Prometheus timely appealed. 
On appeal, we reversed and upheld the 
asserted claims' validity under what was at 
the time this court's "definitive test" for 
determining whether a process is patentable 
subj ect matter under § 101: the machine-or-
transformation test. Under the machine-or-
transformation test, a claimed process· is 
patent eligible if it (1) is tied to a particular 
machine or apparatus, or (2) transforms a 
particular article into a different state . or 
thing. We held that both the "administering" 
and "determining" steps were trans formative 
and not merely data-gathering steps under 
the second prong of the test, and as such the 
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claims did not wholly preempt the use of the 
recited correlations between metabolite 
levels and drug efficacy or toxicity. 
Following our decision in Prometheus, the 
Supreme Court issued a decision rejecting 
the machine-or-transformation test as the 
sole, definitive test for determining the 
patent eligibility of a ,process under § 101. 
Instead, the Court declined to adopt any 
categorical rules outside the well-established 
exceptions for laws of nature,physica1 
phenomena, and abstract ideas, and resolved 
the case based on its decisions in Gottschalk 
v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 93 S.Ct. 253, 34 
L.Ed.2d 273 (1972), Parker v. Flook, 437 
U.S. 584, 98 S.Ct. 2522, 57 L.Ed.2d 451 
(1978), and Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 
175,101 S.Ct. 1048,67 L.Ed.2d 155 (1981), 
holding that Bilski's claims to methods of 
, hedging risk are not patentable processes 
because they attempt to patent abstract 
ideas. The Court did not, however, reject the 
machine-or-transformation test, but rather 
characterized the test as "a useful and 
important clue, an investigative tool, for 
determining whether some claimed 
inventions are processes under § 101." 
The Court then granted Mayo's petition for 
certiorari, vacated our decision holding 
Prometheus's method of treatment claims to 
cover patent-eligible subject matter under 
the machine-or.,transformation test, and 
remanded the case for consideration in light 
of the Court's Bilski decision. On September 
1, 2010, we requested that the parties 
simultaneously submit briefs, without 
further' oral argument, to address the effect 
of the Supreme Court's decision in Bilski on 
, the disposition of this case. In view of this 
additional briefing and the Supreme Court's 
guidance in Bilski,' we again hold that 
Prometheus's method claims recite 
patentable subject matter under § 101. 
DISCUSSION 
We review the district court's grant of 
summary judgment de novo. Summary 
judgment is appropriate if there are no 
genuine issues of material fact and the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. Whether a patent claim is 
directed to statutory subj ect matter is a 
question of law that we review' de novo. 
1. 
The Issue again before us IS whether 
Prometheus's method claims meet the 
requirements of § 101. The text of the 
statute provides that: 
Whoever invents or discovers any 
new and useful process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of 
matter, or any new and useful 
improvement thereof, may obtain a 
patent thereof, subject to the 
conditions and requirements of this 
title. 
35 U.S.C. § 101. 
The Supreme Court has consistently 
construed § 101 broadly. Most recently, in 
Bilski, the Court stated that by choosing 
expansive terms to specify four independent 
patent~eligib1e categories of inventions or 
discoveries-processes, machines, 
manufactures, and compositions of matter-
and by modifying those terms with the 
comprehensive "any," Congress plainly 
contemplated that § 101 would be given 
wide scope. "Congress took this permissive 
approach to patent eligibility to ensure that 
'ingenuity should receive a liberal 
encouragement. ,,, 
Yet, it is equally well-established that § 101, 
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while broad, is not unlimited. "The Court's 
precedents provide three specific exceptions . 
to § 101 's broad patent-eligibility principles: 
'laws of nature, physical phenomena, and 
abstract ideas.'" Although not compelled by 
. the statutory te~t, the Court has held that 
"these exceptions have defined the reach of 
the statute as a matter of statutory stare 
decisis going back 150 years," and "[t]he 
concepts covered by these exceptions are 
'part of the storehouse of knowledge of all 
men . . . free to all men and reserved 
exclusively to none[.]'" 
The Supreme COUli has also established that 
while a law of nature, natural phenomenon, 
or abstract idea cannot be patented, "an 
application of a law of nature or 
mathematical formula to a known structure 
or process may well be deserving of patent 
protection." In making this determination, 
the Court has made clear that a claim must 
be considered as· a whole; it is 
"inappropriate to dissect the claims into old 
and new elements and then to ignore the 
presence of the old elements in the 
analysis." Nonetheless, a scientific principle 
cannot be made patentable by limiting its 
use to a particular technological 
environment or by adding insignificant post-
solution activity. . 
In light of the Supreme Court's decision in 
Bilski, patent eligibility in this case turns on 
whether Prometheus 's asselied claims are 
drawn to a natural phenomenon, the 
. patenting of which would entirely preempt 
its lise as in Benson or Flook, or whether the 
claims are drawn only to a particular 
application of that phenomenon as in Diehr . 
. We conclude they are drawn to the latter. 
II. 
We turn to the parties' arguments on 
. remand. Prometheus argues that neither the 
Supreme COUli's Bilski decision nor the 
Court's GVR Order compels a different 
outcome on remand; and therefore we 
should again reverse the district court's 
jUdgment of invalidity under § 101. 
Regarding Bilski, Prometheus contends that 
the Court held only that patents that do not 
satisfy the machine-or-transformation test 
are not necessarily unpatentable and did not 
overrule the long-established view that 
claims that satisfy the machine-or-
transformation test, like Prometheus's, 
necessarily satisfy § 101. But regardless, 
Prometheus argues, its asserted· claims not 
only satisfy the machine-or-transformation 
test, but also are not drawn to mere 
abstractions. Specifically, Prometheus 
argues that its asserted claims involve a 
particular transformation of a patient's body 
and bodily sample and use particular 
machines to determine metabolite 
concentrations in a bodily sample (e.g., via 
high pressure liquid chromatography), thus 
satisfying either prong of the machine-or-
transformation test. Prometheus further 
argues that its claims also involve an 
application of a law of nature, not the law 
itself, because they recite specific means of 
treating specific diseases using specific 
drugs, and therefore do not preempt the 
abstract idea of calibrating drug dosages to 
treat disease. 
Mayo argues that the Supreme Court in 
Bilski reaffirmed that preemption is the 
controlling standard for § 101 under the 
Court's Benson, Flook, and Diehr 
precedents and made clear that while a 
machine-or-transformation test may inform 
the analysis, that test is not outcome 
detelminative. And, according to· Mayo, 
under the governing preemption standard, 
Prometheus's claims are invalid because 
they preempt all practical use of naturally 
occurring correlations between metabolite 
levels and drug efficacy and any machine or 
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transformation present in the claims is 
merely insignificant post-solution activity. 
Mayo also asserts that the carefully 
considered opinion of three Justices-
allegedly cited approvingly by five Justices 
in Bilski-rejected Prometheus's machine-
or-transformation argument . for· nearly 
identical claims in Laboratory Corp. of 
America Holdings v. Metabolite 
Laboratories, Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 138-39, 
126 S.Ct. 2921, 165 L.Ed.2d 399 (2006), 
concluding that the claims do not cover a 
process for transforming a bodily sample, 
but rather merely instruct the user to obtain 
test results and think about them. Finally, 
Mayo claims that the Supreme Court's 
decision to GVR our earlier decision in this 
case indicates that a different analysis is 
required of us on remand. 
We disagree with Mayo. We do not think 
that either the Supreme Court's GVR Order 
or the Court's Bilski decision dictates a 
wholly different analysis or a different result 
on remand. In our pre-Bilski decision in this 
case, we held not only that Prometheus's 
asserted . claims recite transformative 
"administering" and "determining" steps, 
. but also that Prometheus's claims are drawn 
not to a law' of nature, but to a· particular 
application of naturally occurring 
. correlations, and accordingly do not preempt 
all uses of the recited correlations between 
metabolite levels and drug efficacy or 
toxicity. The Supreme Court's decision in 
Bilski did not undermine our preemption 
analysis of Prometheus's claims and it 
rejected the machine-or-transformation test 
only as a definitive test. The Court merely 
stated that "[t]he Court of Appeals 
incorrectly concluded that this Court has 
endorsed the machine-or-transformation test 
as the exclusive test." The Court stated that 
it had previously noted in Benson, 409 U.S. 
at 70, 93 S.Ct. 253, that "[t]ransformation 
and reduction of an article 'to a different 
state or thing' is the clue to the patentability 
of a process claim that does not include 
particular machines." Thus, the Court did 
not disavow the machine-or-transformation 
test. And, as applied to the present claims, 
the "useful and important clue, an 
investigative tool," leads to a clear and 
compelling conclusion, viz., that the present 
claims pass muster under § 101. They do not 
encompass laws of nature or preempt natural 
correlations. 
III. 
As before, we again hold that Prometheus's 
asserted method claims recite a patent-
eligible application of naturally occurring 
correlations .. between metabolite levels and 
efficacy or toxicity, and thus do not wholly 
preempt all uses of the recited correlations. 
As discussed below, the claims recite 
specific treatment steps, not just the 
correlations themselves. And the steps 
involve a particular application of the 
natural correlations: the treatment of a 
specific disease by administering specific 
drugs and measuring specific metabolites. 
As such, and contrary to Mayo's assertions, 
the claims do not preempt all uses of the 
natural correlations; they utilize them in a 
series of specific steps. See Diehr, 450 U.S. 
at 187, 101 S.Ct. 1048 ("Their process 
admittedly employs a well-known 
mathematical equation, but they do not seek 
to preempt the use of that equation. Rather, 
they seek only to foreclose from others the 
use of that equation in conjunction with all 
of the other steps in their claimed process."). 
The inventive nature of the claimed methods 
stems not from preemption of all use of 
these natural processes, but from the 
application of a natural phenomenon in a 
~eries of steps compnsmg particular 
methods of treatment. Other drugs might be 
administered to optimize the therapeutic 
efficacy of the claimed treatment. 
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We similarly reaffirm that the treatment 
methods claimed in Prometheus's patents in 
suit satisfy the transformation prong of the 
machine-or-transformation test, as they 
"transform an miicle into a different state or 
thing," and this transformation is "central to 
the purpose of the claimed process." The 
transformation is of the human body and of 
its components following the administration 
of a specific class of drugs and the various 
chemical and physical changes of the drugs' 
metabolites that enable their concentrations 
to be determined. We thus have no need to 
separately determine whether the claims also 
satisfy the machine prong of the test. 
Contrm'y to the district court and Mayo's 
arguments on remand, we do not view the 
ciisputed claims as merely claiming natural 
correlations and data-gathering steps. The 
asserted claims are in effect claims to 
methods of treatment, which are always 
transformative when one of a defined group 
of drugs is administered to the body to 
ameliorate the effects of an undesired 
condition. More specifically, Prometheus· 
here claimed methods for optimizing 
efficacy and reducing toxicity of treatment 
regimes for gastrointestinal and non-
gastrointestinal autoimmune diseases that 
utilize drugs providing 6-TO by 
administering a drug to a subject. The 
invention's purpose to treat the human body 
is made clear in the specification and the 
preambles of the asserted claims. 
When administering a drug such as AZA or 
6-MP, the human body necessarily 
undergoes a transformation. The drugs do 
not pass through the body untouched 
without affecting it. In fact, the 
transformation that occurs, viz., the effect on 
the body after metabolizing the artificially 
administered drugs, is the entire purpose of 
administering these drugs: the drugs are 
administered to provide 6-TO, which is 
thought to be the drugs' active metabolite in 
the treatment of disease, to a subject. The 
fact that the change of the administered drug 
into its metabolites relies on natural 
processes does not disqualify the 
administering step from the realm of 
patentability. As Prometheus points out, 
quite literally every transformation. of 
physical matter can be described as 
occurring according to natural processes and 
natural law. Transformations operate by 
natural principles. The transformation here, 
however, is the result of the physical 
administration of a drug to a subject to 
transfonn-i.e., treat-the subject, which is 
itself not a natural process. "It is virtually 
self-evident that a process for a chemical or 
physical transformation of physical objects 
or substances is patent-eligible subject 
matter." The administering step, therefore, is 
not merely data-gathering but a significant 
transformative element of Prometheus's 
claimed methods of· treatment that is 
"sufficiently definite to confine the patent 
. monopoly within rather definite bounds." 
Not all of the asserted claims, however, 
contain the administering step. That 
omission, which occurs in claims 46 and 53 
of the' 623 patent, does not diminish the 
patentability of the claimed methods 
because we also hold that the determining 
step, which is present in each of the asserted 
claims, . is transformative and central to the 
claimed methods. Determining the levels of 
6~ TO or 6-MMP in a subject necessarily 
involves a transformation. Some form of 
manipulation, such as the high pressure 
liquid chromatography method specified in 
several of the asserted dependent claims or 
some other modification of the substances to 
be measured, is necessary to extract the 
metabolites from a bodily sample and 
determine their concentration. As stated by 
Prometheus's expert, "at the end of the 
process, the human blood sample is no 
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longer human blood; human tissue is no 
longer human tissue." That is clearly a 
transformation. In fact, Mayo does not 
dispute that determining metabolite levels in 
the clinical samples taken from patients is 
transformative, but argues that this 
transformation is merely a necessary data-
gathering step for use of the correlations. On 
the contrary, this transformation is central to 
the purpose of the claims, since the 
determining step is, like the administering 
step, a significant part of the claimed 
method. Measuring the levels of 6-TG and 
6-MMP is what enables possible 
adjustments to thiopurine· drug dosage to be 
detected for optimizing efficacy or reducing 
toxicity during a course of treatment. The 
determining step, by working a chemical 
and physical transformation on physical 
substances, likewise sufficiently confines 
the patent monopoly, as required by the 
machine-or-transformation test. 
A further requirement for patent-eligibility 
is ensuring that the involvement of the 
transformation in Prometheus's claimed 
process is "not merely insignificant extra-
solution activity." As made clear from the 
discussion above, the administering and· 
determining steps are transformative and are 
central to the claims rather than merely 
insignificant extra-solution activity. 
The crucial error the district court made in 
reaching the opposite conclusion was failing 
to recognize that the first two steps of the 
. asserted claims are not merely data-
gathering steps. While it is true that the 
administering and determining steps gather 
useful data, it is also clear that the presence 
of those two steps in the claimed processes 
is not "merely" for the purpose of gathering 
data. Instead, the administering and 
determining steps are paJ.i of a treatment 
protocol, and they are transformative. As 
explained above, the administering step 
provides thiopurine drugs for the purpose of 
treating disease, and the determining step 
measures the drugs' metabolite levels for the 
purpose of assessing the drugs' dosage 
during the course of treatment. 
Given the integral involvement of the 
administering and determining steps in 
Prometheus's therapeutic methods, this case 
is easily distinguishable from prior cases 
that found asselied method claims to be 
unpatentable for claiming data-gathering 
steps and a fundamental principle. Perhaps 
the case that offers the closest comparison is 
In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835 (Fed.Cir.1989), 
but the asserted claims found unpatentable 
in that case are readily distinguished from 
those in the instant action. In Grams, the 
applicant claimed a process that involved (1) 
performing a clinical test on individuals and 
(2) based on the data from that test, 
determining if an abnormality existed and 
determining possible causes of any 
abnormality by using an algorithm. We 
found that' this process was not drawn to 
patentable subject matter because the 
essence of the claimed process was the 
mathematical algorithm, rather than any 
transformation of the' tested individuals. 
More specifically, the Grams process was 
unpatentable because "it was merely an 
algorithm combined with a data-gathering 
step," i.e., performing a clinical test. The 
claims did not require the performing of 
clinical tests on individuals that were 
trans formative-and thus rendering the 
entire process patentable subject matter-
because the tests were just to "obtain data." 
The patent and thus the court focused only 
on the algorithm rather than the clinical tests 
purpOlied to be covered by the claims. 
Here, unlike the clinical test recited in 
Grams, the administering and determining 
steps in Prometheus's claimed methods are 
not "merely" data-gathering steps or 
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"insignificant extra-solution activity"; they 
are part of treatment regimes for various 
diseases using thiopurine drugs. As a result, 
the administering and determining steps are 
not insignificant extra-solution activity, and 
the claims are therefore not drawn merely to 
correlations between metabolite levels and 
toxicity or efficacy. 
We agree with the district court that. the final 
"wherein" clauses are mental steps and thus 
not patent-eligible per se. However, 
although they alone are not patent.:eligible, 
the claims are not simply to the mental 
steps. A subsequent mental step does not, by 
itself, negate the transformative nature of 
prior steps. Thus, when viewed in the proper 
context, the final step of providing a 
warning based on the results of the prior 
steps does not detract from the patentability 
of Prometheus's claimed methods as a 
whole. The data that the administering and 
determining steps provide for use in the' 
mental steps are obtained by steps well 
within the realm of patentable subject 
matter; the addition of the mental steps to 
the claimed methods thus does not remove 
the prior two steps from that realm. No 
claim in the Prometheus patents claims only 
mental steps. Therefore, contrary to Mayo's 
assertions, a physician who only evaluates 
the result .of the claimed methods, without 
carrying out the administering andlor 
determining steps that are present in all the 
claims, cannot infringe any claim that 
requires such steps. 
This analysis is consistent with In re Abele, 
684 F.2d 902 (CCPA 1982). In Abele, a 
method claim called for the use of X-ray 
attenuation data, which necessarily involved 
production, detection, and display with a 
CAT scan. The method also called for use of 
an algorithm. We found that the claim was 
patentable because removal of the algorithm 
still left all the steps of a CAT scan in the 
claim; thus, the production and detection 
could not be considered "mere antecedent 
steps to obtain values for solving the 
algorithm. . . . We view the production, 
detection, and display steps as manifestly 
statutory subject matter, and are not swayed 
from this conclusion by the presence of an 
algorithm in the claimed method." In the 
instant case, the presence of mental steps 
similarly does not detract from the 
patentability of the administering and 
determining steps. 
As we explained in Bilski, 
[I]t is inappropriate to determine the 
patent eligibility of a claim as a 
whole based on whether selected 
limitations constitute patent-eligible 
subject matter. After all, even though 
a fundamental principle itself is not 
patent-eligible, processes 
incorporating a fundamental 
principle may be patent-eligible. 
Thus, it is irrelevant that any 
individual step or limitation of such 
processes by' itself would be 
unpatentable under § 101. 
545 F.3d at 958 (citations omitted). 
Such is the case here. Although the wherein 
clauses describe the mental processes used 
to determine the need to change the dosage 
levels of the drugs, each asserted claim as a 
whole is drawn to patentable subject matter. 
Although a physician is not required to 
make any upward or downward adjustment 
in dosage during the "waming" step, the 
prior steps provide useful information for 
possible dosage adjustments to the method 
of treatment using thiopurine drugs for a 
particular subject. Viewing the treatment 
methods as a whole, Prometheus has 
claimed therapeutic methods that determine 
the optimal dosage level for a course of 
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treatment. In other words, when asked the 
critical question, "What did the applicant 
invent?," the answer is a series of 
transformative steps that optimizes efficacy 
and reduces toxicity of a method of 
treatment for particular diseases using 
particular drugs. 
In light of the foregoing analysis, we hold 
that Prometheus's asserted method claims 
satisfy the preemption test as well as the 
. transformation prong of the machine-or 
transformation test. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, We reverse the 
judgment of the district court and remand to 
the court with instructions to deny Mayo's 
motion for summary judgment that the 
asserted claims are invalid under § 101. 
REVERSED and REMANDED 
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"Prometheus: Bound for Clarification or Confusion" 
Farella Braun & Martel 
July 13, 2011 
James W. Morando & Julie Wahlstrand 
On June 20, 201.1, the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari for the second time in 
Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo 
Collaborative Servs., after having already 
granted certiorari last year, vacating and 
remanding to the Federal Circuit for further 
consideration in light of Bilski. The patent 
claims at issue in Prometheus are medical 
method claims directed at administering a 
drug to treat autoimmune disorders, and 
determining whether the metabolite level of 
the drug falls within a range correlated with 
efficacy but not toxicity. 
One could speculate as to why the Supreme 
. Court granted certiorari-and in fact many 
are guessing that it is a second chance at 
some of the same questions presented by 
Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings v. 
Metabolite Laboratories, Inc., where the 
Supreme Court dismissed the writ as 
improvidently granted on procedural 
grounds, and the dissent rendered a 
substantive opinion. However, speculation 
as to the reasons the Supreme Court chose to 
weigh in is likely unproductive, particularly 
after Microsoft v. i4i, where assumptions 
about the Court's purpose for granting 
certiorari did not hold true. 
While it remains to be seen how the high 
Court will handle the issues presented, it is 
clear that the case provides the potential for 
the Court to clarify the patentable subject 
matter analysis, while at the same time 
hopefully avoiding the frequent problem of 
con±1ation between the threshold test for 
patentable subject matter and the separate 
requirement of novelty in patent law. 
Potential for Clarification 
Prometheus will present the Supreme Court 
with an opportunity to clarify the proper 
application of and relationship between the 
"machine-or-transformation" test and the 
"preemption" analysis for determining what 
falls within patentable subject matter under 
35 U.S.C. §101. Are the two tests truly 
separate, or is the machine-or-
transformation test merely a "useful and, 
important clue" to inform the overarching 
preemption test? While the interplay 
between these tests was not fully addressed 
in Bilski, both were addressed in the Federal 
Circuit's decision in Prometheus and are 
also a strong focus of the briefing on petition 
~~rt~~. . 
The Federal Circuit held that Prometheus's 
patent claims satisfied the machlne-or-
transformation test because the steps 
preceding use of the natural correlations 
(between metabolite levels and efficacy or 
toxicity) involve "transformations" of the 
human body (because enzymes transform 
the drug into metabolites whose 
concentrations can be determined). The 
Federal Circuit also held under the. 
preemption test that Prometheus's method 
claims recite a patent-eligible application 
(constituting specific treatment steps) of the 
correlations, and that this application is 
sufficiently limiting so that all uses of the 
naturally occurring correlation are not 
preempted. 
In its certiorari petition, Mayo argued that 
the Federal Circuit got it wrong-that 
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Prometheus's claims monopolize all uses of 
the natural correlations, and fail the 
preemption standard even if specific steps 
and natural "transformations" of body 
chemistry may lead up to those correlations .. 
Addressing the Federal Circuit's treatment 
of the two tests, Mayo's petition argues that 
the "transformations" found by the Federal 
Circuit would only be relevant if they 
impose meaningful limitations on the claims 
such that the claims do not preempt all uses 
of the natural correlation, and that here 
"[t]hose bodily transformations in no way 
limit the uses that may be made of the 
admittedly natural correlations." 
Mayo; s arguments should require the· 
Supreme Court to expand upon Bilski and 
further address the three Supreme Court 
precedents discussed therein (Benson, Flook, 
and Diehr) to clarify the relationship 
betwe~n the preemption standard and the 
machine-or-transformation test. While an 
abstract idea or law of nature cannot be 
patented, the Court has recognized that an 
application may deserve protection if it 
imposes meaningful limits. For example, in 
Benson the Court stated, in· reversing the 
court below, that "The mathematical 
formula involved here has no substantial 
practical application except in connection 
with a digital computer, which means that if 
the jUdgment below is affirmed, the patent 
would wholly pre-empt the mathematical 
formula and in practical effect would be a 
patent on the algorithm itself." Thus, in 
Benson, tethering the claim to an application 
using a digital computer did not reduce the 
preemptive footprint of the claim because it 
did not provide meaningful lImits. Mayo's 
petition attempts to draw parallels to 
. Benson, noting that the transformation steps· 
recited provide no meaningful limitation 
because there is no utility for the correlation 
outside an application involving the human 
body. 
Mayo will also seek to rely on Flook, where 
the applicant attempted to patent a procedure 
for monitoring the conditions during the 
catalytic conversion process in the 
petrochemical and oil-refining industries. In 
Flook, the only innovation was reliance on a 
mathematical algorithm, and the Court 
"rejected '[t]he notion that post-solution 
activity, no matter how conventional or 
obvious in itself, can transform an 
unpatentable principle into a patentable 
process," concluding that "the process at 
issue there was 'unpatentable under § 101, 
not because it contain[ ed] a mathematical 
algorithm as one component, but because 
once that algorithm [wa]s assumed to be 
within the prior art, the application, 
considered as a whole, contain [ ed] no 
patentable invention. ", 
Mayo will seek to distinguish Diehr, also 
discussed in Bilski, where the patent at issue 
claimed a method for molding uncured 
synthetic rubber into cured precision 
products, using a mathematical formula to 
complete some of its steps using a computer. 
The Court in Diehr concluded that the claim 
fell within patentable subject matter because 
it was not an attempt to patent a 
mathematical formula, but instead a patent 
on the process of curing synthetic rubber 
that did not preempt all uses of the formula: 
"Their process admittedly employs a well-
known mathematical equation, but they do 
not seek to pre-empt the use of that 
equation. Rather, they seek only to 
foreclose from others the use of that 
equation in conjunction with all of the other 
steps in their claimed process .... " 
The central policy behind § 101 is to prevent 
monopoly over natural phenomena or 
abstract ideas and keep these dedicated to 
the public domain. It is this concem with 
over-breadth that is at the heart of the § 101 
inquiry, and drives the requirement that the 
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patentee tether the abstract idea or natural 
phenomenon toa real-world application that 
limits the scope of the claims. It therefore 
makes sense that the preemption analysis, 
which focuses directly on this over-breadth 
concern, should be the dominant analysis, 
and that the machine-or-transformation test 
is relevant only to the extent it informs the 
overarching preemption analysis by 
providing limitations on claims involving 
abstract ideas or natural phenomena. This 
use of the machine-or-transformation test to 
determine whether the claims are 
sufficiently limited so as to not monopolize 
all uses of a natural phenomenon is also 
consistent with the Court's statement· in 
Bilski that the machine-or-transformation 
inquiry, while not the sole test, serves as a 
"useful and important clue" to detennine 
whether a claimed invention is a patent-
eligible process. 
The application of these analyses and the 
interplay between them as applied to 
particular facts remain unclear and present 
difficult issues for the lower courts. The 
decision in Prometheus has the potential to 
provide welcome clarification regarding the 
relationship between the preemption and 
"machine-or-transformation" tests following 
Bilski. 
Potential for Confusion 
Prometheus is also impOliant because it 
presents the potential for confusion between 
the threshold patentable subject matter 
analysis under § 101 and the novelty 
analysis under §§ 102 and 103. As Justice 
Kennedy stated in Bilski, the § 101 patent-
eligibility inquiry is a threshold condition on 
patentability separate from novelty and 
nonobviousness. Similarly, as former Chief 
Judge Michel noted in the Federal Circuit 
Bilski opinion, "Congress did not intend the 
'new and useful' language of § 101 to 
constitute. an independent requirement of 
novelty or non-obviousness distinct from the 
more specific and detailed requirements of 
§§ 102 and 103, respectively. . .. [I]t is 
irrelevant to the §. 101 analysis whether 
Applicants' claimed process is novel or non-
obvious." 
There is no doubt, however, that the issues 
of patentable subject matter and novelty are 
easily and frequently confused. Indeed, the 
question presented in Prometheus highlights 
this potential for confusion as it appears to 
conflate the threshold test for patentable 
subject matter under § 101 with what should 
be the separate requirement of novelty: 
"Whether· 35 U.S.C. § 101· is 
satisfied by a patent claim that 
covers observed correlations 
between blood test results and 
patient health, so that the· claim 
effectively preempts all uses of the 
naturally occurring correlations, 
simply because well-known methods 
used to administer prescription drugs 
and test blood may involve 
'transformations' of body 
chemistry." (emphasis added). 
Notably; some of the Supreme Court's own 
precedents, including Flook, contribute to 
the potential for confusion between the 
novelty and patentable subject matter 
analyses. For instance, Flook states that 
because the "algorithm [wa]s assumed to be 
within the prior art, the application, 
considered as. a whole, contain [ ed] no 
patentable invention." Comparison of the 
patent claims to the prior art, however, is 
generally the purview of the novelty 
analysis, not patentable subject matter. 
Admittedly, the preemption analysis invites 
a cursory, and likely necessary, inquiry into 
how commonplace the use of an application 
is, to determine whether that application 
provides sufficient limitation to avoid 
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preemption. That is, if the real-world 
application of an abstract idea is so 
widespread that it effectively provides no 
real limitation, such as the use of the 
computer in Benson, then all uses are 
preempted. Mayo argues along these lines 
that "those steps [relied upon by the Federal 
Circuit in upholding the patent]· are well-
known, are performed every day by 
countless medical personnel, and owe 
nothing at all to Prometheus" and thus that 
the recited steps provide no limitation to a 
monopoly on the natural con-elation. 
. However, Mayo's arguments extend beyond 
this inquiry regarding limitation and go 
further to question the level of innovation, 
which unquestionably invites further 
confusion. In: its petition for certiorari, Mayo 
argues that the steps needed to elicit the 
con-elation, which the Federal Circuit found 
. to be transformative, are not innovative: 
"But these steps are simply the 
administratiori of the drug and the 
measurement of metabolite levels, 
both of which had been known in 
the art for decades. This was enough 
for the Federal Circuit to find patent-
eligibility for a process that~far 
from constituting any innovation-
is nothing more than the body's 
natural reaction to the ingestion of 
drugs, and a mental recognition of 
that natural reaction." 
Prometheus points out the potential for 
confusion in its opposition to the petition, 
stating, "Mayo and its amici repeatedly try 
to import novelty analysis into § 1 0 1 by 
arguing that the physical, transformative 
steps of the patents should be disregarded 
because those steps were previously well 
known in the art-and that without those 
steps all that remains is a mental step." 
Prometheus thus poses an important 
question, which if left unanswered will lead 
to further confusion, and if answered 
without clarity could lead to further 
conflation of the doctrines: Does the specific 
application merely have to be limiting so as 
to avoid preemption,. or does it also need to 
be novel, and non-obvious in order to 
constitute eligible patentable subject matter, 
so that it is not merely "post-solution 
activity"? Hopefully the Supreme Court will 
not succumb to the invitation to conflate the 
two questions and will instead answer this 
question so as to avoid further confusion. 
It is difficult to know why the Supreme 
Court granted certiorari in Prometheus. 
However, the potential for the Court to 
answer critical questions about the 
inten-elationship of the tests for patentable 
subject matter, and to either avoid further 
conflation or add to the confusion of the 
separate § 101 and novelty inquiries, means 
this opinion will be one to watch for. 
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"Major Ruling for Doctors Due" 
SCOTUSblog 
June 20, 2011 
Lyle Denniston 
Six years after stepping into a major legal 
controversy over doctors' medical diagnoses 
of how their patients react to varying drug 
doses, but then· finding itself unable to 
decide, the Supreme Court agreed on 
Monday to try again. It granted review, with 
the decision to come in its next Term, on the 
scope of patent rights for a system of 
analyzing such patient reactions. The 
famous Mayo Clinic and its affiliated 
organizations brought the issue back to the 
Court, a year after the Justices ordered a 
lower court to take a new look at the issue. 
At the center of the Mayo appeal is its claim 
that no . patent should be issued on 
observations of how varying a dosage of a 
medicine alters the way a patient reacts. 
Those kinds of observations are what 
doctors do routinely, the Mayo group has 
contended, and bottling up that process in 
someone's exclusive patent rights would 
stifle normal medical practice, and force 
doctors to spend time looking in legal files 
to see if they are infringing. 
The Circuit Court for the Federal Circuit-
the nation's leading tribunal on patent 
rights-has twice upheld diagnostic method 
patents owned by Prometheus Laboratories, 
Inc., a company that makes medicines and 
devises diagnostic techniques. It has patents 
covering a process for analyzing blood tests 
to determine whether certain biological 
measures rise or fall, depending· upon the 
amount of a drug the patient has been given. 
The claimed invention involves measuring 
the effects of synthetic drugs that are used to 
treat so-called autoimmune diseases-that 
is, disorders in which the body's self-
protective capacity reacts to something 
occurring naturally in the body, as if it were 
an adversary that had to be attacked. The 
drugs suppress that immune response. 
Doctors are said to have difficulty 
determining just how much of such a 
synthetic drug to give a patient, because 
patients' metabolism varies. So the doctor 
will prescribe varying dosages of a drug for 
suppressing an immune response, and then 
analyze blood tests to determine whether the 
dosage is too strong, or not strong enough. 
Prometheus's patents involve a method that 
aids doctors in performing this kind of 
treatment analysis. It has prepared test kits 
for doctors who use the method. 
Prometheus sued the Mayo Clinic and its 
affiliates, contending that they were using 
the kits in violation of Prometheus's patent 
rights. Mayo at one point had a plan to 
produce its own kits, but, after being sued 
for infringement, it held off. Prometheus 
ultimately won in the Circuit Court, in a 
finding that the company's invention had 
satisfied that court's "machine-or-
transformation" test for patent eligibility. 
The Mayo group failed in that court on its 
argument that the test was nothing more 
than· observing a natural phenomenon-
something that, ordinarily, is not patentable. 
The legal fight between Prometheus and the 
Mayo group Was an echo of an earlier fight 
that had reached the Supreme Court, 
between Laboratory Corp. of America and 
Metabolite Laboratories, involving a similar 
dispute . over a method patent involving 
analysis of patient reactions. The Supreme 
Court agreed to hear that case in 2005, but 
the case ultimately was turned aside without 
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a decision, because of a question of whether 
the legal issue had been kept alive. Three 
Justices (Justice Stephen G. Breyer and two 
Justices no longer on the Court) dissented, 
arguing that the case rais.ed a major issue 
over whether eligibility for patents on such 
diagnostic methods might inhibit doctors' 
use of their own medical judgment in 
treating patients. 
After Mayo had lost to Prometheus in a 
closely similar dispute in the Federal Circuit 
in 2009, it took its. case to the Supreme 
Court. After the Court had ruled in Bilski v. 
Kappas in June last year, overturning the 
Circuit Court's singular reliance on the 
machine-or-transformation test of patent 
eligibility, the Justices sent the Mayo case 
back to that tribunal for a second look. 
That resulted in a new decision, once again 
upholding Prometheus's patents. The 
Circuit Court said that the patents were valid 
as a form of transformation, since the test 
measured the change in the body chemistry 
of a patient after being given varying 
dosages of immune-suppressing drugs. 
* * * 
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"Clinical Method Claims Dodge a Bullet: 
Prometheus v. Mayo" 
Mondaq Blog 
December 27,2010 
Mr. James Mullen III, Ph.D., Matthew I. Kreeger & Yan Leychkis 
On December 17, 2010, the U.S. Court of 
. Appeals for the Federal Circuit confirmed 
that claims to clinical and diagnostic 
methods can constitute patent-eligible 
subject matter in its Prometheus II decision. 
This was one of the first Federal Circuit 
opinions applying the recent United States 
Supreme Court Bilski case, which 
interpreted the statutory requirements for 
patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101. In 
Prometheus II, the Federal Circuit 
essentially reaffirmed its' earlier decision in 
Prometheus I, holding that the claims recite 
a patent-eligible application of naturally 
occurring correlations and do not wholly 
preempt all uses. of such correlations. 
Prometheus II clarifies that after Bilski, 
clinical· and diagnostic methods can still be 
patented. 
LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The scope of patentable subject matter is 
broadly outlined in Section 101 of the Patent 
Act, which states that "[w]hoever invents or 
discovers any new and useful process, 
machine, manufacture, or composition of 
matter, or any new and useful improvement 
thereof, may obtain a patent therefore, 
subject to the conditions and requitements of 
this title." However, the Supreme Court has 
specified three categorical exceptions to the 
broad principles of Section 101: "laws of 
nature, physical phenomena, and abstract 
ideas." The Federal Circuit attempted to 
construct a bright-line rule, commonly 
referred to as the "machine-or-
transformation" test. Under this test, a 
process claim satisfies Section 1 0 1 by 
showing that the "claim is tied to a particular 
machine," or the "claim transforms an 
article into a different state or thing." 
Although the Supreme Court regarded it as . 
an "important clue or investigative tool" for 
establishing patentability, it rejected this test 
as the exclusive test for determining a 
patent-eligible subject matter because such 
interpretation unduly limits the statute. 
PROMETHEUS I 
Prometheus sued Mayo for infringement of 
U.S. Patents 6,355,623 and 6,680,302. The 
claims at issue are directed to methods of 
optimizing therapeutic efficacy for treatment 
of· immune-mediated gastrointestinal 
disorders by a process of administering a 
drug to a patient, measuring the level of a 
metabolite of the drug in the patient 
following administration of the drug, and 
comparing the level of the metabolite to 
recited threshold values to determine 
whether the drug's dosage needs to be 
adjusted. 
The district court held the claims 
unpatentable under Section 101.8. The 
Federal Circuit reversed, holding that the 
claims-in-suit pass the machine-or-
transformation test. Mayo filed a petition for 
a writ certiorari, arguing that the Federal 
Circuit'.s reliance on the machine-or-
transformation test as the "single 
determinant" of patentability conflicts with 
the Supreme Court's preemptIon standard 
and reiterating its argument that 
Prometheus's claims effectively preempt 
any correlations between metabolite levels 
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and efficacy or toxicity. The Supreme Court 
granted certiorari, vacated [the] Prometheus 
1 decision and remanded the case to the 
Federal Circuit for reconsideration in light 
of Bilski. 
PROMETHEUS II 
On remand, the Federal Circuit reviewed the 
district court's grant of summary judgment 
de novo and again sided with Prometheus. In 
light of the Supreme Court's decision in 
Bilski, the Federal Circuit framed the issue 
as "whether Prometheus's asserted claims 
are drawn to a natural phenomenon, the 
patenting of which would entirely· preempt 
its use as in Benson and Flook, or whether 
the claims are drawn only to a particular 
application of that phenomenon as in 
Diehr." The Federal Circuit concluded that 
they are drawn to the latter. 
The Federal Circuit rejected Mayo's 
position that the Supreme Court's decision 
to grant review, vacate the Prometheus 1 
decision, and remand in view of Bilski 
("GVR Order") indicates that preemption 
should be used as the controlling standard 
for Section 101 instead of the machine-or-
transforniation test. The court stated that 
"[n]either the Supreme Court's GVR Order 
[n]or the Court's Bilski decision dictates a 
wholly different analysis or a different result 
on remand." The Federal Circuit further 
noted that "[t]he Supreme Court's decision· 
in Bilski did not undermine our preemption 
analysis of Prometheus's claims and it 
rejected the machine-or-transformation test 
only as a definitive test." 
As in Prometheus 1, the Federal Circuit in 
Prometheus 11 noted that "Prometheus's 
asserted method claims recite a patent 
eligible application of naturally occurring 
correlations between metabolite levels and. 
efficacy or toxicity, and thus do not wholly 
preempt all uses of the recited correlations." 
The court explained that "[t]he steps recite 
specific treatment steps, not just the 
correlations themselves," and "involve a 
particular application of the natural 
correlations: the treatment of a specific 
disease by administering specific drugs and 
measuring specific metabolites." 
The Federal Circuit also reaffirmed that "the 
treatment methods claimed in Prometheus's 
patents in suit satisfy the transformation 
prong of the machine-or-transformation test, 
as they 'transform an article into a different 
state or thing,' and the transformation is 
'central to the purpose of the claimed 
process. ", The court noted that the asserted 
treatment methods are always transformative 
when a drug is administered to ameliorate an 
undesired condition. While the court 
recognized that the transformation of the 
drug upon administration occurs according 
to natural processes, it emphasized that the 
act· of drug admini$tration itself is not a 
natural process. . Consequently, the 
administration step . is not merely data 
gathering but rather a transformative 
element of the claimed methods. 
Additionally, the. Federal Circuit held that 
the determining step, present in each of the 
asselied claims, is transformative and central 
to the claimed methods. This step 
necessarily entails some form of 
manipulation to extract the metabolites from 
a bodily sample and determine their. 
concentration. The court noted that "[w]hile 
it is. true that the administering and 
determining steps gather useful data, it is 
also clear that the presence of those two 
steps in the claimed processes is not 
'merely' for the purpose of gathering data." 
Because both steps are integral to the 
treatment protocol, they a transformative 
and central to the claimed methods. 
Last, the Federal Circuit reiterated that the 
inclusion of a mental step does· not destroy 
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the patentability of an otherwise patentable 
process claim. While agreeing with the 
district court that the final "wherein" clauses 
in Prometheus's asserted claims are mental 
steps, the Federal Circuit stressed that "[a] 
subsequent mental step does not, by itself, 
negate the trans formative nature of prior 
steps." Because the administering and 
determining steps fall. squarely within the 
realm . of patentable subject matter, the 
mental steps that follow fail to remove the 
asserted claims as a whole from that realm. 
The Federal Circuit thus concluded that 
Prometheus's asselied methods satisfy the 
preemption test as well as the transformation 
prong of the machine-or-transformation test. 
CONCLUSION 
The Prometheus II decision confil'1J1s that 
inventions that satisfy the machine-or-
transformation test will continue to fare well 
in the post-Bilski world. Moreover, 
Prometheus II indicates that the purpose of a 
claimed method is central to patentability 
analysis, suggesting that claims· directed, at 
least in part, to methods of therapeutic 
treatment may have an easier time passing 
muster under Section 101 than claims 
. directed to purely diagnostic techniques. 
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"Court Backs Patents for Diagnostic Tests" 
New York Times Prescriptions Blog 
December 17, 2010 
Andrew Pollack 
Diagnostic tests used to determine whether a 
patient is getting the proper dose of a 
medicine can be patented, an appeals court 
ruled Friday in a closely watched decision. 
The ruling is important to the emerging field 
of personalized· medicine, which involves 
using tests-such as of a person's genes or 
levels of chemicals in the bloodstream-to 
help predict whether a drug will be safe and 
effective for a particular patient. 
But one question hanging over the field has 
been whether tests that correlate something 
in the body with a drug's effectiveness and 
safety are mere observations of natural 
phenomena and therefore ineligible for 
patents. 
The ruling Friday of the Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit in Washington, which 
upheld patents owned by Prometheus 
Laboratories, would be good for companies 
wanting to develop and patent such so-called 
companion diagnostic tests. 
"This decision will be welcomed by those 
working in the personalized medicine arena, 
which holds much promise for improving 
both the clinical efficacy and cost-efficiency 
of therapeutic treatments," Courtenay 
Brinckerhoff, a Washington patent lawyer 
who was not involved in the case, said in an 
e-mail. 
But the decision might be disliked by those 
who think patents on tests raise costs and 
impede medical progress. 
The decision could bode well for Myriad 
Genetics. The same appeals court, which 
specializes in patent cases, will hear its 
appeal of a lower court decision that 
invalidated patents on the company's 
genetic test, which analyzes gene mutations 
to predic;t whether a woman has a high risk 
of breast cancer. 
Prometheus, based in San Diego, sells a test 
that helps determine the safest and most 
effective doses of a particular class of drugs 
used to treat inflammatory qowel diseases. 
The drugs are broken down naturally in the 
body into other chemicals, and Prometheus's 
test involves measuring the levels of those 
chemicals in the blood. If the concentration 
is above a certain level, the dose of the drug 
should be reduced to avoid side effects. If 
the concentration is below a certain level, 
the drug dose should be increased. 
prometheus sued the Mayo Clinic, which 
wanted to offer a competing test in its 
laboratory. A lower court in 2008 agreed 
with Mayo that Prometheus's patents were 
invalid because the test involved merely 
gathering data. and observing natural 
phenomena. 
But the appeals court has now reversed that 
decision, saying that the test involved the 
application of a law of nature, not the law 
itself. The patent . claims "do not encompass 
laws of nature or pre-empt natural 
phenomena," Judge Alan D. Lourie wrote 
on behalf of a three-judge panel. 
The judges ruled that Prometheus's tests met 
the court's "machine-or-transforination" 
standard-that something was patentable if 
it was tied to a particular machine or 
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involved the transformation of something 
into something else. In this case, the judges 
said, the transformation is of the drug into 
its metabolites in the body and of the body 
itself once it is given the drug. 
"The asserted claims are in effect claims to a 
method of treatment, which are always 
transformative when one of a defined group 
of drugs is administered to the body to 
ameliorate the effects of an undesired 
condition," Judge Lourie wrote. 
This is the second time the appeals court has 
ruled in this case and it has reached the same 
conclusion both times. 
The first decision was vacated in June by the 
Supreme Court, when it issued a ruling in 
the so-called Bilski case covering whether 
methods of doing business could be 
. patented. As pali of that decision, the 
Supreme Court said that the machine-or-
transformation test should not be the sole 
test used to detennine patentability. And it 
asked the appeals court to re-eXalmne its 
Prometheus decision. 
But the appeals court said Friday that while 
. the machine-or-transformation test might no 
longer be the exclusive test of patentability, 
it could still be used. 
The case involving Myriad Genetics has 
attracted a lot of attention mainly because a 
district judge ruled in March that genes 
isolated from human chromosomes cannot 
be patented. . 
But the judge, Robert W. Sweet, also said 
that that the analysis of the genes to see if a 
woman had a high risk of breast cancer 
could not be patented because it was an 
abstract mental process. 
The Prometheus decision could bear on that 
second part of the Myriad case. However, in 
making his ruling, Judge Sweet took pains to 
differentiate Myriad's test from that of 
Prometheus. 
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Caraco Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk AlS 
10-844 
Ruling Below: Novo Nordisk AlS v. Caraeo Pharm. Laboratories, Ltd., 601 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 
2010) eert. granted, 10-844,2011 WL 2518831 (U.S. June 27,2011). 
In 2005, Caraco Pharmecutial Laboratories sought to market a generic version of Novo's 
diabetes treatment drug, Prandin. Caraco attempted to utilize the FDA's abbreviated new drug 
application for doing so .. This program expedites the approval process if generic manufacturers 
can show their proposed drug is bio-equivalent to a drug that has already received approval. If 
approved, the generic drug will be required to carry the same label as the brand-name version. 
Additionally, the accelerated program allows for generic manufacturers to assert they intend to 
market their drug for a non-patented usage, or a "carve-out." If their carve-out is approved, 
generic manufactures can remove the portions of the label that do not apply to the use for which 
they intend to market their drug. 
In response to Caraco's intent to produce a generic version of Prandin, Novo brought a patent 
infringement claim. Caraco counterclaimed under the Hatch-Waxman Act, asserting their intent 
to seek a carve-out that would avoid what would otherwise be an infringement. Around this time, 
Novo amended its patent information on file with the FDA, broadening the use code associated 
with Novo's patents and resulting in the denial of Caraco's carve-out application. Caraco argues 
Novo's new. use code is overbroad and suggests that Novo holds patents for all three FDA-
approved uses of the drug when in fact itholds a patent for only one. 
Questions Presented: Whether the counterclaim provision of the Hatch-Waxman Act applies 
when (1) there is "an approved method of using the drug" that "the patent does not claim," and 
(2) the brand submits "patent information" to the FDA that misstates the patent's scope, 
requiring "correct[ion]." 
NOVO NORDISK AlS and Novo Nordisk, Inc., Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
v. 
CARACO PHARMACEUTICAL LABORATORIES, LTD., and Sun Pharmaceutical 
Industries, Ltd., Defendants-Appellees. 
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
April 14,2010 
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted:] 
Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge 
RADER. Concurl:ing opinion filed by 
Circuit Judge CLEVENGER. Dissenting 
opinion filed by Circuit Judge DYK. 
The United States D'istrict Court for the . 
Eastem District of Michigan entered an 
injunction directing Novo Nordisk AlS and 
Novo Nordisk, Inc. (collectively, "Novo") to 
409 
request the u.s. Food and Drug 
Administration '("FDA") to replace Novo's 
patent use code U-968 listing for Prandin® 
in the Orange Book with the former U-546 
listing. Because Caraco Pharmaceutical 
Laboratories, Ltd. ("Caraco") does not have 
a statutory basis to assert a counterclaim 
requesting such injunctive relief, this court 
reverses and vacates the injunction. 
1. 
This case arises under the Drug Price 
Competition and Patent Term Restoration 
Act of 1984, Pub.L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 
1585 (1984) (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 355, 
360cc; 35 U.S.C. §§ 156, 271), as amended 
by the Medicare Prescription Drug 
Improvement and Modernization Act of 
2003, Pub.L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat.2066 
(2003) (collectively, the "Hatch-Waxman 
Act"). The Hatch~Waxinan Act strikes a 
balance between two potentially competing 
policy interests-· inducing pioneering 
development of pharmaceutical formulations 
and methods and facilitating efficient 
transition to a market with low-cost, generic 
copies of those pioneering inventions at the 
close of a patent term. 
Title 21 prohibits sale of a new drug without 
FDA approval. To obtain that approval, a 
pioneering manufacturer must file a new 
drug application ("NDA"), containing 
clinical studies of the drug's safety and 
efficacy. As part of the NDA process, the 
manufacturer must also identify all patents 
that claim the drug or a method of use: 
The applicant shall file with the 
application the patent number and 
the expiration date of any patent 
which claims the drug for which the 
applicant submitted the application 
or which claims a method of using 
such drug and with respect to which 
a claim of patent infringement could 
reasonably be asserted if a person not 
licensed by the owner engaged in the 
manufacture, use, or sale of the drug. 
21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)(G) (emphases added). 
If the patent information described 
in subsection (b) of this section could 
not be filed with the submission of 
an application under subsection (b) 
of this section . . . ~ the holder of an 
approved application shall file with 
the Secretary the patent number and 
the expiration date of any patent 
which claims the drug for which the 
application was submitted or which 
claims a method of using such drug 
apd with respect to which a claim of 
patent infringement could reasonably 
be asserted if a person not licensed 
by the owner engaged in the 
manufacture, use, or sale of the drug. 
21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(2) (emphases added). 
The FDA has authority to promulgate 
regulations for the efficient enforcement of 
. these provisions. Under. those regulations, a 
pioneering manufacturer files with the FDA 
the patent number and the expiration date of 
any applicable patents by submitting Form 
3542a ("Patent Information Submitted with 
the Filing of an NDA, Amendment, or 
Supplement") or Form 3542 ("Patent 
Information Submitted Upon and After 
Approval of an NDA or Supplement"). If the 
patent claims one or more methods of using 
the NDA drug,· Forms 3542a and 3542 
require a description of each of those 
processes. This description is commonly 
known as the "use code narrative." The FDA 
assigns a unique number, known as a "use 
code," to each description. The FDA 
publishes a list of drugs, along with the 
applicable patents and their associated use 
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codes, in its Approved Drug Products With 
Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations, 
corrimonly known as the "Orange Book." 
A· manufacturer that seeks to market a 
generic copy of these listed drugs may 
submit an abbreviated new drug application 
("ANDA"). The ANDA process streamlines 
FDA approval by allowing the generic 
manufacturer to rely on the safety and 
efficacy studies of a drug already listed in 
the Orange Book upon a showing of 
bioequivalence. 
As part of the ANDA process, a generic 
manufacturer must make a certification 
addressing each patent identified in the 
Orange Book pertaining to its drug. 
Specifically, the generic manufacturer must 
select one of four alternatives [(Paragraph 
Notifications)] permitting use of the 
patented product or process: (I) no such 
patent information has been submitted to the 
FDA; (II) the patent has expired; (III) the 
patent is set to expire on a certain date; or 
(IV) the patent is invalid or will not be 
infringed by the manufacture, use, or sale of 
the generic drug. . 
Often pharmaceutical formulations have 
multiple uses and applications. After 
expiration of the patent on the composition 
itself, only some of those uses may enjoy 
continued protection as patented methods. If 
a generic manufacturer wishes to seek FDA 
approval for a use not covered by a method-
of-use patent for a listed drug, it must make 
a "section viii statement." 21 U.S.C. § 
355G)(2)(A)(viii). Along with the section 
viii statement, the generic manufacturer 
must submit a proposed label to the FDA 
that does not contain the patented method of 
using the listed drug. When considering 
approval of these requests for a use not 
covered by a patent, the FDA relies on the 
applicable patent's use code narrative to 
determine the scope of the patented method. 
The FDA approves the section viii statement 
only where there is no overlap between the 
proposed carve-out label submitted by the 
generic manufacturer and the use code 
narrative submitted by the pioneering 
manufacturer. 
The Hatch-Waxman Act facilitates early 
resolution. of disputes between pioneering 
and generic manufacturers. To achieve this 
objective, the Act makes a Paragraph IV 
certification into an act of patent 
infringement. A generic manufacturer that 
files a Paragraph IV certification must give 
notice to the patentee and the NDA holder 
and provide a detailed basis for its belief that 
the patent is invalid or not infringed. The 
patentee then has forty-five days to sue the 
generic manufacturer for infringement. Ifthe 
patentee does not sue, the FDA may approve 
the ANDA. If the patentee sues, the FDA 
may not approve the ANDA until expiration 
of the patent, resolution of the suit, or thirty 
months after the patentee's receipt of notice, 
whichever is earlier. The court entertaining 
this suit has discretion to order a shorter or 
longer stay if "either party to the action 
fail[s] to reasonably cooperate in expediting 
the action." 
The Hatch-Waxman Act enables a generic 
manufacturer in a Paragraph IV suit to assert 
a counterclaim challenging the accuracy of 
the "patent information" submitted to the 
FDA:. 
[The ANDA] applicant may assert a 
counterclaim seeking an order 
requiring the holder to correct or 
delete the patent information 
submitted by the holder under 
. subsection (b) or ( c) of this section 
on the ground that the patent does 
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not claim either-
(aa) the drug for which the· 
application was approved; or 
(bb) an approved method of using 
the drug. 
21 U.S.C. § 355G)(5)(C)(ii)(I). 
This counterclaim provision was not part of 
the original Hatch-Waxman Act. Rather the 
Medicare Prescription Drug Improvement 
and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub.L. No. 
108-173, 117 Stat.2066 (2003) added this 
counterclaim provision to permit challenges 
to patent information at the FDA. The 
interpretation of this counterclaim provision 
is the central issue in this case. 
II. 
Novo markets and distributes the drug 
repaglinide under the brand name 
PRANDIN. PRANDIN is an adjunct to diet 
and exercise to improve glycemic control in 
adults with type 2 diabetes (non-insulin 
dependent diabetes mellitus). The FDA has 
approved PRANDIN for three uses: (1) 
repaglinide by itself (i.e., monotherapy); (2) 
repaglinide in combination with metformin; 
and (3) repaglinide in combination with 
thiaiolidinediones ("TZDs"). Novo Nordisk, 
Inc. holds the approved NDA for 
PRANDIN. 
The Orange Book lists two patents for 
PRANDIN. U.S. Patent No. RE 37,035 (the 
"'035 patent") claims, inter alia, the 
chemical composition of repaglinide. The 
'035 patent expired on March 14,2009. U.S. 
Patent No. 6,677,358 (th85'8 patent") 
claims, inter alia, repaglinide In 
combination with metformin: 
A m~thod for treating non-insulin 
dependent diabetes mellitus 
(NIDDM) comprising administering 
to a patient in need of such treatment 
repaglinide in combination with 
metformin. 
'358 patent, claim 4. 
The '358 patent expires on June 12, 2018. 
Novo Nordisk AlS owns the '358 patent. 
Novo does not own patents claiming the 
other two approved methods of using 
repaglinide to treat type 2 diabetes. The 
FDA initially assigned the '358 patent the 
use code "U-546-Use of repaglinide in 
combination with metformin to lower blood 
glucose." 
On February 9, 2005, Caraco filed an 
ANDA for the drug repaglinide. The ANDA 
initially contained a Paragraph III 
certification for the 035 patent and a 
Paragraph IV certification for' the 358 
patent. On June 9, 2005, Novo initiated an 
infringement action against Caraco. In April' 
2008, Caraco stipulated that its ANDA 
would infringe the' 358 patent if it included 
a label that discussed the combination of 
repaglinide and metformin. At around the 
same time, Caraco' submitted an amended 
ANDA with a Paragraph IV certification for 
the' 358 patent and a section viii statement 
declaring that Caraco was not seeking 
approval for the repaglinide-metformin 
combination therapy. The FDA indicated 
that it would approve Caraco's proposed 
carve-out label. Novo moved for 
reconsideration on the ground that allowing 
the carve-out would render the drug less safe 
and effective. 
On May 6, 2009, Novo submitted an 
amended Form 3542 for PRANDIN in 
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which Novo updated its use code narrative 
for the' 358 patent. The FDA removed the 
use code U-546 from the Orange Book for 
PRANDIN and substituted the new use code 
"U-968-A method for improving glycemic 
control in adults with type 2 diabetes 
mellitus." The FDA then denied Novo's 
request for reconsideration as moot in light 
of the new use code. According to the FDA, 
the factual predicate on which the FDA's 
permissive carve-out determination had 
rested no longer applied. The FDA then 
disallowed Caraco' s section viii statement, 
because its proposed carve-out label 
overlapped with the use code U-968 for the 
'358 patent. As a result, Caraco' s CUlTent 
label now includes the repaglinide-
metformin combination therapy, which is 
stipulated to infringe claim 4 of 'the 358 
patent. 
On June 11, 2009, Caraco amended its 
answer and counterclaim. Caraco added a 
counterclaim under 21 U.S.C. § 
355(j)(5)(C)(ii), requesting an order 
requiring Novo to change the use code for 
the '358 patent in reference to PRANDIN 
from U-968 to U-546. Caraco claimed that 
the use code U-968 was overbroad because 
it incorrectly suggested that tM358 patent 
covered all three approved methods of using 
repaglinide even though it claimed only one 
approved method. Caraco also added a 
patent misuse defense, asserting that Novo 
misrepresented the scope of the358 patent 
in its use code narrative. 
On June 29, 2009, Novo moved to dismiss 
Caraco's new counterclaim and to strike the 
patent misuse defense. The district court 
denied Novo's motions. Caraco then moved 
for summary· judgment on both the new 
counterclaim and the patent misuse defense. 
On summary judgment, the district court 
granted Caraco' s motion on the 
counterclaim and declined to address the 
patent misuse defense. The district court 
found that Novo had improperly filed an 
overbroad use code narrative for the' 358 
. patent. On September 25, 2009, the district 
court entered the following injunction: 
Novo Nordisk is hereby directed by 
mandatory injunction under 21 
U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(C)(ii)(1)(bb) to 
COlTect within twenty (20) days from 
the date of this Order and Injunction 
its inaccurate description of thd358 
patent by submitting to FDA an 
amended Form FDA. 3542 that 
reinstates its former U-546 listing for 
Prandin and describes claim 4 of the 
358 patent in section 4.2b as 
covering the "use of repaglinide in 
combination with metformin to 
lower blood glucose." 
Novo NOl'disk AlS v. Caraco Pharm. Labs., 
Ltd., 656 F.Supp.2d 729, 730 (E.D.Mich. 
2009). 
Given the urgency of Novo's situation, 
Novo filed a motion in this court for an 
expedited appeal from the district court's 
order. This court granted Novo's motion to 
expedite briefing. Novo also filed a motion 
for a stay of the injunction pending appeal 
and a stay of trial court proceedings. This 
court ordered a stay of the injunction 
pending disposition of this appeal but 
declined to stay trial court proceedings. 
Because the district court had jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1338(e), this 
court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1292(c)(1). 
III. 
[The Court stated that the standard of review 
is generally abuse of discretion but no 
deference is given to lower court's statutory 
construction. ] 
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IV. 
The Hatch-Waxman Act provides a limited 
counterclaim to a generic manufacturer in a 
Paragraph IV infringement action. The Act 
authorizes the generic manufacturer to assert 
a counterclaim "on the ground that the 
patent does not claim either (aa) the drugfor 
which the application was approved; or (bb) 
an approved method of using the drug." 
Novo and Caraco agree that tM 358 patent 
claims only one of the tlu'ee approved 
methods of using PRANDIN (i.e., 
repaglinide in combination with metformin). 
Novo. asserts that the counterclaim is 
available only if tHe 358 patent does not 
claim any approved methods. Caraco argues 
that it is entitled to the counterclaim because 
the' 358 patent does not claim two of the 
approved methods of PRANDIN use. In 
other words, Novo reads "an approved 
method" in the counterclaim statute as "any 
approved method" while Caraco reads it as 
"all approved methods." 
This court detects no ambiguity in the 
statutory language. When an indefinite 
article is preceded and qualified by a 
negative, standard grammar generally 
provides that "a" means "any." 
The rest of the counterclaim provision also 
does not support Caraco' s interpretation. In 
the context of this case, the statutory 
language "an approved method of using the 
drug" refers to the approved methods of 
using the listed drug, PRANDIN. This 
language cannot refer to the methods of 
using Caraco' s . generic drug, because the 
FDA has not yet approved Caraco's ANDA. 
Therefore, the Hatch-Waxman Act 
authorizes a counterclaim only if the listed 
patent does not claim any approved methods 
of using the listed drug. 
Although the statutory language on its face 
presents no ambiguities, this court 
nonetheless examines the legislative history 
to make sure that it does not contain any 
clear intent to the contrary. Before the 
amendment to the Hatch-Waxman Act in 
2003, private litigants could not challenge 
FDA submissions at all. Novo and Caraco 
agree that the counterclaim provision 
responded to this court's decision in Mylan 
Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson, 268 F.3d 1323 
(Fed.Cir.2002). In Mylan, the Orange Book 
listed a patent as covering the FDA-
approved drug BuSpar. Mylan, a generic 
manufacturer, asselied that the patent "did 
not claim BuSpar or an approved method of 
using BuSpar." This court held that Mylan 
did not have a private cause of action to 
delist the allegedly irrelevant patent from the 
Orange Book. The 2003 amendment used 
exact language from Mylan in the new 
counterclaim provision. This choice of 
legislative language suggests that the 2003 
Amendment sought to correct the specific 
issue raised in Mylan, i.e., to deter 
pioneering manufacturers from listing 
patents that were not related at all to the 
patented product or method. Thus, the 
language selected for this Amendment 
supports this court's interpretation that "an 
approved method" means "any approved 
method." A patent listing that covers one 
amongst several approved methods of using 
a formulation protects that patented method 
and thus bears a direct relation to the 
purpose of Orange Book listings. This cOUli 
does not detect a situation such as the one 
occurred in Mylan. 
This case also suggests that this court should 
address the relationship between section viii 
and the counterclaim provision. Section viii 
addresses scenarios where a patent claims at 
least one, but not all, approved methods· of 
using a drug. This court recognizes that a 
broad use code covering all uses of a 
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phannaceutical could require generic 
manufacturers to prove specifically that their 
use will' not overlap with and infringe the 
patented use. This proof, under. Hatch-
Waxman procedures, will take the form of a 
Paragraph IV lawsuit. In that context, the 
generic may provide proof that their use will 
not cause infringement of the patented use. 
This court perceives that the Hatch-Waxman 
Act will thus ensure that a generic drug for 
non-patented purposes will not be used for 
patented purposes via a simple section viii 
certification. Instead, the generic 
manufacturer will need to alleviate the risk 
of infringement or .induced infringement in a 
proceeding that fully tests for infringement 
and its implications, including potential 
health and safety risks. Thus, the Act again 
facilitates efficient resolution of disputes 
concerning potential overlapping of 
protected· and unprotected uses. The Act 
seeks to strike a balance of the pioneering 
and generic manufacturers' interests. 
As Judge Clevenger points out, Caraco's 
real complaint should lie with the FDA, not 
with Novo. Had it not been for the FDA's 
regulatory action, Caraco could have 
asserted in a Paragraph IV lawsuit that its 
proposed labeling did not infringe tHe 358 
patent. It was the FDA, not Novo, that 
tipped the careful balance in the favor of 
pioneering manufacturers. 
V. 
As further indication of balancing interests 
and creation of an efficient dispute 
resolution mechanism, this court notes that 
the Act, by its terms, does not allow generic 
manufacturers to counterclaim unless the 
listed patent bears no relation to the listed 
drug. To be more specific, the terms of the 
counterclaim provision do not authorize an 
order compelling the patent holder to change 
its use code narrative. The counterclaim 
provision states that a generic manufacturer 
can request an order compelling "the holder 
to correct 01' delete the patent information 
submitted by the holder under subsection (b) 
or ( c)." Subsection (b) requires a pioneering 
manufacturer to submit "the patent number 
and the expiration date of any patent . . . 
which claims a method of using such drug." 
Subsection (c) states that "[i]f the patent 
information described in subsection. (b) of 
this section could not be filed with the 
submission of an application," the holder 
"shall file with the Secretary the patent 
number and the expiration date of. any 
patent . . . which claims a method of using 
such drug." 
Thus, the Act defined the term "patent 
infonnation" as "the patent number and the 
expiration date." The reference in subsection 
(c) to "the patent information described in 
subsection (b)" could only mean the patent 
number and the expiration date, because no 
other "patent infonnation" appears in the 
statute. Therefore, to maintain consistency 
in the statutory terms, "the patent 
information" in the counterclaim provision 
must also mean the patent number and the 
expiration date. Thus, the counterclaim 
provision only authorizes suits to correct or 
delete an erroneous patent number or 
expiration date. The authorization does not 
extend to the use code narrative. Once again, 
this careful use of language suggests that the 
Act facilitates efficient resolution of 
disputes over the potential overlap of 
patented and unpatented uses in the fmID of 
a Paragraph IV suit. 
Approximately six months before the 2003 
Amendment, the' FDA promulgated a 
regulation concerning the "Submission of 
Patent Information" in which it requires a 
pioneering manufacturer to submit not only 
the patent number and the expiration date, 
but also the use code narratives and other 
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patent-related information on Forms 3542a 
and 3542. This regulation appeared to 
include the use code nanative under the 
broader heading of "patent information." 
Although this regulation preceded the. 2003 
Amendment, it did not change the meaning 
of the statutory use of the tenn "patent 
information." As this court has clarified, 
"[s]uch opaque timing observations hardly 
amount to a 'most extraordinary showing of 
contrary intentions,' especially when the 
language of the statute trumpets its meaning 
by itself." The counterclaim provision does 
not mention the FDA regulations or in any 
way suggest adoption of a meaning for 
"patent information" broader than the 
express statutory definition. Moreover, this 
court owes "no deference is due to agency 
interpretations at odds with the plain 
language of the statute itself." As discussed 
above, this broader definition would upset 
the careful balance that requires a full 
resolution of the potential infringement 
issues involved in overlapping patented and 
unpatented uses. 
. The legislative history does not add any 
clarity to the meaning of. "patent 
information." During the floor debate, 
Senators occasionally refened to the need to 
conect "patent information." This court. 
must· read these statements to use the term 
"patent information" consistent with the 
express statutory definition. Accordingly, to 
preserve the Act's careful balance and to 
enforce the language of the statute, the 
explicit definition of "the patent 
information" as "the patent number and the 
expiration date" controls. 
VI. 
Caraco argues that in case this court does 
not find that Caraco is entitled to a 
counterclaim, this court should affirm the 
district court's injunction under the doctrine 
of patent misuse. Because the judicial 
doctrine of patent misuse creates an unusual 
circumstance where an infringer can escape 
the consequences· of its infringing conduct 
because the victim of that tort may have 
used its patent rights to gain an unfair 
competitive advantage against an unrelated 
third party, this court examines such 
allegations with partiCUlarity. For instance, 
the doctrine may apply where the patentee's 
misconduct toward unrelated parties 
amounted to unfair market benefits beyond 
the scope of the patent. In any event, in this 
case, the district. cOUli, apparently 
recognizing the rarity of this situation, 
expressly declined to address the doctrine of 
patent misuse. Without any finding to 
review, this court declines to adjudicate this 
issue in the first instance. 
VII. 
This court therefore' reverses the district 
court's grant of summary judgment on 
Caraco's attempted, but unsuccessful, 
counterclaim and vacates the injunction 
ordering Novo to conect its use code for the 
'358 patent listed in the Orange Book for 
PRANDIN. 
REVERSED and VACATED. 
CLEVENGER, Circuit Judge, concurring. 
I agree with Judge Rader's analysis of the 
relevant statutory provisions in this case and 
therefore join the opinion he writes for the 
court. I am not as certain as Judge Rader that 
the ongoing Paragraph IV litigation will 
cleanly resolve the dispute between the 
parties. 
The dissent masks the cause for the dispute 
between the parties. Novo did nothing that 
was illegal or forbidden. FDA voluntarily 
requested a change to the approved 
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indications for PRANDIN® which required 
Novo to use FDA's new approved labeling. 
The change also permitted Novo to revise its 
use code as the relevant FDA form, "Patent 
Information Submitted Upon and After 
Approval of an NOA or Supplement," 
expressly instructed Novo to "[s]ubmit the 
description of the approved indication or 
method of use' that you propose FDA 
include as the 'Use Code' in the Orange 
Book." Novo changed its use code to match 
the new PRANDIN® indication. Nothing in 
the record suggests that Novo is responsible 
f01; the labeling change, which, given the 
statutory and regulatory framework, happens 
to benefit Novo at Caraco's expense. 
If not for FDA's request that Novo change 
its labeling to the present broad indication, 
everything would have worked properly 
under the relevant statutes. As Judge Rader 
notes, the "efficient dispute, resolution 
mechanism" was in play. Caraco, filed its 
ANDA for repaglinide, and by making its 
Paragraph IV certification had committed 
the statutory act of infringement. Novo 
followed with its infringement suit. Caraco 
was prepared to defend on the grounds that 
its proposed use of repaglinide would not 
induce infringement of the 358 patent. 
Caraco also filed a section viii statement in 
light of the then-approved labeling and use 
code for PRANDIN®, and proposed carve-
out language in its labeling to signify its 
proposed noninfringing use of repaglinide. 
Caraco was thus set to get FDA approval to 
,bring its generic drug to market and to 
defend itself in Novo's Paragraph IV suit. 
But FDA, acting independently, gummed up 
the works. By requiring a single broad 
indication for repaglinide as part of the 
approved labeling, FDA created a situation 
where Caraco can no longer assert that' its 
proposed labeling does not infringe the' 358 
patent. It remains to be seen what impact 
FDA's action will have on Caraco's ability 
to defend itself in the ongoing Paragraph IV 
litigation; but FDA's regulatory action 
threatens to impair Caraco' s ability to 
disprove infringement. FDA thus may have 
inadvertently upset the careful balance of 
interests represented by the efficient dispute 
resolution mechanism Congress created in 
the Hatch-Waxman Act. 
The dissent's fix would be to have United 
States District Courts dictate to FDA what 
indications should be used on the prescribed 
labeling for approved drugs, even though 
there is nothing illegal, or even incorrect, 
about Novo's current use code. There is no 
basis for a counterclaim to correct or delete 
the patent information submitted by Novo. If 
a fix is in order under the circumstances of 
this case, it lies with the FDA and Congress 
to understand the consequences of changing 
the approved repaglinide labeling to a single 
broad indication, and corresponding use 
code, and to remedy the situation. Laying 
blame on Novo is wrong. 
The counterclaim statute, which the dissent 
would expand beyond its literal reach, was 
designed to cure the situation presented in 
Mylan. Congress has not addressed the fact 
situation presented in this case. Congress is 
the appropriate entity to readjust, if 
necessary, the delicate balance it has struck 
between original drug manufacturers and 
their generic counterparts. 
DYK, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
In 2003, Congress enacted the counterclaim 
provision of the Hatch-Waxman Act in order 
to prevent manipulative practices by patent 
holders with respect to the Orange, Book 
listings. These practices were designed to 
delay the onset of competition from generic 
drug manufacturers. In my view, the 
majority, in reversing the dIstrict court, now 
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construes the statute contrary to its manifest 
purpose and allows the same manipulative 
practices to continue in the context of 
method patents. The amendment was 
designed to permit the courts to order 
correction of information published in the 
Orange Book, yet under the majority's 
opinion,erroneous Orange Book method of 
use information cannot be corrected. I 
respectfully dissent. 
I 
* * * 
A 
[The Court described the process for new 
drug approval (NDA) and the streamlined 
process for generic drug approval.] 
Some NDA filers realized that they could 
block generic competition by making 
unwarranted claims to patent coverage, for 
example, by listing in the Orange Book a 
patent for a drl,lg or method of use when in 
fact the patent was clearly inapplicable. The 
FDA repeatedly declined to police the 
Orange Book listings, and before the 
enactment of the counterclaim provision in 
2003, we held that the courts could not do so 
through deClaratory judgments. 
Congress responded by enacting the 
counterclaim amendment as part of the 
"Greater Access to Affordable 
Pharmaceuticals Act" ("Gregg-Schumer 
Bill"), enacted in 2003 .... 
[T]he amendment allows an ANDA 
applicant, who is defending against a patent 
infringement suit brought by the holder of 
the NDA, to asse1i a counterclaim to correct 
or delete the Orange Book "patent 
information submitted . . . under subsection 
(b) or (c)" on the ground that the patent does 
not claim "the drug for which the 
application was approved" or "an approved 
method of using the drug." We have not 
previously construed this provision. The 
majority now holds that the counterclaim 
provision is unavailable to correct erroneous 
method of use information in the Orange 
Book-on two separate grounds. 
II 
A 
In my view, the majority has misconstrued 
the term "patent information submitted . . . 
under subsection .(b) or (c)." In the 
majority's view, method of use information 
is not "patent information." The maj ority 
construes the term as limited to the patent 
number and expiration date: "[T]he Act 
defined the term 'patent information' as 'the 
patent number and the expiration date. '" 
Majority Op. at 1366. There is, in fact, no 
definition of "patent information" in. the 
statute, and in reaching this construction, the 
maj ority ignores critical statutory language. 
The statute requires the NDA applicant to 
file with the application the patent 
number and the expiration date of 
any patent which claims the drug for 
which the applicant submitted the 
application or which claims a 
method of using such drug and with· 
respect to which a claim of patent 
. infringement could reasonably be 
asserted if a person not licensed by 
the owner engaged in the 
manufacture, use, or sale of the drug. 
21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (emphases added). 
Thus, the statute requires the NDA applicant 
to list patents claiming a drug or method of 
use "with respect to which a claim of patent 
infringement could reasonably be asselied." 
In other words, the statute on its face 
contemplates that the scope of the patent 
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must be accurately described and that the 
patent must be related to the drug or method 
of use for which the NDA application is 
submitted. The statute does not require the 
listing of patent numbers· and expiration 
dates in the abstract. It contemplates the 
description of the scope of the patent and of 
the relationship between the patent and the 
drug or the method of use; the description of 
that scope and relationship is itself "patent 
information." The statute requires that this 
information be published, stating that the 
Secretary "shall publish information 
submitted under the two preceding 
sentences." 
Other provisions of the statute also 
contemplate that the ANDA filer will be 
able to understand the scope of the patent 
and to relate the patent information to the 
drug or drugs being claimed and the method 
or methods of use being claimed. Describing 
the scope of the patent and relating the listed 
. patents to the drug or method of use is 
essential to the operation of the statute, as 
the basic idea of the patent listings in the 
Orange Book is·to put ANDA applicants on 
notice regarding which listed drugs and 
methods of use may be copied and which 
drugs or method of use are patent protected, 
and to enable the ANDA filer to submit an 
appropriate certification as required by law. 
The statute requires an ANDA applicant to 
provide, as part of the application, 
(vii) a certification, in the opinion of 
the applicant and to the best of his 
knowledge, with respect to each 
patent which claims the listed drug 
refened to in clause (i) or which 
claims a use for such listed drug for 
which the applicant is seeking 
approval under this subsection and 
for which information is required to 
be filed under subsection (b) or (c) of 
this section-
(I) that such patent information has 
not been filed, 
(II) that such patent has expired, 
(III) of the date on which such patent 
will expire, or 
(IV) that such patent is invalid or 
will not be infringed by the 
manufacture, use, or sale of the new 
drug for which the application is 
submitted .... 
Id. § 355G)(2)(A)(vii) (emphases added). 
Similarly, the section viii certification 
provision also appears to contemplate that 
information submitted under subsection (b) 
or (c) will encompass information regarding 
the patented method of use. The statute 
directs the ANDA applicant to submit, 
if with respect to the listed drug 
. refened to in clause (i) information 
was filed under subsection (b) or (c) 
of this section for a method of use 
patent which does not claim a use for 
which the applicant is seeking 
approval under this subsection, a 
statement that the method of use 
patent does not claim such a use. 
Id. § 355G)(2)(A)(viii). 
The statute plainly contemplates that "patent 
information" will include information that 
describes the scope of the patent and that 
relates the patent to the drug or method of 
use. 
B 
Quite apart from the fact that the majority's 
limiting interpretation is inconsistent with 
the statutory language and structure, the 
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majority's interpretation is III my view 
untenable for other reasons. 
First, the majority agrees that the 
counterclaim amendment was designed to 
overrule our decision in Mylan.. In 
overruling Mylan, Congress viewed 
erroneous information as to the scope of the 
patent and its relationship to an approved 
drug or method of use as "patent 
information" that could be ordered 
corrected. The majority appears to suggest 
that the overruling of Mylan is limited to the 
precise facts of Mylan, namely, the situation 
in which correction of the error would 
require that the patent number be deleted 
entirely from the Orange Book. The 
overruling w(;mld not apply to a situation in 
which other erroneous Orange Book 
information is involved, for example, where 
the patent is erroneously listed with respect 
to a particular drug or method of use, but is 
properly listed elsewhere in the Orange 
Book. This ignores the context of the Mylan 
decision. 
The first thing to understand is that the 
majority's description of the Orange Book 
likely bears no relationship to the actual 
document. The Orange Book is not a list of 
patents from which a particular patent could 
be excised. The Orange Book is a list of 
NDAs that associates particular patents with 
approved drugs or methods of use. 
Correction of an Orange Book listing does 
not strike a patent from a list, it strikes (or 
corrects) the listing that associates the patent 
with a particular NDA, approved drug, or 
method of use. 
The problem in Mylan was that the Orange 
Book improperly described the scope of the 
patent and improperly related the patent to a 
drug and method of use not covered by the 
patent. ... 
Thus, in Mylan, the accused infringer 
challenged the accuracy of the listing 
associating the patent with the approved 
method of use. Congress acted to provide a 
counterclaim action to correct such errors. 
Congress' concern with the proper listing of 
the patent in the Orange Book does not 
remotely suggest a myopic congressional 
focus on situations where the patent 
belonged nowhere in the Orange Book, as 
the majority suggests. Most significantly, 
viewing the overruling of Mylan as limited 
to complete delisting would be inconsistent 
with the explicit statutory language, which 
provides for correction of Orange Book 
information "on the ground that the patent 
does not claim . . . the drug for which the 
application was approved." The statute thus 
must allow cOlTection of a misdescription of 
patent scope that includes a drug not· 
covered by the patent and erroneous 
information about the relationship between 
the patent and the drug, even if the patent is 
properly listed elsewhere in the Orange 
Book. In other words the scope of the patent 
and its relationship to the drug must be 
"patent information." 
Moreover, if "patent information" includes 
information as to the scope of the patent 
with respect to the drug and the relationship 
between the patent number and the drug, it 
must also include Orange Book information 
describing the scope of a method of use 
patent andlinking the method of use to the 
patent. There is no basis in the statutory 
language or statutory purpose for 
distinguishing between drug information and 
method of use information. Either both must 
be "patent information," or neither must be 
patent information. In my view, all Orange 
Book information is "patent information." 
Second, at the time the counterclaim 
provision was enacted in 2003, the FDA had 
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adopted the Patent Listing Rule,. making 
clear that the agency had adopted a broad 
interpretation of "patent information 
submitted . . . Under subsection (b) or (c)." 
That interpretation is entitled to Chevron 
deference even if the language of the statute 
is ambiguous, and not (as I urge) plainly 
contrary to the majority's interpretation. By 
the time of the counterclaim amendment in 
2003, the FDA had adopted detailed 
requirements for the submission of "patent 
information" for both drugs and methods. 
The 2003 rule, published as a proposed rule 
in the Federal Register in late 2002 and 
finalized six months before the counterclaim 
amendment, includes a section entitled 
"Submission of patent information" on the 
requirements for the listing of a patent in the 
Orange Book. The report accompanying the 
regulatory revision makes clear that the 
FDA is defining what constitutes "patent 
information" for purposes of subsections (b) 
and ( c). Additionally, the report 
accompanying the Proposed Rule in 2002 
confirms that the FDA's authority for the 
2003 rule arises from not only the FDA's 
general authority to enforce the FDCA under 
21 U.S.C. § 371, but also its authority to 
implement section 505 of the Hatch-
Waxman Act, "including the patent listing 
and patent celiification requirements" in 
section 505(b). The regulation itself 
provides that "patent information" includes 
1) "[i]nformation on the drug substance 
(active ingredient) patent including . . . 
[w]hether the patent claims the drug 
substance that is the active ingredient in the 
drug product described in the new drug 
application or supplement," 2) 
"[i]nformation on the drug product 
(composition/formulation) patent including . 
. . [w ]hether the patent claims the drug 
product for which approval is being sought," 
and 3) "[i]nformation on each method-of-
use patent including ... [w ]hether the patent 
claims one or more methods of using the 
drug product for which approval is being 
sought and a description of each pending 
method of use or related indication and 
related patent claim of the patent being 
submitted. " 
The NDA applicant is thus not only required 
to submit the patent number and the 
expiration date as part of its application, but 
is also required to describe the scope of the 
patent and relate the drug substance, drug 
product, or method of use in question to the 
particular patent. Furthermore, the 
regulation requires an NDA holder or 
applicant to complete FDA Form 3542, 
which requires the applicant to identify 
whether the submitted patent claims a "drug 
substance," "drug product," or "method of 
use," and link such information to each 
patent for which information is being 
submitted. The information in this form 
provides the basis for the Orange Book 
listing. 
Congress was well aware of this regulatory 
interpretation of "patent information" when 
it enacted the counterclaim provision. As 
Senator Schumer, one of the original 
sponsors of the amendment, stated, "The bill 
provides a critical complement to the work 
the FDA has done in clarifYing its 
regulations on patent listing, but it goes 
much further." Additionally, in several 
places in the legislative history the FDA 
regulation is cited approvingly. 
Quite apart from Chevron, it is well 
established that where, as here, Congress 
was specifically aware of the agency's 
interpretation of a statutory term at the time 
the statute was enacted, this is compelling 
evidence of legislative adoption of the 
agency's interpretation. This principle has 
been recognized by the Supreme Court for 
decades, both in the context of reenactment 
of existing statutes where statutory 
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terminology had been construed by the 
agency before the reenactment, and in the 
context of new legislation utilizing 
terminology that the agency had previously 
construed. Here, Congress utilized the 
FDA's interpretation of "patent information" 
by enacting the Gregg-Schumer Bill with 
full awareness of the agency's interpretation 
of the term, and the FDA's interpretation is 
binding on us in construing the statute. 
Third, the legislative history makes clear 
that Congress was concerned with correcting 
Orange Book .information generally. The 
legislative history suggests a broad concern 
with preventing brand manufacturers from 
manipulating the patent listing system in the 
Orange' Book in order to delay entry of 
generics into the market. The purpose of the 
statutory provision as reflected in the 
legislative history refers broadly to 
correction of Orange Book information, not 
just to correction of patent numbers and 
expiration dates. As Senator Schumer 
described it, "[T]he provisions enforce the 
patent listing requirements at the FDA by 
allowing a generic applicant, when it has 
been sued for patent infringement, to file a 
counterclaim to have the brand drug 
company delist the patent or correct the 
patent information in the FDA's Orange 
Book. " 
Under the circumstances, it seems to me that 
we must interpret the phrase "patent 
information submitted . . . under subsection 
(b) or ( c)" to include Orange Book 
information that describes the scope of the 
patent and relates the patent number and 
expiration date to the drug or method of use 
and, in particular, that "patent information" 
submitted under subsections (b) and (c) must 
be interpreted to include the patent 
information required by the 2003 regulation, 
including method of use information. 
III 
In my view, the maj ority also errs by 
interpreting "an approved method of using 
the drug" in 21 U.S.C. § 
355G)(5)(C)(ii)(I)(bb) to mean "any" 
approved method of use approved in the 
patentee's NDA. The majority's approach 
here is fundamentally inconsistent with the 
Supreme Court's. admonition, in a recent 
opinion by Justice Scalia, that "[u]ltimately 
context determines meaning," and the 
Court's repeated instruction that "[i]n 
expounding a statute, we must not be guided 
by a single sentence or member of a 
sentence, but look to the provisions of the 
whole law, and to its object and policy." 
The evident purpose of the counterclaim 
provision is to allow for the correction of 
"patent information submitted ... under (b) 
or (c)." In other words, as discussed above, 
the provision is' designed to provide for 
correction of erroneous Orange Book 
information submitted by the NDA applicant 
or holder, including information with respect 
to patent coverage of both drugs and 
.methods of use. That purpose is reflected in 
the language of the statute, which allows an 
ANDA applicant defending against an 
infringement action to "assert a 
counterclaim seeking an order requiring the 
[NDA] holder to correct or delete the patent 
information submitted by the holder under 
subsection (b) or ( c) of this section on the 
ground that the patent does not claim 
either(aa) the drug for which the application 
was approved; or (bb) an approved method 
of using the drug." In other words, if the 
submitted Orange Book information claims 
patent coverage for an approved drug not 
covered by the patent or a method of use not 
covered by the patent, that information may 
be corrected. 
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Thus, the reference to "an approved method 
of using the drug" in subsection (bb) must 
refer to information in the Orange Book 
concerning "an approved method of using 
the drug." The majority's error lies in 
focusing on the relationship between the 
patent and the NDA (which is not Orange 
Book infonnation), rather than the. 
relationship between the patent and the 
Orange Book listing. Under the majority's 
view, no correction of erroneous Orange 
Book infonnation is permitted so long as the 
patent· covered any approved method of use 
covered by the NDA. The patent can be 
listed in the Orange Book as erroneously 
covering approved use A, despite the fact 
that the patent actually covers approved use 
B, and the counterclaim provision provides 
no mechanism for correction. This cannot be 
what Congress intended. 
Moreover, the statutory language referring 
to "an approved method of using the drug" 
obviously refers, once again, to the 
terminology used in the 2003 Patent Listing 
Rule. That regulation required that for "each 
method of use patent" the NDA applicant 
submit certain information, including 
"[w]hether the patent claims one or more 
approved methods of using the approved 
drug product and a description of each 
approved method of use or indication and 
related patent claim of the patent being 
submitted." In other . words, the regulation 
requires the patentee to relate the patent to 
the approved method of use. Subsection (bb) 
is directly concerned with correction of the 
Orange Book patent information relating the 
patent to the approved method of use. 
Once the overall operation of the statutory 
scheme is understood, the text is clear. 
Webster's Third New International 
Dictionary describes "a" as being "used as a 
function word before a singular noun 
followed by a restrictive clause or other 
identifying modifier <a man who was here 
yesterday >." This definition appears before 
the definition of "a"· as "any." As the 
example illustrates, "an" in this case may be 
the function word before the singular noun 
("approved method of using the drug") 
conveying a particular. identity through the 
use of a restrictive clause. The restrictive 
clause here is implicit-"an approved method 
of using the drug" logically refers to an 
approved method of use listed by the NDA 
holder in the Orange Book, as associated 
with the listed patent. Thus, "an" refers to a 
particular method of using the drug, that is, . 
the particular approved method listed by the 
NDA holder in the Orange Book. This is the 
only interpretation of the statutory language 
that yields a result that is not plainly at 
variance with the purpose of the legislation 
as a whole. "As in all cases of statutory 
construction, our task is to interpret the 
words of these statutes in light of the 
purposes Congress sought to serve." 
. In short, the statute must be construed to 
read as follows: 
(ii) Counterclaim to infringement 
action.-
(I) In general.-· If an owner of the 
patent or the holder of the approved 
application under subsection (b) of 
this section for the drug that is 
claimed by the patent or a use of 
which is claimed by the patent brings 
a patent infringement action against 
the applicant, the applicant may 
assert a counterclaim seeking an 
order requiring the holder to correct 
or delete the patent information 
submitted by the holder under 
subsection (b) or (c) of this section 
on the ground that the patent does 
not claim either-
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(aa) the [associated] drug for which 
the application was approved; or 
(bb) an [associated] approved 
method of using the drug. 
An error in an Orange Book use code, which 
covers an unpatented method of use, is 
. subject to correction under a proper reading 
of the counterclaim provision. 
IV 
The facts in this case well illustrate the true 
manipulation that the counterclaim provision 
was designed to avoid .... 
* * * 
Novo acknowledges that monotherapeutic 
use of repaglinide is not covered by the '358 
patent. But the use code claims that the 
patent does cover the monotherapy use. In 
my view, this is precisely the type of 
situation that Congress intended the 
counterclaim provision to address. 
The concurrence blames the FDA for 
Caraco's predicament, adopting Novo's 
disingenuous argument that the FDA, and 
not Novo, was responsible for the change in 
the use code. The concurrence accuses the 
FDA of "gumm[ing] up the works. By 
requiring a single broad indication for 
repaglinide as part of the approved labeling, 
FDA created a situation where Caraco can 
no longer assert that its proposed labeling 
does not infringe' the 358 patent." 
Concurring Op. at 1368. First, the FDA did 
not require a change in the use code. The 
FDA does not interpret patents or police the 
Orange Book listings, .the very source of the 
problem that led to the counterclaim 
provision. The FDA role in administering 
the Orange Book is ministerial: it simply 
lists the patent information that it receives 
from brand manufacturers, expecting those 
parties to abide by the statutory and 
regulatory mandates. 
Second, while the FDA did require a general 
change in oral diabetes drug labeling in 
November of 2007 that required a 
corresponding change in the PRANDIN 
label, there is absolutely· nothing in the 
statute or regulations that required Novo to 
change the use code to track this new 
indication. The FDA did not direct or 
request that Novo change "its use code to 
reflect the new indication, nor was Novo 
required under FDA regulations to make 
such a change. Indeed, in response. to 
questioning at oral argument, Novo admitted 
this. 
However, Novo argues that the labeling 
change required by the FDA in the 
"Indication" part of the label made the use 
code change appropriate. Novo argues that 
FDA Form 3542 allows them. to submit 
either the method of use or the indication for 
the use code. That is partially correct, but 
the form also requires that the use code 
information refer to that portion of the label 
that relates to a patented use. An approved 
label, as in this case, may cover both 
patented uses and unpatented uses. Nothing 
in the FDA regulations or FDA Form 3542 
suggests that the patentee may derive 
Orange Book use code information from that 
portion of the label referring to unpatented 
uses. Quite the contrmy, the applicable 
regulations and FDA FOlID 3542 are clear 
that the patentee is required to utilize those 
portions of the label that refer to the 
patented use. 
Here, the patentee did exactly. what was 
expressly forbidden. For the proposed use 
code description submitted on the FDA 
Form 3542, Novo submitted the following: 
"A method for improving glycemic control 
in adults with type 2 diabetes mellitus." It 
thus utilized that portion of PRANDIN's 
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label that refers to the use of repaglinide 
standing alone to treat diabetes (an 
unpatented use), not to the use of repaglinide 
together with metformin (a patented use). 
There is no justification for using a portion 
of the label referring to an unpatented use to 
describe a patented use. 
The manipulative nature of Novo's actions 
is confirmed not only by the· lack of 
justification for the change, but also by the 
timing of the change (two years after the 
labeling change was initiated by the FDA 
and immediately after the FDA approved 
Caraeo's section viii carve-out), and by its 
own admission that preventing approval of 
Caraco's ANDA was part of the motivation 
for changing the use code. At oral argument, 
Novo conceded that the decision to change 
the use code was in part "a response to the 
section viii ruling ... in Decembe108 from 
FDA." 
v 
Finally, the majority opinion suggests that 
the court's restrictive interpretation of the 
counterclaim provision is not so bad because 
it does not leave Caraco without a remedy to 
correct the erroneous Orange Book listing . 
. The majority is sanguine about the outcome, 
believing that forcing Caraco to defend the 
paragraph IV infringement suit will 
"facilitate[ ]. efficient resolution of disputes 
concerning potential overlapping of 
protected and unprotected uses." Majority 
Op. at 1365. In contrast, the concurrence 
doubts that there is a remedy in the 
infringement suit, and I agree. As the 
concurrence notes, "[b]y requiring a single 
broad indication for repaglinide as part of 
the approved labeling, FDA created a 
situation where Caraco can no longer assert 
that its proposed labeling does not infringe 
the' 358 patent." Concurring Op. at 1368. 
Indeed, Novo's adoption of a broad use code 
for PRANDIN likely prevents Caraco from 
being able to disprove infringement in the 
paragraph IV lawsuit, because Caraco is 
now compelled to include information 
regarding the patented combination therapy 
in its label. 
Nor would there be a remedy in a suit under 
the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"). 
To be sure, we have held that an AP A action 
could be brought to challenge FDA action in 
refusing to police use codes in the Orange 
Book, but at the same time we expressed no 
view as to whether· such an action would 
succeed. To succeed in such an action, the 
ANDA applicant would have to establish 
that the FDA's refusal to police use codes 
was arbitrary and capricious, or contrary to 
the statute. We have subsequently held that 
the FDA is under no statutory obligation to 
determine the correctness of particular 
patent listings in the Orange Book, and th~t 
nothing in the Hatch-Waxman Act requires 
the FDA to screen Orange Book. 
submissions by NDA applicants and refuse 
those that do not satisfy the statutory 
requirements for listing. Moreover, the very 
enactment of the counterclaim provision 
assumed that no alternative remedy was 
available to an ANDA applicant cha:llenging 
an Orange Book listing. Today's decision 
strikingly limits the counterclaim provision 
with the consequence that, in all likelihood, 
the ANDA applicant is left without any 
remedy to correct an erroneous Orange 
Book listing with respect to a method of use 
patent. This cannot be what Congress 
intended. 
* * * 
In summary, the majority's crabbed view of 
the statute sanctions an unjustified 
manipulation of the Orange Book. In this 
suit, Caraco seeks to compel Novo to correct 
the use code for PRANDIN, and to reinstate 
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the earlier U-546 use code describing the 
'358 patent as covering the "USE OF 
REPAGLINIDE IN COMBINATION 
WITH METFORMIN TO LOWER BLOOD 
GLUCOSE." Under the correct construction 
of the counterclaim provision, the district 
court properly held that Caraco was entitled 
to an order reinstating the former U-546 use 
code. 
In holding that the counterclaim provision is 
unavailable, the majority's approach is 
notably inconsistent . with the approach 
adopted by our sister circuit in another 
recent Hatch-Waxman Act case, Teva 
. Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sebelius, 595 
F.3d 1303 (D.C.Cir.20l0). There the court 
construed another provision of the 2003 
amendments concerning the NDA holder's 
withdrawal of "patent information submitted 
under subsection (b) or (c)." 21 U.S.C. § 
355(j)(5)(D)(i)(l)(bb )(CC). The statute 
provided that if such information were 
"withdrawn by the holder of the 
application," the period of exclusivity of the 
ANDA first filer would be forfeited. The 
court held that only the withdrawal resulting 
ftom a successful counterclaim suit 
triggered a forfeiture and not a voluntary 
withdrawal. This was so because there was 
"not a single cogent reason why Congress 
. might have permitted brand manufacturers 
to trigger subsection (CC) by withdrawing a 
challenged patent, outside the counterclaim 
scenario," and because of the strong policy 
of the statute favoring the l80-day 
marketing exclusivity period. Here the 
majority reaches a result that is unsupported 
by any cogent reason for leaving an ANDA 
applicant without a remedy to correct an 
erroneous Orange Book listing with respect 
to a method of use patent, and is directly 
contrary to the congressional purpose. I 
respectfully dissent. 
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"High Court to Hear Generic-Drug Case, 
Rejects Abu Ghraib Challenge" 
Wall Street Journal 
June 27, 2011 
Brent Kendall 
The Supreme Court agreed on Monday to 
consider whether generic-drug makers can 
file certain legal counterclaims against 
branded-drug companies to get their 
cheaper, copycat medicines on the market. 
At issue is whether the generics companies 
can challenge the way brand-name 
manufacturers describe their patents to the 
Food and Drug Administration. The generics 
say their brand rivals, if left unchecked, can 
describe their patents broadly in FDA 
submissions to shut out generic competition, 
even for unpatented uses of a drug. 
The Supreme Court will consider an appeal 
by Caraco Pharmaceutical Laboratorie~, a 
unit of ~un Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd., 
which is seeking to introduce a generic 
version of Novo Nordisk AlS's diabetes 
drug Prandin. 
One Novo Nordisk patent on the drug 
compound has expired, but the company 
holds a second patent, which doesn't expire 
until 2018, that involves the use of the drug 
in combination with another medicine. 
The FDA has approved three uses for the 
drug. Caraco wants to introduce a generic 
version for the two uses that aren't patented. 
The company says it can't do so because 
Novo Nordisk's description of its patent to 
the FDA is so broad that it forecloses the 
agency from approving a generic version of 
the drug. 
A divided federal appeals cOUli ultimately 
ruled last year that Caraco couldn't file a 
legal counterclaim to challenge the way 
Novo described its patent to the FDA. 
Novo said in a court brief that its FDA 
submission was correct and followed an 
agency directive concerning the labeling of 
oral diabetes drugs. It argued that the 
generic industry's concerns were overblown 
and said the issue at the center of the case 
rarely arises. 
The Obama administration urged the 
Supreme Court to hear Caraco' s appeal, 
arguing that the lower-court ruling was 
incorrect. . Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, 
Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc. and the Generic 
Pharmaceutical Association also filed briefs 
supporting Caraco, saying a loss would have 
serious adverse consequences for generics 
manufacturers. 
The case is Caraco Pharmaceutical 
Laboratories v. Novo Nordisk, 10-844. Oral 
arguments will take place during the court's 
next term, which begins in October. 
* * * 
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"Novo Nordisk A/S v. Caraco Pharmaceutical 
Laboratories, Ltd. (Fed.Cir. 2010)" 
Patent Docs 
April 27, 2010 
Kevin E. Noonan 
On April 14th, the Federal Circuit rendered 
a decision construing statutory language in a 
rather straightfoiward and unremarkable 
(albeit not unanimous) opinion. But the 
statutory language at issue involved the 
2003 Medicare Prescription Drug 
Improvement and Modernization Act, which 
amended the 1984 Drug Price Competition 
and Patent Term Restoration Act 
(colloquially known as the Hatch-Waxman 
Act), thus raising the opinion's significance. 
The statutory provisions at issue involve the 
requirements for listing patents· claiming 
drug products or their uses in the Orange 
Book. The statute requires an innovator and 
approved New Drug Application (NDA) 
holder to identify these patents by patent 
number and expiration date. For patents 
claiming uses (more properly, methods of 
use) of a regulated drug, the FDA proscribes 
"use codes"· which are published in the 
Orange Book as well. 
For a use not covered by an Orange Book 
listed patent, a generic drug manufacturer 
who files an Abbreviated New Drug 
Application (AND A) must submit a 
proposed label for the unpatented use as 
well as a statement under 21 U.S.C. § 
355G)(2)(A)(viii) . (a "Section viii" 
statement) that the use does not infringe any 
listed patent. Approval of the ANDA 
requires that the proposed label does not 
overlap with any patented method (a "carve-
out"). 
As part of the litigation provisions of the 
Hatch-Waxman Act, an ANDA filer can file 
a counterclaim in ANDA litigation that 
challenges the accuracy of the patent 
information submitted by the innovator, on 
two grounds-either that the patent doesn't 
claim the approved 'drug or an approved 
method for using the drug (which is defined 
by the use codes and the innovator drug 
label). This part of the law was enacted as 
part of the MMA amendments, in response, 
to a Federal Circuit decision as discussed in 
the opinion and below, and is codified as 21 
U.S.C. § 355G)(5)(c)(ii)(I): 
[The ANDA] applicant may assert a 
counterclaim seeking an order 
requiring the holder to correct or 
delete the patent information 
submitted by the holder under 
subsection (b) or (c) of this section 
on the ground that the patent does 
not claim either-
(aa) the drug for which the 
application was approved; or 
(bb) an approved method of using 
the drug. 
The case involves Novo Nordisk's 
repaglinide drug product marketed as 
PRANDIN®. Novo listed two patents in the 
Orange Book associated with this drug: 
Reissue Patent No. RE37,035, which claims 
repaglinide drug product itself; this patent 
expired March 14, 2009. The other patent, 
U.S. Patent No.6,677,358, claims the 
method of using repaglinide in combination 
with metformin; this patent expires June 12, 
2018. There are two other approved uses for 
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PRANDIN®: as monotherapy and in 
combination with thiazolidinediones 
(TZD's); neither of these indications is 
claimed in any Orange Book listed patent. 
All indications are for treating Type 2 
(adult-onset) diabetes. 
Caraco filed an ANDA for generic 
repaglinide having a Paragraph III 
certification regarding the '035 patent and a 
Paragraph IV certification for the '358 
patent, the latter leading to ANDA litigation 
pursuant to 35.U.S.C. § 271 (e)(2). During 
the litigation, Caraco stipulated in that 
action that its ANDA would infringe the 
'358 patent if it included a label describing 
the combination of repaglinide and 
metformin, and at the same time submitting 
an amended ANDA with a Paragraph IV 
certification and a Section viii statement that 
its ANDA would not seek approval for the. 
repaglinide + metformin combination. The 
"carve-out" label was acceptable to FDA. 
However, at that time the FDA changed the' 
use code associated with Novo's 
PRANDIN® product. The original use 
code, U-546, specified the combination of 
repaglinide + metformin to lower blood 
glucose. The FDA changed this use code to 
U-968, for a method for improving glycemic 
control in adults with Type 2 diabetes." 
This use code was not limited to the, specific 
repaglinide + metformin combination, . and 
indeed was not expressly limited to Novo's 
drug (i. e., it could encompass metformin 
monotherapy). (There was some dispute 
between the majority and the concurring 
opinion, the. concurrence asserting that the 
FDA changed the use code sua sponte which 
was not asserted in the majority opinion.) 
This change in the use code caused the FDA' 
to rej ect Caraco' s Section viii certification 
and "carve-out" label, requiring Caraco to 
include the rapaglinide + metformin 
combination on its label. Since Caraco 
stipulated that this combination was an 
infringement, the FDA's decision essentially 
mandated judgment for Novo absent a 
finding at trial . of invalidity or 
unenforceability. 
In response to the FDA's determination, 
Caraco counterclaimed for an injunction to 
return the use code to U-546. The District 
Court granted summary judgment on this 
issue, granting Caraco the requested 
injunction. Specifically, the Court's 
injunction ordered Novo to request the FDA 
to change the use code in the Orange Book 
for Prandin® from U-968 to its former U-
546 listing. 
The Federal Circuit granted Novo an 
expedited appeal and briefing schedule, and 
stayed the injunction pending the appeal. In 
its opinion, by Judge Rader joined by Judge 
Clevenger (with concurring opinions by 
Judge Clevenger and a dissenting opinion by 
Judge Dyk), the CAFC held that the statute 
contained no provisions permitting an 
ANDA defendant to request or a district 
court to grant' such an injunction, reversing 
the decision and vacating the injunction. 
The Federal Circuit characterizes the 
question as whether the statutory language 
of "an approved method" means "any 
approved method" (Novo) or "all approved 
methods" (Caraco). Novo contended that 
reciting one of the patented uses was 
sufficient to preclude the statutory 
counterclaim, while Caraco contended that 
reciting any unpatented use permits an 
ANDA defendant to assert the counterclaim. 
In finding for Novo, the Court found "no 
ambiguity" in the language of the statute: 
When an indefinite article is 
preceded and qualified by a negative, 
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standard grammar generally provides 
that "a" means "any." See, e.g., 
American Heritage Dictionary of the 
English Language 1 (4th Ed. 2006). 
The Court also says Caraco improperly 
focuses on its proposed uses: 
[T]he statutory language "an 
approved method of using the drug" 
refers to the approved methods of 
using the listed drug, PRANDIN. 
This language cannot refer to the 
methods of using Caraco' s . generic . 
drug, because the FDA has not yet 
approved Caraco's ANDA. 
Thus, the Court concluded that Caraco can 
assert its counterclaim only if no patent 
listed in the Orange Book claims "any 
approved methods of using the listed drug." 
That was not the case here. 
The opinion also references the legislative 
history "to make sure that it does not contain 
any clear intent to the contrary." It did not: 
the Court says that the counterclaim 
provisions of the statute addressed the 
Court's own interpretation of the Hatch-
Waxman Act to be devoid of a "private 
cause of action to delist an allegedly 
irrelevant patent from the Orange Book." 
This intent was ascertained by the panel due 
to the use in the statute of "exact language" 
from the Mylan decision, the Court 
concluding that "[t]his choice of legislative 
language suggests that the 2003 Amendment 
sought to correct the specific issue raised in 
Mylan, i.e., to deter pioneering 
manufacturers from listing patents that were 
not related at all to the patented product or 
method." Accordingly, the opinion found 
this legislative history to be consistent with 
its interpretation that "an approved method" 
means "any approved method," because this 
interpretation "bears a direct relation to the 
purpose of Orange Book listings." 
The opinion also asserts that, under its 
interpretation, the combination of a Section 
viii certification and ANDA litigation will 
"ensure that a generiC drug [approved] for 
non-patented purposes will not be used for 
patented purposes via a simple section viii 
certification." This is consistent, the court 
contends, with the Hatch-Waxman Act's 
purpose of striking "a balance [between] the 
pioneering and genenc manufacturers' 
interests. " 
Finally, the Court held that the statute has no 
provisions permitting a generic drug maker 
to obtain an order from a court, like the 
injunction here, to compel a patent holder to 
change or modify its use code. The plain 
language of the statute authorizes the 
generic drug maker to "request an order 
compelling the 'holder to correct or delete 
the patent information submitted by· the 
holder' ." (The Court notes that "the. patent 
information" under the statute. is "the patent 
number and the expiration date.") (emphases 
in original). Put simply, "the patent 
information" does not include the use code 
narrative according to the plain language of 
the statute, and thus does not grant an 
ANDA challenger to obtain the injunction 
granted by the district court below. 
This analysis is complicated by an FDA 
requirement, promulgated before passage of 
the amendments in 2003, that "a pioneering 
manufacturer ... submit not only the patent 
number and the expiration date, but also the 
use code narratives and other patent-related 
information" on specific FDA forms. The 
panel refused to conclude that the regulation 
"change [ d] the ordinary meaning of the 
statutory use of the term 'patent 
information,'" citing the Court's opinion in 
Wyeth v. Kappas that clear statutory 
meamng trumps any agency regulatory 
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interpretation. And the Court reminds us all 
that "no deference is due to agency 
interpretations at odds with the plain 
language of the statute itselfl.]" Here, the 
legislative intent sheds no light on any 
relevance of the agency provisions to the 
plain meaning discerned by the panel. 
Judge Clevenger concuned with the Court's 
judgment, but in his view Novo merely 
reacted to a request by the FDA, and 
changed its use code narrative to match the 
new FDA use code. "FDA, acting 
independently, gummed up the works," 
according to the judge. 
Judge Dyk dissented, believing that the 
construction is contrary to the "manifest 
purpose" of the statute, allowing "the same 
manipulative practices" the statute was 
passed to prevent, i. e., "delay[ing] the onset 
of competition from generic drug 
manufacturers." The dissent has a thorough 
explication of the Hatch-Waxman act and 
the 2003 Amendments, particularly with 
regard to what Judge Dyk characterizes as 
efforts by NDA filers to "block generic 
competition by making unwarranted claims 
to patent coverage, for example, by listing in 
the Orange Book a patent for a drug or 
method of use when in fact the patent was 
clearly inapplicable." 
Since the FDA "repeatedly declined to 
police Orange Book listings," and the 
Federal Circuit refused to let ANDA filers. 
use· declaratory judgment jurisdiction to do 
so, Congress intervened by passing the 2003 
amendments, including the Section V111 
celiification provisions thereof. 
Judge Dyk disagrees with majority on 
construing the term "patent information" to 
be limited to patent number and expiration 
date. According to Judge Dyk, this 
information is not required "in the abstract," 
"the statute on its face contemplates that the 
scope of the patent must be accurately 
described and that the patent must be related 
to the drug or method of use for which the 
NDA application is submitted." 
In context, the statute "contemplates the 
description of the scope of the patent and of 
the relationship between the patent and the 
drug or the method of use; the description of 
that scope and relationship is itself 'patent 
information. ,,, 
At least one source of the majority's error, 
in Judge Dyk's view, is their enoneous 
understanding of the Orange Book: 
[T]he majority's description of the 
Orange Book likely bears no 
relationship to the actual document. 
The Orange Book is not a list of 
patents from which a particular 
patent could be excised. The Orange 
Book is a list of NDAs that 
associates particular patents with 
approved drugs or methods of use. 
Conection of an Orange Book listing 
does not strike a patent from a list, it 
strikes (or conects) the listing that 
associates the patent with a particular 
NDA, approved drug, or method of 
use. 
Judge Dyk also disagreed with the 
majority's treatment of the FDA's 
regulations promulgated six months before 
enactment of the 2003 Amendments, stating 
that "Congress was well aware of this 
regulatory interpretation of 'patent 
information' when it enacted the 
counterclaim provision," and citing pOliions 
of the legislative history illustrating this 
awareness (e.g., Senator S'chumer's 
statement that "[t]he bill provides a critical 
complement to the work the FDA has done 
in clarifying its regulations on patent listing, 
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but it goes much further." Legislative and 
Regulatory Responses to the FTC Study on 
Barriers to Entry in the Pharmaceutical 
Marketplace: Hearing Before the S. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 108th Congo 19 (2003)). 
Judge Dyk believes that under 
circumstances where "Congress was 
specifically aware of the agency's 
interpretation of a statutory term at the time 
the statute was enacted, this is compelling 
evidence of legislative adoption of the 
agency's interpretation," citing Supreme 
Court precedent to this effect (including 
United States V. Bd. ofComm'rs of Sheffield, 
Ala., 435 U.S. 110, 131-35 (1978); 
Cammarano V. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 
510 (1959); and Hartley V. Comm'r, 295 
U.S. 216, 220 (1935)). 
Judge Dyk also rejected the majority's 
interpretation of the term "any" in the 
statute, citing (ironically in view. of his 
Merck V. Integra decision) Justice Scalia's 
admonition that, in construing a statute, 
'[ u ]ltimately context determines meaning,'" 
citing Johnson V. United States, No. 08-
6925, slip op. at 5 (U.S. Mar. 2, 2010). He 
illustrates this objection with the following 
hypothetical: 
Under the majority's view, no 
correction of erroneous Orange Book 
information is permitted so long as 
. the patent covered any approved 
method of·use covered by the NDA. 
The patent can be listed in the 
Orange Book as erroneously 
covering approved use A, despite the 
fact that the patent actually covers 
approved· use B, and the 
counterclaim provision provides no 
mechanism for correction. This 
cannot be what Congress intended. 
Judge Dyk's dissent adds more confusion to 
the history of the change in use code for 
PRANDIN®; consistent with his view that 
NDA holders attempt to manipulate FDA 
rules to maximize the time generic drug 
manufacturers are kept off the market, in his 
description of the underlying facts Novo 
asked the FDA for the change in use codes, 
and Caraco submitted its "carve-out" 
labeling proposal at FDA's behest. 
According to Judge Dyk: 
Here, .the patentee did exactly what 
was expressly forbidden. FOr .the· 
proposed use code description 
submitted on the FDA Form 3542, 
Novo submitted the following: "A 
method . for improving glycemic 
control in adults with type 2 diabetes 
mellitus." lA. 673. It thus utilized 
that portion of PRANDIN's label 
that refers to the use of repaglinide 
standing alone to treat diabetes (an 
unpatented use), not to the use of 
repaglinide together with metformin 
(a patented use). There is no 
justification for using a portion of the 
label referring to an unpatented use 
. to describe a patented use. 
The manipulative nature of Novo's 
actions is confirmed not only by the 
lack of justification for the change, 
but also by the timing of the change 
(two years after the labeling change 
was initiated by the FDA and 
immediately after the FDA approved 
Caraco's section viii carve-out), and 
by its own admission that preventing 
approval of Caraco's ANDA was 
part of the motivation for changing 
the use code. At oral argument, Novo 
conceded that the decision to change 
the use code was in part ~'a response 
to the section viii ruling . . . III 
December '08 from FDA." 
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"In summary, the majority's crabbed view 
of the statute sanctions an unjustified 
manipulation of the Orange Book," 
according to Judge Dyk. Perhaps hoping to 
provoke Supreme Court review, in the final 
portion of the dissent, Judge Dyk 
characterizes as "notably inconsistent" the 
majority's view and the views of the D.C. 
Circuit court regarding what constituted 
whether the counterclaim is available under 
these circumstances. 
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Sackett v. Environmental Protection Agency 
10-1062 
Ruling Below: Sackett v. Us. E.P.A., 622 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2010) cert. granted in part, 10-
1062,2011 WL 675769 (U.S. June'28, 2011). 
Chantell and Michael Sackett own approximately one half acre of undeveloped land near Priest 
Lake in Idaho. In April of2007, the Sacketts began filling in part of their land in preparation for 
construction of a dwelling. In November of 2007, the EPA issued a compliance order informing 
the Sacketts their land is a wet land subject to the Clean Water Act (CWA) and directing them to 
remove the fill and restore the land to its original condition or face fines. The Sacketts petitioned 
the EPA for a hearing to contest the determination of their land as a wet land but were denied. 
The Sacketts then bi'ought an action in federal district court, challenging the compliance order as 
arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act and alleged violations of their 
due process rights as the order was issued without a hearing, The district court dismissed the case 
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that the CW A precludes judieial review of 
compliance orders before the EP A has commenced an enforcement action. On appeal, the Ninth 
Cii'cuit affirmed the lower court, holding that Congress meant to preclude pre-enforcement 
judicial review of compliance orders in the interest of efficiency; The court also found no 
deprivation of the Sacketts' due process rights, holding that the CW A requires the EPA to prove 
alleged violations have actually occurred before assessing fines. 
Questions Presented: (1) May petitioners seek pre-enforcement judicial review of the 
administrative compliance order pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. $704? 
(2) If not, does petitioners' inability to seek pre-enforcement judicial review of the administrative 
compliance order violate their rights under the Due Process Clause? 
Chantell SACKETT; Michael Sackett, Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
v. 
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY; Steven L. Johnson, 
Administrato r, Defendants-Appellees. 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
Filed September 17,2010 
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.] 
GOULD, Circuit Judge: 
We' determine whether federal courts have 
subject-matter jurisdiction to conduct review 
of administrative compliance orders issued 
by the Environmental Protection Agency 
pursuant to the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1319(a)(3), before the EPA has filed a 
lawsuit in federal court to enforce the 
compliance order. We join our sister circuits 
and hold that the Clean Water Act precludes 
pre-enforcement judicial review of 
administrative compliance orders, and that 
such preclusion does not violate due 
process. 
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I 
Chantell and Michael Sackett ("the 
Sacketts") own a 0.63-acre undeveloped lot 
in Idaho near Priest Lake ("the Parcel"). In 
April and May of2007; the Sacketts filled in 
about one-half acre .ofthat property with dirt 
and roc~ in preparation for building a house. 
On November 26, 2007, the EPA issued a 
compliance order against the Sacketts. The 
compliance order alleged that the Parcel is a 
wetland subject to the Clean Water Act 
("CW A") and that the Sacketts violated the 
CW A by filling in their propeliy without 
first obtaining a permit. The compliance 
order required the Sacketts to remove the fill 
material and restore the Parcel to its original 
condition. The compliance order states that 
"[v]iolation of, or failure to comply with, the 
foregoing Order may subject Respondents to 
(1) civil penalties of up to $32,500 per day 
of violation . . . [ or] (2) administrative 
penalties of up to $11,000 per day for each 
violation." 
The Sacketts sought a hearing with the EPA 
to challenge the finding that the Parcel is 
subject to the CW A. The EPA did not grant 
the Sacketts a hearing. and continued to 
assert CW A jurisdiction over the Parcel. The 
Sacketts then filed this action in the United 
States District Court for the District of Idaho 
seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. 
They challenged the compliance order as (1) 
arbitrary and capnclOUS under the 
Administrative Procedure Act ("AP A"), 5 
U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); (2) issued without a 
hearing in violation of the Sacketts' 
procedural due process rights; and (3) issued 
on the basis of an "any information 
available" standard that is unconstitutionally 
vague. 
The district court granted the EPA's Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) motion to 
dismiss the Sacketts' claims for lack of· 
subject-matter jurisdiction. It concluded that 
the CW A precludes judicial review of 
compliance orders before the EP A has 
started an enforcement action . in federal 
court. The Sacketts filed a Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 59(e) motion for 
clarification and reconsideration that was 
also denied. The Sacketts appealed. We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
II 
We review de novo the dismissal of a 
complaint for lack of subject-matter 
jurisdiction. 
The EPA has determined that the Sacketts 
discharged pollutants into the waters of the 
United States in violation of the CW A. 
When the EPA identifies a CW A violation, 
it has three main civil enforcement options. 
First, it can assess an administrative penalty. 
When the EPA assesses an administrative 
penalty, the alleged violator is entitled to "a 
reasonable opportunity to be heard and to 
present evidence," the public is entitled to 
comment, and any assessed penalty is 
subject to immediate judicial review. 
Second, the EP A can initiate a civil 
enforcement action in federal district court. 
Third, the EP A can issue, as it did here, an 
administrative "compliance orqer." 
A compliance order "is a document served 
on the violator, setting forth the nature of the 
violation and specifying a time for 
compliance with the Act." The EP A derives 
its power to issue compliance orders from 
33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(3), which states: 
Whenever on the basis of any 
information available to him the 
Administrator finds that any person 
is in violation of section 1311, 1312, 
1316,1317,1318, 1328, or 1345 of 
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this title, . . . he shall issue an order 
requiring such person to comply with 
such section or requirement, or he 
shall bring a civil, action in 
accordance with [33 U.S.C. § 
1319(b) ]. 
To enforce a compliance order, the EPA 
must bring an enforcement action in federal 
court under 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b). The 
compliance order issued against the Sacketts 
exposed them to potential court-imposed 
civil penalties not to exceed $32,500 "pel' 
day for each violation" of the compliance 
order. In assessing the amount of the 
penalty, courts "shall consider the 
seriousness of the violation 01' violations, the 
economic benefit (if any) resulting from the 
violation, any history of such violations, any 
good-faith efforts to comply with the 
applicable requirements, the economic 
impact of the penalty on the violator, and 
such other matters as justice may require." 
The Sacketts argue that compliance orders 
are judicially reviewable prior to the EPA 
filing an enforcement action in federal court. 
The CW A, however, does not expressly 
provide for pre-enforcement judicial review 
of compliance orders. The Sacketts argue 
that federal courts are nonetheless 
authorized to conduct pre-enforcement 
review of compliance orders pursuant to the 
APA. Under the APA, "[a]gency action 
made reviewable by statute and final agency 
action for which there is no other adequate 
remedy in a court are subject to judicial 
review." Agency action is not reviewable 
under the AP A, however, where the relevant 
statUte "preclude[s] judicial review." 
Whether the CW A precludes pre-
enforcement review of compliance orders is 
im issue of first impression in our' circuit. 
We begin with the presumption favoring 
judicial review of administrative action. 
That presumption is overcome, however, 
"whenever the congressional intent to 
preclude judicial review is fairly discernible 
in the statutory scheme." "Whether imd to 
,what extent a particular statute precludes 
judicial review is determined not only from 
its express language, but also from the 
structure of the statutory scheme, its 
objectives, its legislative history, and the 
nature of the administrative action 
involved." The CWA does not expressly 
preclude pre-enforcement judicial review of 
such compliance orders. So we must 
consider the other factors identified by the 
Supreme COUli to determine whether the 
CW A impliedly precludes pre~enforcement 
judicial review. 
In this assessment, we do not work from a 
blank slate. Every circuit that has confronted 
this issue has held that the CW A impliedly 
precludes judicial review of compliance 
orders until the EPA brings an enforcement 
action in federal district court. The 
reasoning of these courts is persuasive to us, 
as well as the broad uniformity of consensus 
on this issue. 
First, we look to the structure of the 
statutory scheine and the nature of the 
administrative action involved. Here, 
Congress gave the EPA a choice of 
"issu[ing] an order requiring such person to 
comply with such section or requirement, or 
. . . bring [ing] a civil action [in district 
cOUli]." Authorizing pre-enforcement 
judicial review of compliance orders would 
eliminate this choice by enabling those 
subject to a compliance order to force the 
EP A to litigate all compliance orders in 
court. Such a result would be discordant 
with the statutory scheme. 
Moreover, no sanctions can be, imposed, ,or 
injunctions issued, for noncompliance with a 
compliance order until the EPA brings a 
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civil enforcement action in district court. 
Given that an enforcement action gives an 
opportunity for judicial. consideration of the 
compliance order, we infer that Congress 
intended that all challenges to the 
compliance order be brought in one 
proceeding. 
In addition, by contrast to how it treated 
compliance orders, Congress set forth an 
explicit mechanism for judicial review of 
administrative penalties assessed by the 
EPA for CWA violations. Congress's 
express grant of judicial review for 
administrative penalties helps to persuade us 
that the absence of a similar grant of judicial 
review for compliance orders was an 
intentional omission that must be respected. 
Second, we look to the objectives of the 
. . statutory scheme. Here, courts have 
concluded that compliance orders, like pre-
enforcement administrative orders in other 
environmental statutes, are meant to "allow 
EP A to act to address environmental 
problems quickly and without becoming 
immediately entangled in litigation." This 
goal of enabling swift corrective action 
would be defeated by permitting immediate. 
judicial review of compliance orders. 
Third, we consider the legislative history of 
the CW A. The enforcement provisions of 
the CW A were modeled on enforcement 
provisions in the Clean Air Act ("CAA"), 
and many courts have relied on similar 
provisions in the CAA in concluding that the 
CW A precludes pre-enforcement judicial 
review of compliance orders. During the 
enactment of the CAA, the Conference 
Committee which reconciled the House and 
Senate versions of the CAA deleted a 
provision in the Senate's version of the bill 
that would have expressly provided for pre-
enforcement review of CAA administrative 
compliance orders. At least one court has 
inferred from this deletion that it was 
intended to preclude pre-enforcement 
judicial review of compliance orders. Such 
an inference is not unassailable. 
Nevertheless, and subject to the general 
caution with which we must view all 
legislative history not adopted by both 
houses and enacted as law, that inference is 
supported by the structure of the CW A and 
its statutory language discussed above. 
In view of the above considerations, we hold 
that a congressional intent to preclude pre-
enforcement judicial review of compliance 
orders is "fairly discernible in the statutory 
scheme." 
III 
The Sacketts argue that CW A compliance. 
orders must be judicially reviewable before 
enforcement because preclusion of pre-
enforcement review violates their due 
process rights. They rely on the Eleventh 
Circuit's opinion in Tennessee Valley 
Authority v. Whitman, 336 F.3d 1236 (l1th 
Cir.2003) [hereinafter TVA ], in which that 
court identified constitutional problems with 
a similar compliance-order provision in the 
CAA[.] The Eleventh Circuit conchided that 
the complete preclusion of judicial review of 
compliance orders issued under the CAA 
would raise serious constitutional questions 
where compliance orders, "if ignored, lead[ ] 
automatically to the imposition of severe 
civil penalties and perhaps imprisonment." 
The chief problem with the CAA, as the 
Eleventh Circuit saw it, was that a 
compliance order could be issued by the 
EP A "on the basis of any information 
available" without any hearing, and that the 
CAA made civil and criminal penalties 
dependent on violations of compliance 
orders whether or not there was an actual 
violation of the CAA. 
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If the CW A is read in the literal manner the 
Sacketts suggest, it could indeed create a 
due process problem. Like the CAA, the 
CW A permits the EPA to issue compliance 
orders "on the basis of any information 
available," which presumably includes "a 
staff report, newspaper clipping, anonymous 
phone tip, or anything else that would 
constitute 'any information[.],,' And 
according to' the plain text of the 
enforcement provision, "any person who 
violates any order issued by the 
Administrator under [33 U.S.C. § 1319(a) ], 
shall be subject to a civil penalty ... for 
each violation." Thus, the Sacketts' reading 
of the CW A suggests that they risk 
substantial financial penalties for violating 
the compliance order, even if they did not 
violate the CW A, if the EP A establishes in 
an enforcement proceeding that the 
compliance order was validly issued based 
on "any information available." 
. We decline to interpret the CW A in this 
manner. The civil penalty provision of the 
CWA is "not a model of clarity." Although 
the term "any order" in 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) 
could be interpreted to refer to all 
compliance orders issued on the basis of 
"any information available," the term could 
also be interpreted to refer only to those 
compliance orders that are predicated on 
actual, not alleged, violations of the CW A, 
as found by a district court in an 
. enforcement action according to traditional 
civil evidence rules and burdens of proof. 
Mindful of the Supreme Court's repeated 
instruction that "every reasonable 
construction must be resorted to, in order to 
save a statute from unconstitutionality," we 
believe that the latter interpretation is the 
better interpretation of "any order" in § 
1319(d). The EPA is authorized only "to 
commence a civil action for appropriate 
relief, including a permanent or temporary 
injunction, for any violation for which [the 
EPA] is authorized to issue a compliance 
order." Read carefully, this provision does 
not authorize the EPA to bring enforcement 
actions for, mere violations of compliance 
orders. Rather, to enforce a compliance 
order, the EPA must bring an action alleging 
a violation of the CW A itself. Given that the 
CW A does not empower the EPA to bring 
an enforcement action on the basis of a 
violation of a compliance order alone, it 
follows that a court cannot assess penalties 
for violations of a compliance order under § 
1319( d) unless the EPA also proves, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that the 
defendants actually violated the CW A in the 
manner alleged. Under this interpretation, if 
the EPA does not prove that the CW A was 
actually violated, the compliance order is 
unenforceable, even if it was validly issued 
on the basis of "any information available." 
We therefore hold that the term "any order" 
in § 1319( d) refers only to orders predicated 
on actual violations of the CW A as 
identified by a district court in an 
enforcement proceeding according to 
traditional rules of evidence and standards of 
proof. 
The Sacketts further allege that forcing them 
to wait until the EPA brings an enforcement 
action "ignores the realities of [their] 
circumstances," because of the "frightening 
penalties" they risk accruing by refusing to 
comply. The increase in penalties from 
noncompliance with an administrative order 
not subject to immediate judicial review, 
however, does not necessarily constitute a 
due process violation. Rathel', statutory 
preclusion of pre-enforcement judicial 
review of administrative orders violates due 
process only when the "practical effect of 
coercive penalties for noncompliance [is] to 
foreclose all access to the courts" so that 
"compliance is sufficiently onerous and 
coercive penalties sufficiently potent that a 
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constitutiomilly intolerable choice might be 
presented. " 
Weare not persuaded that the potential 
consequences from violating CW A 
compliance orders are so onerous so as to 
"foreclose all access to the courts" and 
create a "constitutionally intolerable 
choice." We reach this conclusion for two 
reasons. First, the CW A has a permitting 
provision. The Sacketts could seek a permit 
to fill their property and build a house, the 
denial of which would be immediately 
appealable to a district court under the AP A. 
If the Sacketts were denied a permit and 
then took an appeal, they could challenge 
whether their property is subject to the 
jurisdiction of the CW A. Therefore; rather 
than completely foreClosing the Sacketts' 
ability to use their property or challenge 
CW A jurisdiction, the CW A channels 
judicial review through the affirmative 
permitting process. 
Second, the civil penalties prOVISIOn IS 
committed to judicial, not agency, 
discretion. The amount of the penalty for 
noncompliance with a CW A compliance 
order is to be determined by a court and is 
determined on the basis of six factors: (1) 
the seriousness of the violation, (2) the 
economic benefit resulting from the 
violation, (3) any history of CWA 
violations, (4) good-faith efforts to comply, 
(5) the economic impact of the penalty on 
the violator, and (6) such other matters as 
justice may require. Any penalty ultimately 
assessed against the Sacketts would 
therefore reflect a discretionary, judicially 
determined penalty, taking into account a 
wide range of case-specific equitable 
factors, and imposed only after the Sacketts 
have had a full and fair opportunity to 
present their case in a judicial forum. 
We therefore hold that precluding pre-
enforcement judicial review of CW A 
compliance orders does not violate due 
process. 
IV 
In conclusion, we hold that it is "fairly 
discernable" from the language and structure 
of the Clean Water Act that Congress 
intended to preclude pre-enforcement 
judicial review of administrative compliance 
orders issued by the EPA pursuant to 33 
U.S.C. § 1319(a)(3). We furtherinterpret the 
CW A to require that penalties for 
noncompliance with a compliance order be 
assessed only after the EP A proves, in 
district court,and according to traditional 
rules of evidence and burdens of proof, that 
the defendants violated the CW A in the 
manner alleged in the compliance order. 
Thus we do not see any sharp disconnect 
between the process given a citizen and the 
likely penalty that can be imposed under the 
CW A. Under these circumstances, 
preclusion of pre-enforcement judicial 
review does not violate the Sacketts' due 
process rights. The district court properly 
dismissed this case for lack of SUbject-matter 
jurisdiction. 
AFFIRMED. 
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"Supreme Court to Hear EPA Wetland Case" . 
New York Times 
June 28, 2011 
Lawrence Hurley 
The Supreme Court decided today to take up 
a challenge to U.S. EPA's authority to issue 
compliance orders under the Clean Water 
Act without allowing an immediate hearing 
on the underlying issue. 
At issue are efforts by Chantell and Michael 
Sackett to build a house on a half-acre parcel 
near Priest Lake, Idaho. . 
After they began earth-moving work, the 
Sacketts were halted by EPA, which said the 
property fell within the jurisdiction of 
Section 400 of the Clean Water Act. The 
landowners were in violation after they 
placed fill material into wetlands, EPA said. 
The order prevented further construction 
work on the site and required the Sacketts to 
restore the wetlands. 
The Sacketts-backed by the Pacific Legal 
. Foundation (PLF), a conservative 
Sacramento, Calif.-based group that focuses 
on property rights-filed suit in the District 
of Idaho, but a federal judge dismissed their 
request that they be able to contest the order. 
The 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals 
agreed with the district judge's conclusion. 
The court held that the Sacketts' due process 
rights were not violated because those 
subject to compliance orders have an 
opportunity to go to court if EP A 
commences an enforcement action. 
The Supreme Court will consider whether 
the Sacketts' should be able to contest a 
compliance order before the enforcement 
proceedings and, if not, whether that would 
violate their due process rights. 
The Sacketts' lawyers argue that the use of 
compliance . orders puts their clients and 
others in an "impossible situation" because 
they "must either run the risk of ruinous 
penalties or imprisonment" or essentially 
buy their right to judicial review by entering 
the pelmitting process. 
That could cost $200,000, they say. 
PLF attorney Damien Schiff said the case 
raises important property rights and due 
process questions. 
"When government seizes control of your 
land and you disagree with the justification, 
shouldn't you be allowed your day in 
court?" he said in a statement. 
The Obama administration stated in its brief 
that appeals courts have "uniformly 
concluded". that the Clean Water Act 
provisions in question do not violate the due 
process clause because EPA must file suit in 
federal court if it wants to enforce 
compliance. 
In some ways, the Sacketts' claim mirrors 
one made by General Electric Co. over 
whether it could challenge EPA 
administrative orders requiring companies to 
clean up sites containing hazardous 
materials. Earlier this month, the Supreme 
Court declined to take up that case. 
The justices will hear arguments in the 
Sackett case in the 2011 court tenn, which 
begins in October. 
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"EPA Beats Back Constitutional Challenge 
to Water Act Enforcement System" 
Inside the EPA 
October 1, 2010 
Aaron Lovell 
A federal appeals court has found that the 
system for judicial review of Clean Water 
Act (CW A) compliance orders does not 
constitute a violation of due process, though 
the plaintiffs in the case are considering 
options to challenge the ruling, including a 
possible appeal to the Supreme Court. 
The U.S. COUli of Appeal$ for the 9th 
Circuit ruled Sept. 17 in Sackett v. EPA that 
the CW A "precludes pre-enforcement 
judicial review of administrative compliance 
. orders, and that such preclusion does not 
violate due process," according to the 
court's opinion, which notes that it joins 
other circuit courts in holding that view. The 
ruling is available on InsideEP A. com. 
While the plaintiffs have made no decisions 
about their next steps, they could consider a 
rehearing in the 9th Circuit, request review 
from the Supreme Court, Qr both, according 
to a lawyer involved with the case. A 
petition to the high court could focus on the 
conflict between the 9th Circuit's opinion 
and a high-profile decision in the 11th 
Circuit on how to interpret compliance order 
language in the Clean Air Act, which 
includes enforcement provisions similar to 
the CWA. 
The Pacific Legal Foundation (PLF), a 
conservative legal organization that is 
representing the plaintiffs, has previously 
sought to have the Supreme COUli 
reconsider key environmental law arguments 
after conservative Chief Justice John 
Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito were 
appointed to the high court. 
In Sackett, a couple building a house on a 
plot of land on the shore of Priest Lake, ID, 
received a compliance order from EPA 
saying the land contained wetlands covered 
by the CW A and that the couple violated the 
act by not obtaining a permit before starting 
the project. In the order, the agency required 
the plaintiffs to fully restore the preexisting 
wetlands before applying to the Army Corps 
of Engineers for a permit. The plaintiffs 
requested an administrative hearing with 
EPA to challenge the agency finding that the 
land is a wetland covered by the CW A. 
When EPA did not grant the hearing, the 
plaintiffs filed suit in the U.S. District Court 
for the District of Idaho, arguing that the 
compliance order was arbitrary and 
capricious, was issued without a hearing in 
violation of their due process rights and was 
issued "on the basis of an 'any information 
available' standard that is unconstitutionally 
vague," according to the opinion. The 
district court granted an EP A motion to . 
dismiss the case for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction. ., 
In the appeal, the plaintiffs argued that a 
2003 decision by the 11th Circuit in 
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) v. 
Whitman found constitutional problems with 
the compliance orders issued under the 
Clean Ail' Act. Disagreements between the 
circuits on how to interpret the compliance 
order statutes could also form the basis for 
further appeals. 
In TVA, the court ruled that the ail' act's 
enforcement "scheme for administrative 
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compliance orders was unconstitutional to 
the extent that severe civil and criminal 
penalties can be imposed for noncompliance 
with the terms of' an administrative 
compliance order. The court found that the 
orders "are legally inconsequential and do 
not constitute final agency action." 
The plaintiffs say this is an issue because an 
order could be issued "on the basis of any 
information available"-including an 
anonymous tip or newspaper article-
without an administrative hearing, and civil 
and criminal penalties, including fines and 
j ail· time, under the act depend on violation 
of the compliance order regardless of 
whether the Clean Air Act was actually 
violated. The CW A could have similar 
implications, the plaintiffs say. 
Summarizing the argument, the 9th Circuit 
says, "the Sacketts' reading of the CWA 
suggests that they risk substantial financial 
penalties for violating the compliance order, 
even if they did not violate the CW A, if the 
EPA establishes in an enforcement 
proceeding that the compliance order was 
validly issued based on 'any .information 
available.' " 
But the 9th Circuit reads the CW A more 
broadly in a way that avoids the 
constitutional problems raised by the 11th 
Circuit, and concludes that the due process 
rights would not be affected. "Although the 
term 'any order' . . . could be interpreted to 
refer to all compliance orders issued on the 
basis of 'any information available,' the 
term could also be interpreted to refer only 
to those compliance orders that are 
predicated on actual, not alleged, violations 
of the CW A, as found by a district court in 
an enforcement action according to 
traditional civil evidence rules and burdens 
of proof," according to the opinion. 
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CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood 
10-948 
Ruling Below: Greenwood v. CompuCredit Corp., 615 F.3d 1204 (9th Cir. 2010) cert. granted,. 
131 S. Ct. 2874,179 L. Ed. 2d 1187 (U.S. 2011). 
This case deals with the terms connected with the issuance of an "Aspire Visa" credit card. This 
card was marketed by CompuCredit to customers with weak credit scores. The card was for a 
fixed limit of $300 and against that $300, cardholders were charged a finance charge, a monthly 
maintenance fee, and an annual fee of $257. The terms of the agreement also included a binding 
arbitration agreement that waived all alternative fonns of dispute relief including filing a lawsuit. 
Wanda Greenwood, representing a class of similar cardholders filed suit, alleging several 
violations of California law and the Credit Reporting Organization Act (CROA). CompuCredit 
moved to compel arbitration, which the district court denied, finding the CROA contained 
prohibitions against waivers of the right to sue. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding the plain 
language of the CROA clearly indicated Congress intended to create a non-waiveable right for 
consumers to sue. 
Question Presented: Whether claims arising under the Credit Repair Organizations Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 1679 et seq., are subject to arbitration pursuant to a valid arbitration agreement. 
Wanda GREENWOOD; Ladelle Hatfield; Deborah McCleese, on behalf of themselves and 
other similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellees, 
v. 
COMPUCREDIT CORPORATION and Columbus Bank and Trust, jointly and 
individually,. Defendan ts-Appellants. 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
Filed August 17, 2010 
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.] 
THOMAS, Circuit Judge. 
This appeal presents the question, inter alia, 
as to whether the word "sue," as used in the 
Credit Repair Organization Act ("CROA"), 
means "arbitrate." Or, perhaps the question 
is, as Alice put it: "whether you can make 
words mean so many different things?" We 
conclude that Congress meant what it said in 
using the term "sue;" and that it did not 
mean "arbitrate." We affinn the order of the 
district court denying the Credit Providers' 
motion to compel arbitration. 
I 
CompuCredit marketed a subprime credit 
card under the brand name Aspire Visa to 
consumers with low or weak credit scores 
through massive direct-mail solicitations and 
the internet. CompuCredit marketed the card 
and the cards were issued by Columbus 
Ban1e and Trust (collectiveiy "Credit 
Providers"). 
Greenwood and her fellow plaintiffs 
("Consumers") allege CompuCredit 
444 
marketed the card by representing to 
consumers it could be used to "rebuild your 
credit," "rebuild poor credit," and "improve 
your credit rating." Consumers allege the 
promotional materials noted there "was no 
deposit required," and that consumers would 
immediately receive $300 in available credit 
when they received the card. In fact, they 
allege, Credit Providers charged a $29 
finance charge, a monthly $6.50 account 
maintenance fee, and a $150 annual fee, 
. assessed immediately against the $300 limit 
before the consumer received the card. In 
aggregate, the card had $257 in fees the first 
year. Although the promotional material 
mentioned the fees, it did so in small print 
amidst other information in the 
adve1iisement, and not in proximity to . its 
representations that no deposit was required. 
Consumers each applied for and received an 
Aspire card, and were charged these fees. 
Consumers allege the Credit Providers' 
actions constitute several violations of the 
CROA and of California's Unfair 
Competition Law. 
Before receiving the Aspire'Visa credit card, 
each Consumer received a mailing entitled 
"Pre-Approved Acceptance Certificate." The 
Acceptance Certificate includes the 
following paragraph: 
By signing, I request an Aspire Visa 
card and ask that an account be 
opened for me. I certify that 
everything I have stated in the 
Acceptance Certificate is true and 
accurate to the best of my 
knowledge. I have read and agree to 
the be bound by the "Summary of 
Credit Terms" and "Terms of Offer" 
printed on the enclosed insert, which 
inse1i includes a discussion of 
arbitration applicable to my account, 
and 1S incorporated here by 
reference. 
One Consumer mailed in her acceptance, 
one applied over the internet, and the other 
applied over the phone. 
The "Terms of Offer" states: 
Important-The agreement you 
receive contains a binding arbitration 
provision. If a dispute is resolved by 
binding arbitration, you will not have 
the right to go to court or have the 
dispute heard by a jury, to engage in 
pre-arbitration discovery except as 
permitted under the code of 
procedure of the National Arbitration 
Forum ("NAF"), or to participate as 
part of a class of claimants relating 
to such dispute. Other rights 
available to you in court may be 
unavailable in arbitration. 
The "Summary of Credit Terms" contain$ 
the following: 
ARBITRATION PROVISION 
(AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE 
CLAIMS) 
Any claim, dispute or controversy 
(whether in contract, tort, or 
otherwise) at any time arising from . 
or relating to your Account, any 
transferred balances or this 
Agreement (collectively, "Claims"), 
upon the election of you or us, will 
be resolved by binding arbitration 
pursuant to this Arbitration Provision 
and the Code of Procedure ("NAF 
Rules") of the National Arbitration 
Forum ("NAF") in effect when the 
Claim is filed. If for any reason the 
NAF cannot, will not or ceases to 
serve as arbitration administrator, we 
will substitute another nationally 
recognized arbitration organization 
utilizing a similar code of procedure. 
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Upon such an election, neither you 
nor we will have the right to litigate 
in court the claim being arbitrated, 
including a jury trial, or to engage in 
pre arbitration discovery except as 
provided under NAF Rules. In 
addition, you will not have the right 
to participate as representative or 
member of any class of claimants 
relating to any claim subject to 
arbitration. Except as set forth 
below, the arbitrator's decision will 
be fmal and binding. Other rights 
available to you in court might not 
be available in arbitration. 
The agreement also provides, "This 
Agreement, and your Account, and any 
claim, dispute or controversy (whether in 
contract, tort or otherwise) . . . are governed 
by and construed in accordance with 
applicable federal law and the laws of 
Georgia." 
Consumers brought this action in federal 
district court, and the Credit Providers 
moved to compel arbitration of Consumers' 
CROA claims. The district court held the 
arbitration clause in the Credit Providers' 
Aspire Visa credit card agreements was 
invalid and void under the CROA's 
prohibition of the waiver of a consumer's 
right to sue in court, and denied the motion 
to compel arbitration. The district court also 
denied the Credit Providers' Motion for 
Leave to File Motion for Reconsideration. 
The Credit Providers filed a timely 
interlocutory appeal challenging the denial 
of the motion to compel arbitration. 
We review the denial of a motion to compel 
arbitration de novo. 
II 
The district court correctly concluded that 
the arbitration agreement was void because 
the CROA specifically prohibits provisions 
disallowing any waiver of a consumer's 
right to sue in court for CROA violations. 
A 
We employ our usual methodology in 
statutory construction. As always, our 
starting point is the plain language of the 
statute. "[W]e examine not Ol1ly the specific 
provision at issue, but also the structure of 
the statute as a whole, including its object 
and policy." If the plain meaning of the 
statute is unambiguous, that· meaning is 
controlling and we need not examine 
legislative history as an aid to interpretation 
unless "the legislative history clearly 
indicates that Congress meant something 
other than what it said." If the statutory 
language is ambiguous, we consult 
legislative history. 
In this context, we also note that Congress 
has manifested a "liberal· federal policy 
favoring arbitration agreements." 
Specifically, the Federal Arbitration Act 
declares that "[a] written provision in ... a 
contract evincing a transaction involving 
commerce to settle by arbitration a 
. controversy thereafter arising out of such 
contract or transaction . . .. shall be valid, 
irrevocable, and enforceable, Save upon' such 
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the 
revocation of any contract." 
The Supreme Court. has held that "[h]aving 
made the bargain to arbitrate, the party 
should be held to it unless Congress itself 
has evinced an' intention to preclude a 
waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory 
rights at issue." "[I]f Congress intended the 
substantive protection afforded by a given 
statute to include protection against waiver 
of the right to a judicial forum, that intention 
would be deducible from text or legislative 
history." More recently, the Supreme Court 
has reiterated that the Congressional intent 
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to preclude waiver "will be discoverable in 
the text of the [statute], its legislative 
history, or an 'inherent conflict' between 
arbitration and the [statute's] underlying 
purposes." The burden is on the party 
opposing arbitration to show that Congress 
intended to preclude a waiver of judicial 
remedies for the statutory rights at issue. 
B 
With these principles in mind, we turn to the 
Credit Reporting Organization Act. The 
CROA expressly identifies four rights, 
which appear in the disclosures section of 
the statute"15 U.S.C. § 1679c. The first two 
rights concern rights that consumers have in . 
relation to credit bureaus, which are not 
implicated by this suit. The third and fourth 
rights specifically concern rights that 
. consumers have in relation to credit repair 
organizations. The third right directly 
addresses the Consumers' argument: "You' 
have a right to sue a credit repair 
organization that violates the Credit Repair 
Organization Act." In addition, each credit 
repair organization is required to (1) inform 
the consumer of his or her right to sue, (2) 
provide such information to the consumer in 
a separate document containing a verbatim 
copy of an eight-paragraph text specified by 
Congress, which enumerates the "right to 
sue," (3) obtain from the consumer a 
signature cOl1firming receipt of such 
information, and (4) keep such signed 
confirmations on file for two years from the 
date of signing. The disclosure document 
must be provided to every consumer "before 
any contract or agreement between the 
consumer and the credit repair organization 
is executed." 
The CROA also contains a non-waiver 
prOVISIOn, phrased in unusually 
comprehensive and precise language: "Any 
waiver by any consumer of any protection 
provided by or any right of the consumer 
under this subchapter (l) shall be treated as 
void; and (2) may not be enforced by any 
Federal or State court or any other person." 
Thus, the plain language of the CROA 
provides consumers with the "right to sue." 
The "right to sue" means what it says. The 
statute' does not provide a right to "some 
form of dispute resolution," but instead 
specifies the "right to sue." The act of suing 
in a court of law is distinctly different from 
arbitration. The right to sue protected by the 
CROA cannot be satisfied by replacing it 
with an opportunity to submit a dispute to 
arbitration. 
Where terms are not defined within a statute, 
they are accorded their plain and ordinary 
meaning. The plain and ordinary meaning of 
terms can be deduced through reference 
sources, including Black's Law Dictionary 
and general usage dictionaries. 
To sue is "[t]o institute a lawsuit against 
(another party)." For "lawsuit," Black's 
directs us to "suit," which is defined as: 
"[ a]ny proceeding by a party or parties 
against another in a court of law." The plain 
. meaning of the phrase "right to sue" thus 
clearly involves the right to bring an action 
in a court of law. 
By contrast, "arbitration" is "[a] method of 
dispute resolution involving one or more 
neutral third parties who are usu[ ally] agreed 
to by the' disputing parties and whose 
decision is binding." Arbitration is one of 
several mechanisms of "alternative dispute 
resolution," which is "[a] procedure for 
settling a dispute by means other than 
litigation, such as arbitration or mediation." 
The Corpus Juris Secundum underscores 
that "[a]rbitration . is not a judicial 
proceeding either at common law or under 
statutes. It is a proceeding separate from 
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litigation based upon its underlying purpose 
of encouraging dispute resolution without 
result to the courts, and may be 
characterized as an alternative to litigation." 
As a matter of parlance, reference, and 
common sense, we cannot conclude that 
when Congress used the word "sue," it 
really meant "arbitrate." The district court 
correctly read the statute, and determined 
that the consumer's statutory right to sue 
could not be waived. 
III 
The Credit Providers raise a number of 
counter-theories, none of which IS 
persuasIve. 
A 
Credit Providers first argue that, by placing 
the "right to sue" in the mandatory 
"Disclosures" section of the statute, thus 
requiring it be explicitly stated to all 
consumers, does not actually create a right 
to sue as the terms are ordinarily understood. 
Under such a reading, Congress, whose 
purpose in enacting the statute included 
protecting consumers from misinformation, 
drafted a statute which requires credit repair 
organizations to misinform consumers about 
a fictional right. Under Defendant's 
interpretation, Congress was requiring that 
consumers be told a lie: that they possessed 
a non-existent right. We should "avoid, if 
possible, a [statutory] interpretation that 
would produce 'an absurd and unjust result 
which Congress could not have intended.'" 
We do not believe Congress was playing 
Humpty Dumpty with the statute, and we 
decline to accept the Credit Providers' 
invitation to go down that particular rabbit 
hole. . 
B 
The Credit Providers characterize the 
language stating "you have the right to sue" 
in Section 1679c as merely a simplified 
shorthand for the more "complicated" right 
to bring a claim under Section 1679g. This 
is actually a two-step argument. First, Credit 
Providers argue the "right to sue" language 
should not be examined independently 
because it is merely a "simplified" 
restatement for consumers of the 
"substantive" rights embodied in the rest of 
the statute, patiicularly Section 1679g, 
which sets out the punishments available for 
violations . of the Act. Second, Credit 
Providers argue the more general language 
of Section 1679g does not preclude 
arbitration. 
We disagree. We must, if possible,. interpret 
a statute such that all its language is given 
effect, and none of it is rendered 
superfluous. Under Credit Providers' 
interpretation, the "right to sue" language, 
indeed, the entire "Disclosures" section, 
becomes superfluous and insignificant, 
merely a restatement of other sections of the 
statute that expand upon the rights set out in 
Section 1679c. We decline to adopt such a 
reading. 
In addition, Credit Providers argue the 
language "right to sue" was used in the 
Section because it is more "understandable" 
to the average consumer than a broader 
phrase such as the "right to bring a claim." 
This is despite the fact that, according to 
Credit Providers; Congress meant to give 
consumers that latter right, rather than the 
former. If the purpose of the "Disclosures" 
was to communicate to consumers their right 
to sue or to proceed using some form of 
alternative dispute resolution, the phrase 
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"right to sue" is a phrase particularly likely 
to cause confusion, and lead consumers to 
misunderstand their rights under the CROA. 
We see no reason to interpret the language 
in a way that goes against the purpose even 
Credit Providers· have ascribed to it. The 
language actually chosen by Congress 
should be given effect because it is plain and 
clear on its face, and we "presume that [the] 
legislature says in a statute what it means 
and means in a statute what it says there." 
The extremely broad anti-waiver provision 
in the CROA protects the enumerated "right 
to sue," by treating as void "[a]ny waiver by 
any consumer of any protection provided by 
or any right of the consumer under this 
subchapter .... " The Act further provides 
that "[a]ny attempt by any person to obtain a 
waiver from any consumer of any protection 
provided by or any right of the consumer 
under this subchapter shall be treated as a 
violation of this subchapter." The plain 
language of the statute demonstrates that the 
waiver provision applies to the previously 
enumerated "right to sue." First, the use of 
the word "any" to describe which rights are 
covered is "expansive language [that] offers 
no indication whatever that Congress 
intended" to limit a statute's reach. Thus, we 
read the term "any right of the consumer" to 
apply to all the rights in the statute, 
including the "right to sue." Second, 
Congress's consistent use of the word 
"right" indicates the waiver prohibition 
applies to the "right to sue," as identical 
words in a statute should be· given a 
consistent and identical meaning throughout 
the statute. Therefore,' we conclude that 
Congress meant what it said. Accordingly, 
the non-waiver provision invalidates any 
waiver of the right to sue. 
C 
Weare also not convinced by Credit 
Providers' argument regarding the language 
in 15 U.S.C. § 1679f(a). The section states a 
consumer waiver of any right or protection 
"may not be enforced by any Federal or 
State court or any other person." Credit 
Providers argue the "any other person" 
language demonstrates Congress intended 
arbitrators to be able to decide CROA 
claims. First, we do not think this language 
leads to such a clear and unilateral 
conclusion. For example, it is foreseeable 
that a credit repair organization would 
institute arbitration proceedings against a 
consumer for collection of the 
organization's fees under its contract with 
the consumer. The CROA creates various 
non-waivable consumer rights and 
protections other than the right to sue. In an 
arbitration colleCtion proceeding, one of the 
other non-waivable consumer rights or 
protections could arise. The "any other 
person" language of Section 1679f(a) 
assures that these rights and protections 
would be preserved in an arbitration 
instituted by a credit repair organization or 
debt collection agency. It is consistent with a 
consumer's explicitly stated non-waivable 
right. to sue. Given the plain language 
creating such a right, we do not find this 
language requires a different conclusion. 
In addition, the statutory language 
underscores the central tole of courts in 
enforcement of the statute in § 1679g. This 
section, which sets out available damages 
for violations of the CROA, repeatedly 
refers only to "courts" as the enforcement 
mechahism. For example, punitive damages 
may be assessed in "such additional amount 
as the court may allow" and lays out factors 
that "the court shall consider." Thus, the 
language in the remainder of the statute 
suppOlis the plain reading of the text 
creating the right to sue, rather than 
requiring a different outcome. 
We agree with other courts that the 
"CROA's non-waiver of rights provisions, 
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combined with -its proclamation of a 
consumer's right to sue, represent precisely 
the expression of congressional intent 
required by" the Supreme Court to find that 
a waiver of judicial remedies is precluded. 
"Congress did not intend to void all waivers 
of rights under the Act, and require 
consumers to sign a congressionally 
mandated enumeration of their rights under 
the Act, only to permit those very same 
rights to waived mere moments later upon 
the signing an agreement such as the one in 
question here." We agree with the district 
cOUli that "[t]o recognize that CROA voids 
all waivers of 'any right of the consumer' 
and mandates that any waiver of the right to 
sue is void strikes the court as embracing an 
unhealthy regard for the federal policy 
favoring arbitration." Thus, we hold the 
plain language of the CROA prohibits 
enforcement of the arbitration agreement. 
IV 
We realize this decision is in conflict with 
that of two of our sister circuits, but we are 
unpersuaded by the reasoning of those cases. 
See Gay v. CreditInform, 511 F.3d 369 (3d. 
Cir.2007); Picard v. Credit Solutions, Inc., 
564 FJd 1249 (11th Cir.2009). Both Gay 
and Picard give surprisingly little regard to 
the "right to sue" language in the statute, 
and rely upon reasoning in Supreme Court 
cases that are distinguishable from the 
situation here. As Picard essentially follows 
and adopts the reasoning in Gay, we will not 
deal with the two cases separately. 
Gay dispatches with the explicit language 
creating a consumer's "right to sue" in a 
mere footnote. The court states that since the 
section does not specify the forum for 
resolution of the dispute, it does not support 
the argument that it provides a "judicial, 
rather than an arbitral, forum for CROA 
violations." As discussed in more detail 
above, this ignores the plain meaning of the 
word "sue." The Third Circuit continues that 
even if "sue" implies the availability of a 
judicial forum (which we believe it does), 
use of the word "would not mean that the 
organization could not assert defenses that it 
had to such an action including the right to 
invoke a contractual arbitration provision to 
change the forum." This ignores completely 
the anti-waiver clause of the statute. The 
anti-waiver clause explicitly states that any 
waiver of any right by the consumer "shall 
be treated as void" and "may not be 
enforced by any Federal or State court .... " 
Thus, the organization might asseli the 
defense of the contractual arbitration 
provision, but the . court is explicitly 
forbidden from enforcing this waiver of the 
right to sue. 
Gay also relies upon analogies to several 
Supreme Court arbitration cases that we find 
unavailing. The Third Circuit first 
analogized the issue to the one the Supreme 
Court considered in Shew-son/Am. Express, 
Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S, 220, 107 S.Ct. 
2332, 96 L.Ed.2d 185 (1987), when it 
determined whether Section 29(a) of the 
Exchange Act prohibited arbitration 
agreements. Section 27 of the Act provides, 
"The district courts of the United States ... 
shall have exclusive jurisdiction of 
violations of this chapter or the rules and 
regulations thereunder, and of all suits in 
equity and actions at law brought to enforce 
any liability or duty created by this chapter 
or the rules and regulations thereunder." 
Section 29(a) of the Act declares void "[a]ny 
condition, stipulation, or provision binding 
any person to waive compliance with any 
provision of[the Act]." The plaintiffs in 
McMahon argued that Section 29(a) 
prohibited waiver of the Section 27 right to 
bring suit in a federal district court. 
As pointed out by the court in McMahon, 
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the Exchange Act's anti-waiver provision, § 
29(a), 
forbids ] enforcement of 
agreements to waive "compliance" 
with the provisions of the statute. 
But § 27 itself does not impose any 
duty with which persons trading in 
securities must "comply." By its 
terms, § 29(a) only prohibits waiver 
of the substantive obligations 
imposed by the Exchange Act. 
Because § 27 does not impose any 
statutory duties, its waiver does not 
constitute a waiver of "compliance 
with any provision" of the Exchange 
Act under § 29(a). 
J.,1cMahon, 482 U.S. at 228, 107 S.Ct.2332. 
In summary, because the Exchange Act only 
prohibits waivers of compliance with its 
substantive obligations and the mandate of a 
judicial forum is not a substantive 
obligation, the Exchange Act does not 
preclude arbitration agreements. 
Applying McMahon, the Third Circuit 
observed that "the section [of the CROA] in 
which this anti-waiver provision appears is 
entitled 'Noncompliance with this 
subchapter. '" The Third Circuit reasoned 
that the CROA's anti-waiver provision only 
"extend [ s] to rights premised on the 
imposition of statutory duties." Because the 
right to sue in .a judicial forum is not a . 
statutory duty under the CROA, the court 
concluded that the anti-waiver provision did 
not apply to it. However, the plain text of 15 
U.S.C. § 1679f encompasses waivers of 
"any protection" or "any right" under the 
CROA-categories which are much broader 
than mere noncompliance. "[H]eadings and 
titles are not meant to take the place of the 
detailed provisions of the text," and where 
the plain text of the statute is unambiguous, 
"the heading of a section cannot limit the 
plain meaning. of the text." Here, because 
the text of § 1679f(a) is not ambiguous, we 
need not turn to the title of the section to 
clarify its meaning. Further, the substantive-
procedural distinction has no application to 
the CROA. Unlike the Exchange Act, the 
CROA grants consumers the "right to sue." 
Vesting jurisdiction to hear a claim in a 
particular court is quantitatively different 
from a statute that expressly provides for a 
right to sue. Thus, § 1679fs prohibition on 
waivers may not be limited to "compliance" 
with the CROA, and McMahon does not 
apply. 
Weare also not persuaded that the other 
Supreme Court cases regarding the 
availability· of arbitration require allowing 
arbitration in this case. For instance, in 
Mitsubishi Motors COlp. v.· Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 105 S.Ct. 
3346, 87 L.Ed.2d 444 (1985), the Supreme 
Court considered whether the language in 15 
U.S.C. § 15(a) rendered antitrust claims 
non-arbitrable in the context of an 
international commercial dispute. In relevant 
part, § 15(a) provides that "any person who 
shall be injured in his business or property 
by reason of anything forbidden in antitrust 
laws may sue therefor in any district court of 
the United States." The Court held that this 
section did not evidence a congressional 
intent to preclude Sherman Act claims from 
being arbitrable, emphasizing that the 
Federal Arbitration Act and the Convention 
on the Recognition of Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards favor arbitration 
for disputes in international commerce. The 
Court concluded· that it was important "to 
subordinate domestic notions of arbitrability 
to the international policy favoring 
commercial arbitration." The present case 
differs in" that it does not contain an 
international component. More importantly, 
the CROA contains express language which 
precludes waiving "any right of the 
451 
consumer." A plain reading of the statute 
dictates that one of those rights is the "right 
to sue a credit repair organization that 
violates" the CROA. The. Sherman Act does 
not contain similar non-waiver language, 
and thus does not apply to this situation. . 
In Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.} 
500 U.S. 20, 29, 111 S.Ct. 1647, 114 
L.Ed.2d 26 (1991), the Supreme Court 
considered whether an arbitration agreement 
in a securities registration application could 
be avoided· on the theory that arbitration 
"deprives claimants of the judicial forum 
provided for by the [Age Discrimination in 
.Employment Act (ADEA)]." The ADEA 
contains the following non-waiver 
provision: "any individual may not waive 
any right or claim under this Act unless the 
. waiver is knowing and voluntary." 
However, the ADEA does not explicitly 
provide for a "right. to sue." Rather, the 
ADEA takes a "flexible approach to 
resolution of claims. The EEOC for 
example, is directed to pursue 'informal 
methods of conciliation, conference, and 
persuasion,' which suggests that an out-of-
I court dispute resolution, such as arbitration, 
. is consistent with the statutory scheme 
established by Congress." 
. Contrary to the ADEA, the CROA 
specifically grants access to a judicial forum 
and a right to sue, and reveals no such 
"flexibility" toward alternative methods of 
dispute resolution. Moreover, in contrast to 
language in the AD EA that permits 
"knowing and voluntary" waiver of statutory 
rights, the CROA proscribes any "waiver by 
any consumer of any protection provided by 
or any right of the consumer under this title" 
irrespective of a consumer's knowledge or 
intent. Thus, Gilmer is also inapplicable 
here. 
Finally, III Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. 
Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 80, 121 S.Ct. 513, 
148 L.Ed.2d 373 (2000), the Supreme Court 
considered whether claims under the Truth 
in Lending Act (TILA) were arbitrable. The 
party challenging arbitration did not 
"contend that the TILA evinces an intention 
to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies." 
Instead, plaintiffs challenged arbitration 
because the costs and fees would be 
prohibitive. The Court, finding no showing 
regarding prohibitive costs was made, 
rejected the argument. Here, arbitration is 
challenged on the ground that the CROA 
evinces an intention to preclude a waiver of 
judicial remedies. Green Tree simply does 
not apply. . 
v 
The CROA gives consumers the "right to 
sue," and prevents any waiver of "any right" 
under the statute. We find this sufficient to 
demonstrate Congress intended that 
consumers cannot waive their right to sue 
under the CROA, and instead submit to 
arbitration. Therefore, we affirm the district 
court's holding that the forced arbitration 
clause is void and the court's denial of the 
motion to compel arbitration of the CROA 
claims . 
AFFIRMED. 
TASHIMA, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
Because I disagree with the majority's 
conclusion that Congress intended to 
preclude a waiver of a judicial forum for 
claims under·· the Credit Repair 
Organizations Act ("CROA"), I respectfully 
dissent. 
As the majority acknowledges, Congress has 
manifested "a liberal federal policy favoring 
arbitration agreements." Under the Federal 
Arbitration Act, courts should enforce 
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arbitration agreements involving statutory 
claims '''unless Congress itself has evinced 
an intention to preclude a waiver of judicial 
remedies for the statutory rights at issue. '" 
Congress' intent to preclude a waiver of 
judicial remedies must be shown by the 
statute's text, its legislative history, or an 
inherent conflict between arbitration and the 
statute's underlying purpose. Plaintiffs bear 
the burden of showing that Congress 
intended to preclude a waiver of a judicial 
forum for CROA claims. 
The majority concludes that the plain 
language of 15 U.S.C. § 1679c(a) provides 
consumers with the "right to sue," that the 
right to sue implies a judicial forum, and 
that 15 U.S.C. § 1679f prohibits any waiver 
of this right. (Maj. Op. at 1208.) I submit, 
however, that the plain language of § 
1679c(a) does not confer this right upon 
consumers, and neither the CROA nor its 
legislative history shows that. Congress 
intended to preclude a waiver of judicial 
remedies. 
All that § 1679c(a) requires is that a credit 
repair organization provide consumers with 
the following written disclosure: 
You have a right to dispute 
inaccurate information in your credit 
report .... 
You have a right to obtain a copy of 
your credit report .... 
You have a right to sue a credit 
repair organization that violates the 
Credit Repair Organization Act. This 
law prohibits deceptive practices by 
credit repair organizations. 
You have the right to cancel your 
contract with any credit repair 
organization for any reason within 3 
business days from the date you 
signed it. ... 
15 U.S.C. § 1679c(a). 
This section .does not purport to create any 
substantive rights, including the right to sue. 
Rather, its sole purpose is to set forth a 
disclosure . statement to be communicated 
verbatim to consumers. 
Each of the rights referred to in § 1679c(a) 
is separately conferred within Chapter 41 of 
Title 15, thus indicating that Congress 
included § 1679c(a) to advise consumers of 
relevant rights provided for elsewhere in the 
CROA. See Rex v. CSA-Credit Solutions of 
America, Inc., 507 F.Supp.2d 788, 798-99 
(W.D.Mich.2007) ("The inclusion of 
separate sections actually providing the 
substantive rights indicates that the language 
in the disclosures in § 1679c does not create 
any rights. Rather, the language in § 1679c 
only sets forth the phrasing that is to be used 
in advising consumers of their rights under 
other sections of Chapter 41 of Title 15."). 
For example, 15 U.S.C. § 168li provides a 
consumer with the right to dispute 
inaccurate information in his credit report, 
15 U.S.C. § 1681j provides a consumer with 
the right to obtain a copy of his credit report, 
and 15 U.S.C. § 167ge(a) provides a 
consumer with the right to cancel a contract 
with a credit repair organization within three 
business days. 
The "right to sue" listed in § 1679c(a) is 
provided for in 15 U.S.C. § 1679g, which 
establishes civil liability for violations of the 
CROA. Becallse § 1679g provides for civil 
liability, a consumer ordinarily has the 
"right to sue" a credit repair organization 
which violates the CROA. Nowhere in the 
CROA, however, does Congress mandate· a 
judicial forum for enforcement of the 
CROA's substantive provisions. The 
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disclosure language in § 1679c(a), while 
recognizing a right to sue, does not itself 
confer that right. Because § 1679c(a) does 
not establish any rights, but only requires 
credit repair organizations to make a written 
disclosure to consumers, the disclosure 
statement's mention of a "right to sue" 
cannot be the basis of a non-waivable right 
under 15 U.S.C. § 1679f. 
In addition, 15 U.S.C. § 1679findicates that 
Congress intended that CROA claims to be 
enforceable outside a judicial forum. It 
provides that "[a]ny waiver ... of any 
protection . . . or any right . . . under this 
subchapter . . . may not be enforced by any 
Federal or State court or any other person." 
By including "or any other person" in the 
same sentence that lists Federal and State 
courts as appropriate for CROA claims, 
Congress clearly indicated that arbitrators, 
mediators, and other third parties may 
decide CROA claims. This· language 
indicates that Congress contemplated a role 
for arbitrators in enforcing CROA claims. 
On the other hand, the majority's suggestion 
that the references to "the court" in § 1679g 
support a right to sue in court, does not 
overcome the "liberal federal policy 
favoring arbitration agreements." Such 
language merely indicates Congress' 
expectation that the question of civil liability 
will normally be resolved in a judicial 
forum. It does not confer a non-waivable 
right to a judicial forum. 
Finally, the mere mention of a '~right to sue" 
does not necessarily mean the right to sue in 
court, especially given the lack of other 
statutory language supporting this 
interpretation. The only other circuits to 
have ruled on this issue are in agreement. 
See PicaiAd v. Credit Solutions, Inc., 564 
F.3d 1249, 1255 (lIth Cir.2009) ("Although 
CROA requires credit repair organizations 
to inform consumers of their right to a 
private cause of action, such does not 
preclude arbitration under CROA"); Gay, 
511 FJd at 377 n. 4 ("[15 U.S.C. § 1679c(a) 
] does not specify the for1llll for the 
resolution of the dispute and therefore does 
not support [the] argument that the CROA 
provides a consumer with the right to bring 
suit in a judicial, rather than an arbitral, 
forum for CROA violations."). We should 
not lightly create a circuit split on an issue 
of national application on the basis of the 
flimsy evidence on. which the majority 
relies. We should be "hesitant to create such 
a split, and we should do so only after the 
most painstaking inquiry" and only if 
required by the "unambiguously expressed 
intent of Congress." 
The majority does not even address whether 
the legislative history of the CROA or any 
inherent conflict between arbitration and the 
statute's underlying purpose may form a 
basis for prohibiting waiver of the judicial 
forum. Nothing cited by Plaintiffs suggests 
that Congress actually considered the issue 
of arbitrability of CROA claims, and the 
legislative history does not establish that 
Congress intended CROA claims to be non-
arbitrable. In addition, there is no inherent 
conflict between arbitration and CROA's 
underlying purpose because Plaintiffs may 
enforce their rights under the substantive 
provisions of CROA even if compelled to 
arbitrate. 
Because neither the plain text of the statute, 
its legislative history, nor any inherent 
conflict between the purpose of CROA and 
arbitration shows that Congress intended to 
preclude a waiver of judicial remedies, I 
would reverse the district court's order and 
remand with instructions to compel 
arbitration. 
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"Rights of the Second-Chance Cardholder" 
SCOTUSblog 
May 2,2011 
Lyle Denniston 
In the wake of the Great Recession, America 
has a good many consumers who would 
like-and may need-to have credit cards, 
but they are higher risk, or "sub-prime" 
b011'0wers. There has been, for some years, a 
financial industry to serve them: the 
community of "credit repair organizations" 
willing to give those consumers a second 
chance. Congress took steps, back in 1996, 
to make sure such consumers were not 
duped, adding the Credit Repair 
Organizations Act as a title in the Consumer 
Credit Protection Act. On Monday, the 
Supreme Court' agreed to spell out what 
legal remedies that law provides: a right to 
sue, or only a right to go to arbitration? The 
appeals courts are split on the issue. 
The Court granted review of CompuCredit 
Corp., et al., v. Gi'eenwood, et al. (10-948), 
a challenge to a Ninth Circuit Court ruling 
that the 1996 law guarantees a right to sue, 
and will not allow the consumer to waive 
that right even though obliged, by a credit· 
card agreement, to take any dispute to 
arbitration. The case will be heard and 
decided in the Court's next Term, starting 
Oct. 3. ' 
As a general matter, consumer advocates 
would rather have the chance to sue, instead 
of going to arbitration, on the theory that 
they can do better in court-especially since 
the Supreme Court has been in the process 
of discouraging group arbitration by a 
number of consumers with the same 
commercial complaint. Businesses, though, 
prefer arbitration, because they fear risks of 
being taken before a jury in a position to 
award sympathetic damages, mid that risk 
may f01:ce them to settle. Arbitration, too, is 
a less expensive process than a court case. 
Both sides thus have a keen interest in the 
new case, the latest in a series of disputes 
the Court has taken on in the past several 
terms to clarify the role of arbitration in 
consumer disputes. 
The case involves a "sub-prime credit card" 
that CompuCredit Corp. marketed under the 
brand name, "Aspire Visa." It promoted the 
card, especially to high-risk, poor-credit 
consumers, through mass mailings and 
Internet advertising. One of the issuers of 
the card was a Georgia bank, Columbus 
Bank and Trust (recently taken over and 
now a part of Synovus Bank, a Florida-
based regional banking firm). 
Wanda Greenwood and several, other 
consumers obtained the cards from the ballie. 
They later would say they were attracted 
because no deposit was required and there 
was a promise that they would immediately 
have $300 in credit available to them. Later, 
after they were signed up, they discovered 
that a total of $257 in first-year fees were 
being charged. Although those fees are 
spelled out in the fine print, the consumers 
contended that they did not get proper notice 
of those fees. The card agreements they 
entered in order· to get the cards required 
them to arbitrate any disputes. 
Their lawsuit, including some Californians, 
. was filed as a class-action case in a federal 
court in San Francisco, relying on the 1996 
federal law and on California state law (as to 
the Californians in the class; the California-
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related issues are no longer involved in the 
case). The lawsuit contended that the card 
agreement deceived them about the fees that· 
would be charged in the first year. 
Under the federal law, credit repair 
organizations are required to make a number 
of disclosures to their potential customers, 
including a statement that "you have a'right 
to sue." That is a part of a civil liability 
section of the law, that specifies that any 
person who fails to obey the law is liable for 
damages. Another provision says that "any 
waiver by any consumer of any protection 
provided by or any right of the consumer ... 
shall be treated as void." 
CompuCredit and the bank asked the 
District Court to compel arbitration of the 
dispute over the entry fees, citing the 
binding arbitration clause in the card 
agreements. The judge refused, ruling that 
claims under the Credit Reporting 
Organizations Act were not subject to 
arbitration. The Ninth Circuit Court agreed, 
declaring: "We conclude that Congress 
meant what it said in using the term 'sue,' 
and that it did not mean 'arbitrate. '" Noting 
that other Circuit Courts had ruled the 
arbitration agreement had to be enforced, the 
Ninth Circuit panel said it disagreed. 
CompuCredit and Synovus Banle, in their 
petition to the Supreme Court, relied heavily 
upon the fact that the Circuit Courts are split 
on the issue. They contended that the Ninth 
Circuit's decision conflicts with· Congress's 
preference for arbitration of commercial 
disputes, under the Federal Arbitration Act. 
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"Ninth Circuit Rules that Congress's Use of the 
Phrase 'Right to Sue' Precluded Parties from 
Agreeing to Arbitrate Any Dispute" 
OneWorld:lnternational Practice Blog 
November 15,2010 
Louis M. Solomon 
Our most recent post, on 11/1211 0, analyzed 
the First Circuit's efforts to uphold private 
. parties' freedom to contract with each other 
concerning the forum and law to govern 
their international dispute. By way of 
contrast, a recent decision by the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals, Greenwood, et al. 
v. CompllCredit COIP, et al., No. 09-15906 
(9th Cir. 8/17/10), also addressed the 
freedom of contract issue. Here, however, 
the Court of Appeals found that Congress 
had precluded the right of private parties to 
agree to arbitrate their disputes rather than 
having to litigate them in court. The decision 
creates a conflict with two other Courts of 
Appeals· and is important in the context of 
international litigation, where parties 
frequently believe they have the right to 
determine for themselves whether to 
contract to arbitrate or initiate litigation in 
court to resolve any disputes. 
CompuCredit involved claims by consumers 
under the Credit Repair Organization Act 
(CROA), in particular the rights granted to 
consumers in the disclosure section of the 
CROA, 15 U.S.C. 1679c. One of the rights 
provided: "You have the right to sue a credit 
repair organization that violates the" CROA 
(emphasis supplied). 
In the agreements that CompuCredit made 
with consumers, there was an explicit right, 
. and obligation, . to arbitrate. The District 
Court held that the obligation to arbitrate 
was invalid and denied a motion to compel 
arbitration. . An immediate, interlocutory 
appeal was proper. 
In affirming, the Court of Appeals 
recognized the strong and "liberal federal 
policy favoring arbitration agreements" 
(quoting Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane 
Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991)). Nonetheless, the 
Circuit determined that there was no 
reasonable way the phrase "right to sue" 
could include arbitration. Said the COUli of 
. Appeals: "The plain language of the CROA 
provides consumers with the 'right to sue.' 
15 U.S.C. § 1679c. The 'right to sue' means 
what it says. The statute does not provide a 
right to 'some form of dispute resolution', 
but instead specifies the 'right to sue'. The 
act of suing in a court of law is distinctly 
different from arbitration." . 
The Court of Appeals acknowledged that its 
decision was in conflict with the holdings of 
two other Circuit Court decisions (from the 
Third and Eleventh Circuits). And, of the 
three member panel deciding this appeal, 
one, Circuit Judge Tashima, dissented, 
believing that the language Congress used, 
"right to sue", did not preclude a waiver of a 
judicial fOlUm for the resolution of disputes. 
With the panel itself unable to agree, one 
. might ask if the conclusion of the majority 
was so clear as to preclude any other 
interpretation, and if an alternative 
interpretation was reasonable, whether the 
strong policy in favor both of freedom of 
contract and in particular of resolving 
disputes by arbitration might not have 
permitted a different outcome. 
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"Arbitration and Consumer Protection" 
Harvard Law Review 
February, 2011 
Harvard Law Review Association 
Congress passed the Credit Repair 
Organizations Act (CROA) to assist 
consumers in making informed decisions 
and to protect consumers from unfair or 
deceptive practices when dealing with 
companies that purport to help rebuild 
credit. The CROA augments the Consumer 
Credit Protection Act with additional 
nonwaivable consumer protections, 
including a mandatory pre contractual 
disclosure of consumers' rights when 
contracting with a credit repair organization. 
Recently, in Greenwood v. CompuCredit 
Corp., the Ninth Circuit denied a request to 
compel arbitration based on a predispute 
arbitration agreement, holding that the 
CROA's mandatory disclosure term "right 
to sue" creates. a substantive, nonwaivable 
right that precludes arbitration. While the 
decision marks an additional step toward 
limiting the federal policy favoring 
arbitration for claims involving consumer 
rights, the Ninth Circuit limited arbitration 
by adopting a narrow definition of "sue" that 
the Supreme Court has rejected. As a result 
of this definition, the Ninth Circuit 
effectively created a mandatory rule that 
goes beyond what advocates of consumer 
protection support. by banning arbitration of 
CROA claims. 
The CROA requires that credit repair 
organizations-businesses that . offer to 
"improv[e] any consumer's credit record"-
provide consumers with a specific written: 
disclosure statement. The third paragraph of 
this mandatory disclosure statement tells the 
qonsumer, "You have a right to sue a credit 
repair organization." In addition, the CROA 
creates civil liability for "[a]ny person who 
fails to comply with any provision of this 
subchapter." Moreover, a waiver of "any 
protection provided by or any right of the 
consumer under this subchapter ... may not 
be enforced by any Federal or State court or 
any other person." 
CompuCredit marketed a subprime credit 
card called the Aspire Visa,. issued by 
Columbus Bank and Trust, to consumers 
with "low or weak credit scores," claiming 
the card "could be used to rebuild your 
credit, rebuild poor credit, and improve your 
credit rating." Despite the assertion made in 
CompuCredit's advertisements that the 
credit card offered an immediate $300 line 
of credit with "no deposit required," 
CompuCredit charged consumers $257 in 
fees during the first year against their line of 
credit, including "a $29 finance charge, a 
monthly $6.50 account maintenance fee, and 
a $150 annual fee." Before receiving the 
credit card, each consumer received and 
agreed to the "Terms of Offer" and 
"Summary of Credit Terms" under the "Pre-
Approved Acceptance Certificate," which 
included a "binding arbitration provision" 
requiring "[a]ny claim, dispute or 
controversy ... [to] be resolved by binding 
arbitration. " 
Wanda Greenwood and her fellow plaintiffs, 
each of whom had opened an Aspire Visa 
card, brought suit in the Northern District of 
California against CompuCredit and 
Columbus Barue and Trust, alleging 
violations of theCROA. The defendants 
moved to compel arbitration based on the 
Pre-Approved Acceptance Certificate. The 
district court denied the motion to compel 
arbitration. While the Federal Arbitration 
Act (FAA) requires a district court to 
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compel arbitration when "1) there exists a 
valid agreement to arbitrate; and 2) the 
dispute falls within its telms/' Judge Wilken 
found the arbitration agreement at issue void 
because the text of the CROA created a 
"right to sue" that cannot be waived. Noting 
, the "federal policy favoring arbitration," 
Judge Wilken distinguished "the 'right to 
sue' and non-waiver language used in 
CROA [as] different in important respects, 
from other statutory language" at issue in 
the relevant Supreme Court precedents: 
While the statutes at issue in those cases 
contain jurisdictional provisions granting 
access to federal' courts, the CROA 
establishes the "right to ,sue," which 
precludes arbitration, in a section of the 
statute that imposes a substantive duty of 
disclosure. 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed. Writing for the 
panel, Judge Thomas held that the plain 
language of the CROA created a right to sue 
in a judicial forum that could not be waived. 
Stating that the policy favoring arbitration 
can only be overcome by "[c]ongressional 
intent to preclude waiver" found in the 
statute's text, legislative history, or 
"inherent conflict between arbitration and 
the [statute's] underlying purposes," Judge 
Thomas' read the mandatory disclosure 
section of the CROA as creating an 
unambiguous "right to sue" ina court that 
the broad antiwaiver provision plainly 
covers by protecting "any right, of the 
consumer." Judge Thomas determined that 
the "right to sue . . , cannot be satisfied by 
replacing it with an opportunity to submit a 
dispute to arbitration" because the "plain 
and ordinary meaning" of "sue" does not 
include arbitration. Using legal dictionaries, 
Judge Thomas argued that the plain meaning 
of "sue" involves litigation "in a court of 
law" whereas the plain meaning of 
"arbitration" constitutes "dispute resolution 
without result to the courts." 
The Ninth Circuit also dismissed the 
alternative interpretation of the CROA 
adopted by the Third and Eleventh Circuits, 
distinguishing the Supreme Court precedents 
relied upon by those courts. First, Judge 
Thomas rejected the argument that the 
mandatory disclosure section does not create 
a substantive right to sue in court as well as 
the argument that the "right to sue" actually 
refers to the broader right to bring a claim 
established in § 1679g. Reading the statute 
with Congress's purpose of "protecting 
consumers from misinformation" in mind, 
Judge Thomas reasoned that the defendants' 
interpretations of the "right to sue" would 
either nonsensically "misinform consumers 
about a fictional right" or render "the entire 
'Disclosures' section . .. superfluous." 
Judge Thomas then held that the "any other 
person" language in § 1679f(a)-the 
CROA's antiwaiver provision~does not 
evince a congressional intent to allow 
arbitration of CROA claims because a 
consumer can raise CROA counterclaims in 
an arbitration proceeding initiated by a 
credit repair organization, and the arbitrator, 
or "person," in that proceeding cannot 
enforce a waiver of the consumer's CROA 
protections. Recognizing that the court's 
reading of the CROA "is in conflict with 
that of two ... sister circuits," both of which 
allowed arbitration of CROA claims, Judge 
Thomas highlighted the fact that the other 
circuits "g[a]ve surprisingly little regard to 
the 'right to sue' language" in the mandatory 
disclosure section and consequently to the 
difference between that language, which 
creates a substantive right, and the 
jurisdictional provisions of other statutes 
that the Supreme Court found could be 
waived. 
Judge Tashima dissented. Although he 
disagreed with the majority's interpretation 
of the text of CROA and lamented the 
creation of a circuit split, his dissent used 
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the same inquiry as the majority. Beginning 
with the text of the CROA, Judge Tashim:a 
argued that the mandatory disclosure. section 
does not "create any substantive rights, 
including the right to sue," a reading 
supported by the fact that other sections of 
Title 15 separately confer the. rights 
mentioned in the mandatory disclosure 
statement. Since the civil liability section 
does not "mandate a judicial forum," the 
"right to sue" does not hiean the right to sue. 
in court. Judge Tashima found further 
support for his reading of the CROA in the 
"any other person" language. of the waiver 
provision, which "clearly indicate[s] that 
arbitrators ... may decide CROA claims," 
and in the Third and Eleventh Circuit 
decisions. After dismissing the majority's 
argument that the text unambiguously 
demonstrates a ban on arbitration, Judge 
Tashima then noted the lack of legislative 
history and argued that "there is no inherent 
conflict between arbitration and CROA's 
underlying purpose." 
The Ninth Circuit made three necessary 
determinations in order to find a ban on 
arbitration in the CROA. First, "the plain 
and ordinary meaning" of "sue" precludes 
arbitration. Second, Congress .. created a 
substantive "right to sue" in the mandatory 
disclosure section of the CROA that is 
distinct from the procedural civil liability 
. provision. Finally, the antiwaiver provision 
of the CROA covers the substantive "right 
to sue." Whether the CROA precludes or 
. allows consumer-initiated arbitration 
therefore depends primarily on the decision 
to define "sue" either nan-owly or broadly. 
While the Ninth Circuit supported its nan-ow 
definition of "sue" with "parlance, 
reference, and common sense," the 
definition fails to adopt the Supreme Court's 
view that arbitration is simply another forum 
for adjudication. As a result of the 
dichotomy created between "sue" and 
"arbitrate," the Ninth Circuit· effectively 
created a mandatory rule banning arbitration 
of CROA claims in proceedings initiated by 
consumers. By removing consumers' ability 
to commit to binding arbitration, the court 
contravened consumer protection's purpose 
and the CROA's purpose of aiding 
consumer choice. 
In defining "sue" nan-owly, . the Ninth 
Circuit failed to follow Supreme Court 
precedent interpreting similar language in 
other statutes. Since the CROA and its 
legislative history do not mention 
arbitration, the Ninth Circuit relied 
exclusively on the plain meaning of the 
word "sue" found in legal reference texts to 
distinguish "sue" from "arbitrate." While 
"sue" could be defined broadly as bringing a 
claim in any forum, the Ninth Circuit 
defined "the right to sue" nan-owly as "[t]he 
act of suing in a court of law [which] is 
distinctly different from arbitration" and 
"cannot be satisfied by ... arbitration." The 
Ninth Circuit's definition therefore conflicts 
with the Supreme Court's view of an 
arbitration agreement as "a specialized kind 
of forum-selection clause." The Court in 
Rodriguez de Quijas v. ShearsonlAmerican 
Express, Inc. implicitly accepted' that 
"arbitration is merely a form of trial to be 
used in lieu of a trial at law." The Ninth 
Circuit previously recognized this definition, 
interpreting the ability to "bring suit . . . in 
any district court" granted by the Federal 
Communications Act as lacking the "strong 
showing of congressional intent" necessary 
to "bar[] the arbitral forum" even though it 
bars state and tribal forums. 
The Ninth Circuit attempted to distinguish 
the Supreme Court precedents upholding 
arbitration of statutory claims. The court's 
discussion of ShearsonlAmerican Express, 
Inc. v. McMahon and Rodriguez de QUijas, 
the two Supreme Court cases addressing the 
issues closest to those in Greenwood, 
focused on the application of antiwaiver 
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provisions to substantive rights, such as the 
CROA's "right to . sue," but not to 
procedural, jurisdictional prOViSIOns. 
However, even if the CROA creates a 
substantive "right to sue," that right bars. 
. arbitration only if the court rejects the 
equivalence of arbitration and adjudication 
in court, adopting the "judicial hostility" and 
"outmoded presumption of disfavoring 
arbitration proceedings" Congress sought to 
eliminate with the FAA. The Ninth Circuit 
also ignored the Supreme Court's lengthy 
discussions in McMahon and Rodriguez de 
QUijas equating arbitration with judicial suit. 
The court missed the critical preliminary 
step of defining "sue" conectly and, as a 
result, relied on an outmoded distinction 
between "sue" and "arbitrate" to find the 
CROA bars arbitration. 
While the Ninth Circuit's holding addressed 
only predispute arbitration agreements, the 
decision effectively creates a mandatory rule, 
against arbitration of CROA claims in any 
proceeding initiated by a consumer. By 
holding that "Congress intended that 
consumers cannot waive their right to sue 
under the CROA, and instead submit to 
arbitration," the Ninth Circuit left open the 
possibility that the statute similarly 
precludes postdispute arbitration 
agreements. Postdispute, a· consumer can 
ordinarily choose to enter into an arbitration 
agreement to resolve CROA claims; 
however, submitting to arbitration requires 
an agreement to be bound by the result of 
the arbitration. Since Greenwood held that a 
consumer cannot waive his or her CROA 
right to sue in a court, a consumer can void a 
postdispute arbitration agreement by 
asserting this CROA "right to sue." 
Consumers therefore cannot meaningfully 
submit to arbitration, whereas credit repair 
organizations can continue to enforce 
arbitration agreements in proceedings they 
initiate. 
The mandatory rule against arbitration· 
effectively created by the narrow definition 
of "sue" contravenes the purpose of the 
CROA and goes further than consumer 
protection advocates and legislation support. 
The CROA aims to aid consumer 
contracting by "ensur[ing] that prospective 
buyers ... are provided with the information 
necessary to make an informed decision." 
While consumers have little power to choose 
arbitration in the context of pre dispute 
arbitration agreements, they have a better 
bargaining position postdispute when 
deciding whether to submit to arbitration. 
Proponents of consumer protection 
legislation support banning predispute 
arbitration agreements in consumer contracts 
because the forced arbitration clause harms 
the consumer's ability to contract freely. 
Therefore, the issue with arbitration 
agreements is not the outmoded view that 
arbitration fails t6 afford consumers the 
same protections as a judicial proceeding, 
which the Ninth Circuit focused on by 
defining "sue" as distinct from "arbitrate," 
but rather the elimination of the consumer's 
choice in predispute agreements. Effectively 
banning postdispute arbitration also 
eliminates the conslimer's ability to choose. 
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Credit Suisse Securities v. Simmonds 
10-1261 
Ruling Below: Simmonds v. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC, 638 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2011) cert. 
denied, 10-1218,2011 WL 1343555 (U.S. June 27,2011) and cert. granted, 10-1261,2011 WL 
1481302 (U.S. June 27,2011) 
Plaintiff Vanessa Simmonds brought 54 derivative complaints under Section 16(b) of the 
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. Simmonds alleged numerous instances of short-swing 
trading practices surrounding IPOs of corporations in which she held stock. Accordingly, 
Simmonds sought disgorgement of profits obtained as a result of these transactions. Before 
bringing her claim, Simmonds sent "demand letters" to the companies involved, insisting they 
assert their rights under 16(b) and file their own claims in this matter. When the corporations 
elected not to do so, Simmonds brought these complaints. The district court dismissed 30 of the 
complaints for deficiencies in the demand letters and the remaining 24 as time-barred due to a 
two-year statute of limitations. The Ninth Circuit affilmed the dismissal of the deficient 
complaints but reversed the dismissal of those the district court found time-barred. The court 
interpreted the two-year statutory period as tolled until the disputed transactions had been 
disclosed in mandatory Section 16(a) reports to the SEC, rather than running from the time the 
transactions took place: 
Question Presented: Does the two-year statute of limitations established in Section 16(b) of the 
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, which requires statutory insiders to disgorge profits from 
short-swing transactions in publicly traded issuer securities, begin to run if the targeted insider 
has failed to comply with its obligations under Section 16(a) of the Act to disClose short-swing 
trading activity in reports filed with the SEC? (Roberts, c.J., recused). 
Vanessa SIMMONDS,et al Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
CREDIT SUISSE SECURITIES (USA) LLC; JPMorgan Chase & Co., a Delaware 
corporation, successor in interest to Hambrecht & Quist and Chase Securities Inc.; Bank of 
America Corporation, a Delaware corporation, successor in interest to Fleetboston 
Robertson Stephens, Inc.; Onvia Inc., a Delaware corporation formerly lmown as 
Onvia.com Inc.; Robertson Stephens, Inc.; J.P. Morgan Securities Inc., Defendants-
Appellees. 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
Filed December 2,2010. Amended January 18,2011. Second Amendment January 25,2011. 
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.] 
M. SMITH, Circuit Judge: 
Plaintiff-Appellant Vanessa Simmonds 
appeals the district court's dismissal of fifty-
four related derivative complaints brought 
under Section 16(b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act), 15 
U.S.C. § 78p(b). Simmonds's complaints 
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allege that the Defendant-Appellee 
investment banks (collectively, 
Underwriters) violated Section 16(b) by 
engaging in prohibited "short-swing" 
transactions in connection with the Initial 
Public Offerings (IPOs) of the fifty-four 
Defendant-Appellee corporations 
(collectively, Issuing Companies). between 
1999 and 2000. Simmonds seeks 
disgorgement of the Underwriters' alleged· 
short:"swing trading profits. 
We affirm the district cOUli's c.Onclusion 
(rendered in the thhiy cases in which the 
issue was raised) that Simmonds failed to 
present . an adequate demand letter t.O the 
Issuing C.Ompanies prior to filing her 
lawsuits, and we remand these cases to the 
district court to dismiss the complaints with 
prejudice. We reverse the district c.Ourt's 
conclusion that the remaining twenty-four 
cases are barred by Section 16(b)' s two-year 
statute of limitations, and we remand these 
cases to the district court S.O that all 
defendants, including the Underwriters, have 
a full opportunity to contest the adequacy of 
Simmonds's demand letters with respect to 
the remaining twenty-four cases. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL 
BACKGROUND 
In her First" Amended Complaints 
(Complaints), Simmonds alleges that while 
the Underwriters were acting as lead 
underwriters on the Issuing Companies" 
IPOs, they coordinated their activities with 
the Issuing Companies' officers, directors, 
and principal shareholders (collectively, 
Insiders) in .Order to obtain financial benefits 
from post-IPO increases in the Issuing 
Companies' st.Ock prices. SimmQnds alleges 
that the Insiders entered "lock-up 
agreements" with the Underwriters that 
prevented the Insiders from offering .Or 
selling their stock for 180 days following the 
IPO. The purpose of the lock-up agreements 
was to "collectively hold[ ] ... and refrain[ ] 
from selling" the Insiders' shares, and the 
Underwriters and Insiders intended to 
receive financial benefits by selling these 
shares int.O an inflated market after the l.Ock-
up agreements expired. In order t.O create 
this inflated market, the Underwriters and 
Insiders allegedly agreed to release the IPO 
to the general public at a discount to the 
price that "they knew to be the likely 
aftermarket price range . . . based .On clear 
indications of IPO and aftermarket demand." 
The Underwriters also allegedly inflated the 
post-IPO share prices by engaging in a 
practice known as "laddering"-in exchange 
for giving their customers access to IPO 
allocations, the Underwriters required their 
customers (including the Issuing. 
Companies' . Insiders) to purchase shares "at 
progressively higher prices" following the 
IPO. Finally, Simmonds asserts that the 
Under-writers engaged in "improper 
research-related activities that were designed 
to inflate the market price" of the shares. 
According to Simmonds, these allegations 
establish that the Underwriters and Insiders 
acted as a gr.Oup and coordinated their 
conduct with respect to acquiring the Issuing 
Companies' stock, holding the stock, and 
disposing of the stock "so as to share in the 
profits gained in the aftermarket foll.Owing 
the IPO." 
Simmonds alleges that the Underwriters had 
three types of "direct .Or indirect pecuniary 
interest [ s]" in the Issuing Companies' stock 
that all.Owed the Underwriters to "profit[ ] 
from purchases . and sales, .Or sales and 
purchases" of that stock. (The C.Omplaints 
define these transactions as the operative 
"Short-Swing Transacti.Ons". f.Or purposes of 
these lawsuits.) First, the Underwriters 
"shar[ ed] in the profits of customers to 
whom they made IPO allocations" .Of the 
Issuing Companies' stock. Second, the 
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Underwriters "allocat[ ed] shares of [the 
Issuing Companies'] stock to executives and 
other high-level insiders of other companies, 
both private and public, from which [the 
Underwriters] expected to receive new or 
additional investment banking business in 
return." Finally, the Underwriters "creat[ed] 
the opportunity for other members of the 
[g]roup to derive personal financial benefits 
from the sale of the [the Issuing 
Companies'] stock into an inflated market, 
in an effort by [the Underwriters] to obtain 
future investment banking business from 
[the Issuing Companies]." 
In her Complaints, Simmonds seeks to 
compel the Under-writers to disgorge the 
profits they received from these "Short-
Swing Transactions." Simmonds alleges that 
prior to filing the Complaints, she submitted 
demand letters insisting that the Issuing 
Companies seek· this relief directly (as is 
their right under Section 16(b)). When more 
than sixty days .had lapsed after she sent the 
demand letters, Simmonds filed· the 
Complaints at issue in this appeal. 
The Underwriters jointly filed a motion to 
dismiss Shnmonds's Complaints under 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). The Underwriters 
. contended that Simmonds's claims were 
time-barred, that Simmonds's Complaints 
failed to state a cause of action under 
Section 16(b), and that the Underwriters are 
protected by various exemptions from 
Section 16(b). Thirty of the Issuing 
Companies (collectively, Moving Issuers) 
filed a separate motion to dismiss under 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b )(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 
12(b)(6). The Moving Issuers argued that 
Simmonds's claims were time-barred and 
that Simmonds lacked standing because she 
failed to submit adequate demand letters to 
the Issuing Companies prior to filing suit. 
The district court gr~nted the Moving 
Issuers' Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) motions to 
dismiss based on the inadequacy of 
Simmonds's demand letters, and granted the 
Underwriters' Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) 
motions to dismiss based on the two-year 
statute of limitations. In re Section 16(b) 
Litig., 602 F.Supp.2d 1202, 1211-18 
(W.D.Wash.2009). The court did not 
address the Underwriters' remaining 
arguments regarding the merits of 
Simmonds's allegations and the scope of the 
Underwriters' exemptions from Section 
16(b). The court dismissed without prejudice 
the thitiy actions resolved by the Moving 
Issuers' Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) motions. The 
cOUli dismissed the remaining twenty-four 
cases with prejudice in light of its ruling on 
the statute of limitations. 
Simmonds filed a timely appeal, and the 
thirty Moving Issuers filed timely cross-
appeals requesting that the district court's 
dismissals ·of their cases be entered with 
prejudice rather than without prejudice. We 
granted the parties' joint motion to 
consolidate the cases on appeal pursuant to 
Fed. R.App. P. 3(b)(2). 
mRISDICTION AND STANDARD OF 
REVIEW 
Ordinarily, "[a] dismissal of a complaint 
without prejudice is not a final order." 
However, the district court's orders in these 
cases are final and appealable because 
"leave to amend was not specifically 
allowed and [Simmonds] cannot amend 
[her] complaint to defeat the. statute of 
limitations bar" as construed by the district 
court. Accordingly, we have jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
We review the district court's dismissal for 
failure to comply with the demand 
requirement for abuse of discretion. We 
review the district .court's dismissal on 
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statute of limitations grounds de novo. We 
refrain from reviewing issues not addressed 
by the district court. 
DISCUSSION 
"Congress enacted Section 16(b) as part of 
the Exchange Act to prevent corporate 
insiders from exploiting their access to 
information not generally available to 
others." Section 16(b) requires corporate 
insiders to disgorge any trading profits they 
obtain· in any "short-swing" transaction, 
which is defined as "a coupled purchase-
and-sale, or sale-and-purchase, c'ompleted 
within six months." There are four basic 
elements of a Section 16(b) claim: "(1) a 
purchase and (2) a sale of securities (3) by 
an officer or director of the issl)-er or by a 
shareholder who.owns more than ten percent 
of anyone class of the issuer's securities (4) 
within a six-month period." 
. The purpose of the rule is not to punish 
specific instances of wrongdoing or remedy 
harins suffered by particular individuals. 
Rather, the law is "aimed at protecting the 
public" by .preventing corporate insiders 
from exploiting inside information at the 
expense of ordinary investors. In order to 
fulfill this purpose, Section 16(b) "is a blunt 
instrument, at once both over- and under-
inclusive." It "is over-inclusive in that it 
imposes strict liability regardless of motive, 
including trades not actually based on inside 
information," and "[i]t is underinclusive in 
that there is no liability for trades made on 
inside information if more than six months 
transpire between purchase and sale." 
This appeal focuses on a pair of procedural· 
prerequisites to filing a Section 16(b) 
lawsuit: the demand requirement, and the 
statute of limitations. Shareholders may only 
file a Section 16(b) suit after requesting that 
the issuing company take appropriate action 
against its insiders. If sixty days pass after a 
shareholder demand has been made without 
the issuing company resolving the matter 
(either informally or via lawsuit), 
shareholders may file suit on the issuing 
company's behalf. However, shareholders 
must file their suit within two years of the 
transactions at issue, subject to the tolling 
rules described in greater detail infra. 
A. Demand Requirement 
Section 16(b) provides in relevant part that 
all insider short-swing trading profits "shall 
inure to and be recoverable by the issuer," 
and "[s]uit to recover such profit may be 
instituted at law or in equity in any court of 
competent jurisdiction by the issuer, or by 
the owner of any security of the issuer in the 
name and. in behalf of the issuer iithe issuer 
shall fail or refuse to bring such suit within 
sixty days after request or shall fail 
diligently to prosecute the same thereafter. . 
.. " The issuing company's right to recover 
the insider's trading profits "is simply an 
application of an old principle in the law that 
if you are an agent and you profit by insider 
information concerning the affairs of your 
principal, your profits go to your principa1." 
Section 16(b) does not set forth any 
additional details regarding the nature and 
scope of this statutory demand requirement. 
In light of this Congressional silence, we 
tum to state law for guidance. The Supreme 
Court has explained that "where a gap in the 
federal securities laws must be bridged by a 
rule that bears on the allocation of governing 
powers within the corporation, federal courts 
should incorporate state law into federal 
common law unless the particular state law 
in question is inconsistent with the policies 
underlying the federal statute." Kamen v. 
Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc:, 500 U.S. 90, 108, 
111 S.Ct. 1711, 114 L.Ed.2d 152 (1991). 
Applying this broad principle in the context 
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of the Investment Company Act of 1940, the 
Kamen Court held that "the contours of the 
demand requirement" (in that case, the 
standards governing dem;md futility) must 
be determined by the law of the state of 
incorporation. 
Here, the adequacy of Simmonds's Section 
16(b) demand letters is disputed in the thirty 
cases involving the Moving Issuers, all of 
which are Delaware corporations. In light of 
the principles articulated in Kamen, these 
thirty demand letters must be analyzed in 
accordance with Delaware law, unless there 
is a conflict . between Delaware law and 
federal law that "would frustrate specific 
objectives" of Section 16 and the Exchange 
Act. Our task under Kamen is the same as in 
any case decided under state law after Erie 
R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 
817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938). We must 
"'approximate state law as closely as 
possible in order to make sure that the 
vindication of the state right is without 
discrimination because of the federal 
forum.'" Accordingly, we must follow the 
Delaware Supreme Court's pronouncements, 
or, if the Delaware Supreme Court has not 
addressed the question, "we must predict 
how the Court will decide the issue, based 
on decisions of Delaware courts, decisions 
from other jurisdictions, treatises and 
restatements." In other· contexts, we have 
. relied on the Delaware Court of Chancery's 
decisions as accurate . statements of 
Delaware law, and we note that there are 
particularly compelling reasons for 
following the Delaware Court of Chancery's 
decisions because it is widely recognized as 
the nation's leading authority on corporate 
law issues[.] 
The Delaware Supreme Court has explained 
that the demand requirement exists "first to 
insure that a stockholder. exhausts his 
intracorporate remedies, and then to provide 
a safeguard against strike suits." "The 
purpose of pre-suit demand is to assure that 
the stockholder affords the corporation the 
opportunity to address an alleged wrong 
without litigation, to decide whether to 
invest the resources of the corporation in 
litigation, and to control any litigation which 
does occur." These justifications are not 
unique to Delaware. The Supreme Court has 
repeatedly highlighted these points, as have 
our sister circuits, and leading commentators 
have approved. As we have previously 
stated, the demand rule "is not merely a 
technical or unimportant requirement." 
Rather, it flows from' "the general rule of 
American law . . . that the board of directors 
controls a corporation." Indeed, the policies 
animating shareholder demands are 
palticularly relevant in the Section 16(b) 
context. "Anecdotal evidence suggests that 
well over 90 percent of all Section 16(b) 
claims are settled privately, without any 
lawsuit being filed." This figure would 
almost certainty be lower if Section 16(b) 
did not contain a demand requirement, as 
shareholder demands allow boards to 
investigate the allegations and resolve 
matters without resorting to costly and 
burdensome litigation. 
To give effect to these general policies, the 
Delaware Chancery has required' that 
demand letters "specifically state: (i) the 
identity of the alleged wrongdoers, (ii) the 
wrongdoing they allegedly perpetrated and 
the resultant injury to the corporation, and. 
(iii) the legal action the shareholder wants 
the board to take on the corporation's 
behalf." Furthermore, "the party asserting 
that a demand was made . . . bear[s] the 
burden of proof. . . ." These requirements 
flow directly from the underlying 
justifications for the demand requirement: 
"[i]t is essential that the communication 
contain these three elements to enable the 
board to perform its duty to make a good 
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faith investigation of claims of alleged 
wrongdoing, and, where appropriate, to 
rectify the misconduct." We believe that this 
is a correct statement of Delaware law as it 
would be decided by the Delaware Supreme 
Court. This standard was announced by a 
vice chancellor who was later elevated to the . 
state supreme court, and, more importantly, 
this standard has been unifOlmly followed in 
subsequent 'Chancery decisions. 
Accordingly, under Kamen and our general 
Erie jurisprudence, we apply this legal 
standard (and the Delaware courts' 
applications of it) except where it 
"frustrate [ s] specific objectives" of 
Simmonds's federal cause of action. 
Here, the thhiy demand letters at issue in the 
Moving Issuers' motion (all of which were 
identical in all material respects) stated the 
following pertinent facts. "[T]he Company's 
IPO underwriters, in addition to certain of its 
officers, directors and principal 
shareholders, as identified in the IPO 
prospectus . . . coordinated their efforts for 
the purpose of acquiring, holding, and/or 
. disposing of securities of the Company," 
obtained beneficial ownership of shares 
amounting to more than 10% of the 
company's outstanding common stock in the 
year following the IPO, "engaged in 
purchases and sales of Company within 
periods of less than six months during" that 
year, and failed to report those transactions 
as required by Section 16(a). Simmonds 
"demand [ ed] that the board of directors 
prosecute a claim against" those persons 
"for violations of § 16(b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934," in order to 
"compel[ ] [them] to disgorge the profits 
they made through purchases and sales of 
Company stock." 
In response to twenty-five of the thirty 
Moving Issuers' requests for additional 
information, Simmonds explained that "the 
challenged transactions involved the 
activities of the lead underwriters, the other 
IPO. underwriters, and the officers, directors 
and principal shareholders of the Company . 
. . related to improper IPO allocation (so-
called 'laddering' and 'spinning') and 
research and stock rating activities during 
the Relevant Period. As you are aware, 
information regarding these activities is 
readily available at court, law firm and SEC 
websites." 
Simmonds's initial demand letters satisfied 
the first part of the Delaware test for demand 
adequacy, which requires the shareholder to 
state "the identity of the alleged 
wrongdoers." In FLI Deep· Marine v. 
McKim, the plaintiff s demand letter stated 
that "'certain employees, officers and 
directors of [the company] and others'" had· 
diverted and misappropriated the company's 
assets. The Court of Chancery stated that 
this letter was sufficient to satisfy the first 
prong of Yaw. Simmonds:s demand letters 
identify the alleged wrongdoers with a 
similar level of precision as in the FLI Deep 
Marine plaintiff s demand letter. 
Specifically, Simmonds's letters identified 
"the Company's. IPO underwriters, .in 
addition to certain of its officers, directors 
and principal shareholders" as identified in 
the IPO prospectus." Although the Moving 
Issuers contend that their respective 
prospectuses listed between eleven and fifty-
one underwriters, officers, and directors, and 
we acknowledge that this is a close question, 
we follow the Court of Chancery's approach 
in FLI Deep Marine. Because Simmonds's 
demand letters identified a closed set of 
alleged wrongdoers, we agree with the 
district court that "the demand letters in this 
case sufficiently identify the alleged 
wrongdoers. " 
Simmonds's letters failed, however, to 
satisfy the second arid third prongs of the 
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Delaware test for demand adequacy, which 
require the shareholder to identify the 
"wrongdoing . . . allegedly perpetrated" and 
"the legal action the shareholder wants the 
board to take on the corporation's behalf." 
Simply put, Simmonds's demand . letters 
presented factual theories that vary 
significantly from the facts alleged in the 
Complaints. Her demand letters claimed that 
the Underwriters directly bought and sold 
the Issuing Companies' shares, and 
accordingly requested that the Issuing 
Companies seek disgorgement of the 
Underwriters' trading profits. In contrast, 
her Complaints do not allege that· the 
Underwriters directly participated in buying 
and selling the Issuing Companies' stock, 
and instead seek .disgorgement of the profits 
the Underwriters received through their 
investment banking operations. 
According to the Complaints, the 
Underwriters violated Section 16(b) when 
they profited indirectly through their 
customers' purchases and sales of the 
Issuing Companies' shares. Specifically, the 
Complaints allege that the Underwriters 
engaged in "Short-Swing Transactions" 
when·(l) their existing customers purchased 
and sold the issuing company's stock, (2) 
they obtained new banking customers in 
exchange for giving other companies' 
insiders favorable consideration in the 
issuing company's IPO, and (3) they 
obtained additional banking business from 
the issuing company in exchange for helping 
the issuing company's. insiders profit from 
their own company's IPO. The Complaints 
assert that these "Short-Swing Transactions" 
violated Section 16(b), and request 
disgorgement of profits obtained through 
these "Short-Swing Transactions." None of 
these alleged transactions is referenced in 
any way in the original demand letters 
submitted to the Moving Issuers. The 
garden-variety Section 16(b) claim made out 
. III these demand letters bears no 
resemblance to the elaborate scheme 
described in Simmonds's Complaints. 
Even if we consider Simmonds's follow~up 
letters to twenty-five of the Moving Issuers, 
she failed to identify the wrongful acts 
"clearly and specifically." The follow-up 
letters. noted that the "challenged 
transactions . . . [are] related to improper 
IPO allocation (so-called 'laddering' and 
'spinning') and research and stock rating 
activities." Simmonds's conclusory 
references to "laddering," "spinning," and 
"research and stock rating," were vague and 
ambiguous, as was her open ended reference 
to "court, law firm and SEC websites," and 
completely· failed to provide sufficiently 
detailed infOlmation to permit the boards to 
conduct a good faith inquiry into the alleged 
wrongdoing. 
Moreover, because the demand letters and 
the. Complaints contain distinct factual 
assertions, the demand letters also failed to . 
set forth "the legal action the shareholder 
wants the board to take on the corporation's 
behalf." The demand letters requested that 
the Moving Issuers "compel[ ]" the 
Underwriters and other group members to 
"disgorge the profits they made through 
purchases and sales of [the issuing 
company's] stock." The Complaints, on the 
other hand, do not mention the 
Underwriters' direct trading profits, and 
instead seek disgorgement of the profits the 
Underwriters received through their 
investment banking operations. 
The Court of Chancery has noted that 
demand letters must be sufficiently specific 
to "enable the board to perform its duty to 
make a good faith investigation of claims of 
alleged wrongdoing[ ] and ... to rectify the 
misconduct" at issue in a subsequent 
lawsuit. The court further noted that "to 
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require a board to investigate claims asserted 
ambiguously . . . would not be an efficient 
use of corporate resources, because the 
board would lack the information necessary 
to make a good faith inquiry." Simmonds's 
demand letters were particularly inadequate 
because they described a different course of 
conduct than the one she described in her 
Complaints. And clearly, Simmonds's 
demand letters could have .led directors to 
investigate facts (the Underwriters' 
purchases and sales of Issuing Company 
stock) that were only marginally related to 
the issues ultimately raised in the 
Complaints (the Underwriters' customers I 
purchases and sales of Issuing Company 
stock, and associated profit-sharing 
agreements between the Underwriters and 
their customers). 
We are not persuaded by Simmonds's 
argument that the Moving Issuers 
SUbjectively understood what she meant in 
her demand letters. Delaware case law sets 
forth an objective standard for assessing the 
adequacy of a demand and does not inquire 
whether the board of directors had· 
independent knowledge. of relevant 
information. To the extent that Simmonds's 
argument has been addressed by any courts, 
it has been soundly rejected. For example, 
the Third Circuit has rejected a 
shareholder's argument that a conclusory 
demand was adequate because ."the directors 
were in a better position than the 
shareholders to make the investigation 
necessary to uncover wrongdoers." In the 
related . context of demand refusal, the 
Delaware Supreme Court rejected the 
argument that "[t]he board has better access 
to the relevant facts". and plaintiffs should 
therefore be 'relieved of their burden to show 
that the board's refusal was improper. 
Simmonds's argument is an end-run around 
Delaware's requirement that shareholders 
make reasonably specific demands, and 
were we to adopt Simmonds's proposed 
approach, Delaware's' demand standard 
would be eviscerated. Plaintiffs in derivative 
actions often seek relief for a corporate 
insider's wrongdoing. If the demand 
requirements were relaxed on account of 
insiders' subjective knowledge, then 
shareholders would never have to "clearly 
and specifically" describe their assertions in 
a demand letter. To the extent that 
Simmonds believed that relevant 
information was "readily available at court, 
law firm and SEC websites" as she claimed 
in her follow-up letters, it was her burden 
under Delaware law to distill the relevant 
facts and present them to the board. 
Delaware law does not allow shareholders to 
forego pre-suit investigations in an attempt 
to shift information-gathering costs onto the 
corporation, and this rule is not clearly 
incompatible with Section 16 and the 
Exchange Act. 
As an alternative to her argument that her 
demand letters were adequate, Simmonds 
contends that the demand requirement 
should . be excused as futile. However, 
Delaware courts have repeatedly held that a 
shareholder concedes that a demand is not 
futile by submitting a demand to the board. 
"Delaware law could hardly be clearer" in 
holding that shareholders may not invoke 
the futility exception after submitting a 
demand to the board. 
We hold that the thirty demand letters in the 
record fail to satisfy the demand requirement 
under Delaware law. Accordingly, we affirm 
the district court's order granting the 
Moving Issuers' motions to dismiss the 
thirty cases to which they are parties. 
B. Statute of Limitations 
The district court dismissed the cases 
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involving the remaining twenty-four issuers 
(that is, the Issuing Companies that did not 
join the Moving Issuers' Motion to Dismiss) 
on account of the statute of limitations. 
Section 16(b) provides that "no ... suit shall 
be brought more than two years after the 
date such profit was realized" from the 
alleged short-swing transactions. 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78p(b). We have previously issued a 
thorough decision interpreting this 
provision, Whittaker v. Whittaker Corp., 639 
F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1981), and we are bound 
by our prior holding. 
In Whittaker, a corporate insider engaged in 
prohibited short-swing transactions between 
December 1965 and December 1970. The 
corporation sought disgorgement in January 
1971 without filing a lawsuit. The insider 
paid the full amount requested, but later 
filed suit against the corporation seeking to . 
recover some of the money he had paid. In 
the lawsuit, he argued that Section 16(b)' s 
statute of limitations barred the corporation 
from retaining any amounts that he had 
obtained from short-swing transactions prior 
. to January 1969 (that is, two years prior to 
the time that the corporation requested that 
he disgorge his profits). The district court 
agreed with the insider, and "found that 
various corporate officers had information 
which put the Corporation on notice 
throughout . the relevant trading· period" 
between 1965 and 1970. Based on this 
factual finding, the district court allowed the 
corporation to recover the insider's profits 
only for the two years prior to the 
disgorgement request. 
On appeal, we explained that there were 
three competing approaches to Section 
. 16(b)' s statute of limitations: (1) a "strict" 
approach under which the statute is treated 
as a statute of repose-that is, a firm bar that 
is not subject to tolling; (2) a "notice'; or 
"discovery" approach like the one that had 
been applied by the . district court, "under 
which the time period is tolled until the 
Corporation had sufficient information to 
put it on notice of its potential § 16(b) 
claim"; and (3) a "disclosure" approach 
"under which the time period is tolled until 
the insider discloses the transactions at issue 
in his mandatory § 16(a) reports." After 
thoroughly analyzing the merits of the 
competing interpretations, we held 
unequivocally that "the disclosure 
interpretation is the correct construction of § 
16." Under this approach, "an insider's 
failure to disclose covered transactions in 
the required § 16(a) reports tolls the two 
year limitations period for suits under § 
16(b) to recover profits connected with such 
a non-disclosed transaction. The two-year 
period for § 16(b) begins to run when the 
transactions are disclosed in the insider's § 
16(a) report." Accordingly, we reversed the 
district court's use of the "notice" approach 
and held that the corporation could recover 
all of the insider's short-swing profits, even 
those obtained long after the corporation 
was on notice of the insider's trading. 
In this case, the Defendants advance various 
arguments in an attempt to distinguish 
Whittaker. All of these arguments are 
variations on a single theme-Simmonds 
knew or should have known of the alleged 
wrongful conduct many years before she 
filed her Complaints. But despite the 
Defendants' arguments, the central holding 
of our opinion in Whittaker-both in our 
legal analysis and our application of the law 
to the facts of that case-is that the Section 
16(b) statute of limitations is tolled until the 
insider discloses his transactions in a Section 
16(a) filing, regardless of whether the 
plaintiff knew or should have known of the 
conduct at issue. We recently restated this 
holding in Roth v. Reyes, 567 F.3d 1077 (9th 
Cir.2009), in which we concluded that the 
statute of limitations begins to run when the 
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insider files a Section 16( a) report even if the 
contents of the filing inaccurately claim an 
exemption that does not actually apply. We 
explained that the basic act of filing a 
Section 16(a) report satisfies Whittaker's 
disclosure requirement and "supports the 
goals of disclosure and transparency" 
underlying Section 16. 
The Defendants advance four specific points 
in support of their general theory that 
Whittaker can be distinguished. First, they 
argue that Whittaker does not apply because 
Simmonds knew 01' should have known of 
the relevant facts sometime around 2001. By 
that time, much of the information described 
in the Complaints had been publicly 
disclosed in court filings, news reports, and 
the Issuing Companies' IPO registration 
filings. The Defendants contend that 
"[w]hen a party is aware of the necessary 
facts to bring a claim, there is no excuse for 
any delay beyond the statute of limitations 
period, let alone a delay of six years." 
However, this theory was plainly rejected in 
Whittaker. Our Whittaker decision reversed 
the district court's conclusion that the statute 
of limitations began to run at the time that 
"various corporate officers had information 
which put the Corporation on notice" of the 
insider's short~swing trades. The 
Defendants' "notice" argument is an 
unpersuasive attempt to revive a theory that 
we considered and rejected nearly thitiy 
years ago. 
Second, the Defendants argue that the 
Section 16(b) limitations period should not 
be tolled indefinitely unless the defendant 
actively "conceal [ s] the facts necessary to 
trigger a Section 16(b) lawsuit." This theory 
overlooks the footnote in Whittaker in which 
we explained that "[t]he failure to disclose 
in § 16(a) reports, whether intentional or 
inadvertent, is deemed concealment, thus 
triggering the traditional equitable tolling 
doctrine of fraudulent concealment." That 
conclusion was further bolstered by our 
emphasi~ on creating a rule that can be.· 
"mechanically calculated from objective 
facts," which would be undermined if courts 
were required to conduct case-specific 
inquiries into the insiders' state of mind 
about their failure to file Section 16(a) 
reports. 
Third, the Defendants contend that 
Whittaker does not apply in this case 
because the Underwriters are exempt from 
Section 16(a) reporting requirements under 
the SEC's underwriting and market-making 
exemptions. However, this argument finds 
no support in Whittaker's bright-line rule. In 
any event, were we to follow the Defendants 
down this line of argument, we would soon 
find ourselves deciding the substantive 
merits of the parties' dispute. The question 
of whether or not the Underwriters are 
exempt from filing Section 16(a) reports is 
identical to the question of whether they 
may be held liable under Section 16(b). We 
refrain from adopting an approach that 
"would merge the tolling doctrine with the 
substantive wrong .... " 
Finally, the Defendants argue that Whittaker 
does not apply because it involved a 
corporation that was seeking disgorgement, 
rather than an outside shareholder as in the 
instant case. They assert that we should 
adopt different lines of analysis depending 
on whether the plaintiff is iom issuing 
company or is an outside shareholder such 
as Simmonds. However, our decision in 
Whittaker created a blanket rule that applies 
in all Section 16(b) actions. A key 
component of. our reasoning was that 
Section 16(a) notices allow the company's 
shareholders-who "are likely to be 
outsiders, minority holders"-to obtain the 
information necessary to bring a Section 
16(b) action. Nothing in Whittaker's logic 01' 
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reasoning would allow us to distinguish 
between issuing companies and outside 
shareholders, and we refrain from adopting 
such a strained interpretation of our 
precedent. 
In short, the fundamental holding of 
Whittaker is that Section 16(b)'s two-year 
statute of limitations begins to run from the 
time that the defendant files a Section 16(a) 
disclosure statement. Because Simmonds 
alleges that the Defendants did not file any 
Section 16(a) reports, we conclude that 
Simmonds's claims are not time-baned. 
Accordingly, the district court's decision on 
this ground is reversed. 
C. Cross-Appeal 
In their cross-appeal, the Underwriters 
contend that the district court erred by 
dismissing the thirty cases involving' the 
Moving Issuers without prejudice on 
account of Simmonds's inadequate demand. 
They argue that these dismissals should have 
been with prejudice because Simmonds's 
claims are time-barred. Although we 
disagree that Simmonds's claims are time-
barred, we agree that the district court 
should have dismissed the thirty Complaints 
against the Moving Issuers with prejudice on 
account of her failure to satisfy the Section 
16(b) demand requirement in those cases. 
We have previously held that a complaint 
may be dismissed with prejudice on account 
of the plaintiff s failure to satisfy the 
demand requirement, and various other 
circuits have reached the same conclusion. 
Although the district court dismissed 
Simmonds's thirty Complaints against the 
Moving Issuers "without prejudice," our' 
decision to convert the dismissal is not 
unprecedented. In a derivative action in 
which the shareholder failed to show 
demand futility, the First Circuit sua sponte 
converted the district court's dismissal from 
"without prejudice" to "with prejudice." In 
re Kauffman Mut. Fund Actions, 479 F.2d 
257,267 (1st Cir.1973). The court explained 
that the plaintiff was barred from ielitigating 
the issues decided in that action, and 
accordingly the dismissal should have been 
entered with prejudice rather than without. 
We agree with the First Circuit's approach 
in Kauffman. Simmonds is baned from 
relitigating issues relating to the adequacy of 
the demand letters she sent to the thirty 
Moving Issuers and the follow-up letters she 
sent to twenty-five of the Moving Issuers. 
As with any issue litigated fully on the 
merits, shareholders may not endlessly 
relitigate the adequacy of their pre-suit 
demand. Accordingly, we vacate the district 
court's order dismissing without prejudice 
the thirty cases involving the Moving 
Issuers, and the district court is instructed to 
dismiss these thirty cases with prejudice. 
In the twenty-four cases that were 
improperly dismissed as time-ban'ed and in 
which the Issuing Companies did not join 
the Moving Issuers' Motion to Dismiss, the 
district court is directed to permit the 
Underwriters and Issuing Companies to seek 
dismissal on account of Simmonds's failure 
to comply with the demand requirement. We 
note that our discussion in this opinion will 
almost, certainly resolve the twenty 
remammg cases involving issuers 
incorporated in Delaware. (We express no 
opinion regarding the four cases involving 
non-Delaware issuers.) However, as 
Simmonds's demands letters to those 
companies are not in the record, we leave it 
to the district cOUli to address those cases in 
the first instance. We note that four of the 
cases involve issuers incorporated in 
jurisdictions other than Delaware (two 
issuers are incorporated in California, one in 
Washington, and one in Bermuda). We 
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direct the district court to analyze the 
adequacy of those demand letters in 
accordance with the choice-of-Iaw principles 
articulated in Kamen-namely, the court 
should apply the demand requirements of 
California, Washington, and Bermuda law, 
unless those requirements "would frustrate 
specific objectives" of Section 16 and the 
Exchange Act. ' 
CONCLUSION 
We AFFIRM the district court's conclusion 
that Simmonds's demand letters to the thirty 
Moving Issuers were inadequate \illder 
Delaware law, REVERSE.the district court's 
conclusion that all of Simmonds's claims are 
time-barred, and V ACATE the district 
court's dismissal orders as to the· thirty 
Moving Issuers with instructions that the 
district court dismiss these thirty cases with 
prejudice on account of Simmonds's failure 
. to satisfy Delaware's demand requirement. 
We REMAND the remaining twenty-four 
cases (that is, the cases involving the 
twenty-four Issuing Companies that did not 
join the Moving Issuers' Motion to Dismiss) 
with instructions for the district court to 
allow the Underwriters and Issuing 
Companies to file an appropriate motion to 
challenge the adequacy of Simmonds's 
demand letters under .Delaware, California, 
Washington, and Bermuda law, unless that 
law conflicts with Section 16(b). Costs are 
awarded to the Appellees. 
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN 
PART, VACATED IN PART, AND 
REMANDED IN PART. 
M. SMITH, Circuit Judge, specially 
concuTI"mg: 
The statutory text of Section 16(b) provides 
that "no such suit shall be brought more than 
two years after the date such profit was 
realized." 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b). In my view, 
"no suit" means no suit, and "two years after 
the date such profit was realized" means two 
years after the insider's final profitable 
transaction, regardless of when-or even 
if--a Section 16(a) report is filed. The text 
of the statute sets a firm bar against Section 
16(b) suits filed more than two years after 
the transaction is completed. Accordingly, I 
agree with the Supreme Court's dictum that 
Section 16(b) "sets' a 2-year ... period of 
repose." Lamp/, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & 
Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350,360 n. 
5, 111 S.Ct. 2773, 115 L.Ed.2d 321 (1991). 
This. straightforward textual reading is 
further confirmed' by comparing the 
language of Section 16(b) with the language 
of the other statutes of limitations in our 
securities laws. The Court in Lamp! 
explained that language such as Section 
16(b)'s "no such suit shall. be brought" 
creates periods of repose that are not subject 
to tolling. In addition, the general securities 
fraud statute of limitations added by the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 116 Stat. 801, 
provides that securities fraud suits "may be 
brought not later than . . . 5 years after such 
violation." 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b)(2). The 
Supreme Court recently noted that this 
provision "giv [es] defendants total repose 
after five years." There is little meaningful 
distinction between the language of 28 
U.S.C. § 1658(b)(2) and Section 16(b)-one 
provides that suits "may be brought not later 
than ... 5 years after such violation," and 
the other provides that "no such suit shall be 
brought more than two years after the date 
such profit was realized." To me, this nearly 
identical language should "giv[ e] defendants 
total repose" under both statutes. 
There are numerous reasons why Congress 
would elect to create a finn two-year period 
of repose for Section 16(b) actions. 
Although there is no direct evidence of 
Congress's intent, the legislative history has 
left behind an intriguing clue. When the 
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Senate and House of Representatives passed 
their respective bills that later became the 
Exchange Act, the House of 
Representatives's version did not even 
provide for a private right of action under 
Section 16(b), whereas the Senate's version 
provided a right of action but omitted a 
statute of limitations. It is reasonable to infer 
that the House negotiators, in reaching a 
compromise with the Senate over the 
inclusion of a private right of action, might 
have bargained to include a stringent statute 
of limitations to circumscribe that right of 
recovery. 
Admittedly, the legislative history is 
inconclusive, but a restrictive statute of 
limitations is eminently logical. Section 
16(b) imposes an inflexible penalty on 
corporate insiders even if they are not at 
fault and third parties are unharmed. As 
Section 16(b)'s critics have noted, its 
disgorgement provision "is little more than a 
trap for the unwary." It makes no sense to 
allow individuals to be hauled into court 
years-or even decades-after they 
unintentionally violate Section 16. Our 
holding in Whittaker creates the possibility 
that "a claim that affects long-settled 
transactions might hang forever over honest 
persons." Whittaker could lead to the 
anomalous situation in which a corporate 
officer who mistakenly calculates the six-
month short-swing period can be compelled 
to disgorge his trading profits decades after 
the fact, whereas a culpable officer who 
engages in fraudulent insider trading 
becomes immune from civil suit after five 
years as long as his trades were spaced more 
than six months apart. I fail to see the logic 
behind such a result, and I fear that 
Whittaker failed to foresee such anomalies. 
I note that Whittaker was motivated by the 
well-intentioned concern that corporate 
insiders could avoid Section 16(b) liability if 
they flout Section 16(a)'s reporting 
requirements. However, I do not believe that 
this concern warrants the creation of never-
ending liability for corporate directors, 
officers, and shareholders. The Exchange 
Act is a comprehensive statute that was 
designed to address various types of 
wrongdoing. It is inappropriate for us to use 
Section 16(b), which prohibits certain types 
of insider trading, to enforce the policies of 
Section 16(a), which requires disclosure of 
insider trading. The Exchange Act creates 
more than adequate enforcement 
mechanisms for enforcing Section 16(a)'s 
disclosure requirements. If the insiders do 
not file their reports, they may be held 
professionally, civilly, or criminally liable 
for failing to do so. And if the insiders 
withhold their Section 16(a) reports in order 
to profit from inside information, they may 
be subjected to Rule 10b-5 securities fraud 
actions. 
Ultimately, I believe that Whittaker's cure is 
worse than the disease it intended to address. 
I would have preferred to adopt anyone of 
the three alternatives to Whittaker: the 
statute of repose approach, Lamp/, 501 U.S. 
at 360 n. 5, 111 S.Ct. 2773, the actual notice 
approach, Litzler, 362 F.3d at 208, or the 
hybrid approach that tolls the statute in cases 
of "fraud or concealment," id at 208 n. 5 
(Jacobs, l, concurring). Of these three 
approaches, the statutOlY text and statutory 
structure clearly point toward the repose 
approach. Were it not for Whittaker, I would 
hold that Section 16(b) suits may not be 
brought more than two years after the short-
swing trades take place. 
Despite these concerns, I am compelled to 
follow Whittaker. See Miller v. Gammie, 
335 F.3d 889, 899 (9th Cir.2003) (en banc). 
Accordingly, I concur with the panel's 
decision. 
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"Supreme Court to Consider Time Limit 
on Insider-Trading Suit" 
Fox Business 
June. 27, 2011 
Brent Kendall 
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed Monday to 
hear an appeal by several investment banks 
seeking to enforce strict time limits on when 
a plaintiff can file one type of insider-
trading lawsuit. 
At issue are claims that the banks, as 
underwriters of "hot" initial public offerings 
10 years ago, impermissibly reaped "short-
swing" insider profits from aftermarket 
gains of those stocks. 
The case involves a single plaintiff's 
challenge to the banks' actions in 54 IPOs. 
The plaintiff, Vanessa Simmonds, alleged in 
54 separate complaints that the banks shared 
in the profits of customers who received IPO 
allocations and sold their shares on the open 
market at higher prices; The suits also claim 
the banks strategically allocated IPO shares 
to customers who would return the favor by 
giving the banks more business. 
Simmonds holds stock in the companies that 
issued shares through the disputed IPOs. She 
sent those companies letters demanding that 
they sue the underwriting banks for 
disgorgement of ill-gotten profits. When the 
companies declined, she invoked a provision 
of the Securities. Exchange Act that allowed 
her to sue the banks herself. 
The banks say the suits should be thrown out 
because they were filed after a two-year 
time limit. A San Francisco-based federal 
appeals court said the suits were not too late 
because the time limit had been postponed. 
The appeals court, however, dismissed 30 of 
Simmonds' lawsuits on other legal grounds. 
The other 24 remain alive, though the 
appeals court suggested many of those have 
deficiencies also. 
Banks appealing to the Supreme Court 
included Ban1( of America Corp. (BAC) and 
subsidiaries of Citigroup Inc. (C), Credit 
. Suisse Group (CS, CSGN.VX), Deutsche 
Ban1( AG (DB, DBK.XE), Goldman Sachs 
Group (GS), J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. 
(JPM) and Morgan Stanley (MS). 
The case is Credit Suisse Securities v. 
Simmonds, 10-1261. Oral arguments will 
take place during the court's next term, 
which begins in October. 
475 
"High Court to Consider Time Limit 
for Derivative Claims" 
Law 360 
June 27,2011 
Evan Weinberger 
The U.S. Supreme Court on Monday agreed 
to hear a group of investment banks' 
challenge to a Ninth Circuit ruling in a case 
involving initial public offerings with 
broader implications for shareholder 
derivative. suits brought after the statute of 
limitations codified in federal securities 
laws. 
The high cOUli agreed to hear an appeal of a 
December decision reviving 24 lawsuits that 
were part of a consolidated securities action 
over initial public offerings of 54 companies 
in the late 1990s on the grounds that a lower 
court incorrectly dismissed them with 
prejudice based on the underwriters' 
assertion that the two-year statute of 
limitations had elapsed for the claims. The 
suits alleged that the underwriters engaged 
in prohibited short-swing transactions. 
In their petition for certiorari, the 
underwdters argued that the 30-year-old rule 
on which the Ninth Circuit relied, 
established in a 1981 case called Whittaker 
v. Whittaker Corp., was out of step with 
established precedents in the Second Circuit 
and needed to be resolved by the Supreme 
Court. 
The rule states that the two-year statute of 
limitations on derivative claims is tolled 
until a shareholder files the necessary forms 
notifying a company of wrongdoing, even if 
the company is already aware of the 
. wrongdoing. 
"Because the issuers on whose behalf this 
case was brought and their shareholders had 
actual notice of the underlying facts for at 
least six years before this lawsuit was filed, 
these complaints would have been time-
barred if brought in the Second Circuit," the 
underwriters said in their cert petition, filed 
in April. "Certiorari is warranted based on 
that conflict alone." 
Bank of America Corp., JPMorgan Chase & 
Co., Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC, 
Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs Group 
Inc., Deutsche Bank AG and Citigroup Inc., 
among others, were the petitioners. 
At the same time, the Supreme Court 
rejected a cert petition filed by Vanessa 
Simmonds, the named plaintiff in the 
consolidated securities, who appealed the 
Ninth Circuit's affirmation of the district 
court's dismissal of the remaining 30 
lawsuits on. the grounds that she did not 
comply with presentation requirements 
under Section 16(b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act. 
According to her petition, the Ninth Circuit 
ruled Simmonds' demand letters did not 
state with sufficient specificity that the 
investment banks and company insiders 
issuing their first batch of public stock turn 
over ill-gotten gains. 
The letters, the appeals court said, clearly 
failed to satisfy the adequacy standards that 
compelled Simmonds to state the alleged 
wrongdoing the shareholder targeted and the 
legal action the shareholder intended to take 
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prior to filing the suits. 
Simmonds argues that such specificity was 
not required under Section 16(b) claims, 
noting that several scholars have argued that 
such demand letters are traditionally only 
one page long and written in general terms. 
Jeffrey 1. Tilden, a partner at Gordon Tilden 
Thomas & Cordell LLP representing 
Simmonds, said he was disappointed in the 
high court's split cert rulings, but vowed to 
fight on the statute of limitations. question. 
"The petition granted addresses an issue that 
has been long settled in the Ninth Circuit, 
nationally and in the mind of the [U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission], and 
we look forward to addressing it," he said. 
Counsel for the underwriters, Christopher 
Landau of Kirkland & Ellis LLP,· could not 
be immediately reached for comment. 
Chief Justice John Roberts recused himself 
from the decisions on the two cert petitions, 
according to the Supreme Court. 
During a 10-day span in October 2007, 
Simmonds, then a 22-year-old college 
student, sued the banks and 54 companies 
that made IPOs in 1999 and 2000. Many of 
the defendant companies were part of the 
dot-com boom, and included TiVo Inc., 
Audible Inc. and Priceline.com Inc. 
Simmonds-whose father, . Robert 
Simmonds, works as a securities plaintiffs 
attomey-sought disgorgement of profits 
from the underwriters on behalf of the 
nominal defendant issuers under Section 
16(b), which creates strict liability for 
company insiders who buy and sell stock in 
their own company within a six-month 
period without disclosure. 
* * * 
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"Supreme Court Grants Cert in Yet 
Another Securities Case" 
The D & 0 Diary 
June 27,2011 
Kevin LaCroix 
Years from· now, when the history of the 
Roberts Court is finally written, I hope that 
the historians will be able to explain why 
during the first dozen years of the 21 st 
century, the u.s. Supreme Court seemed so 
eager to take up securities cases. But 
whatever the reason, on June 27, 2011, on 
the final day of a term in which the Court 
heard three different securities cases, the 
Supreme Court granted petition for writ of 
certiorari to hear yet another securities case 
next term. 
The case is styled as Credit Suisse 
Securities (USA) LLC v. Simmonds and the 
question that the Supreme Court will address 
has to do with the interpretation and 
application of the statute of limitations in 
Section 16(b )of the '34 Act, relating to· so-
called "short swing profits." Here is the 
Question Presented in the case: 
Whether the two-year time limit for 
bringing an action under Section 
16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b), is 
subject to tolling, and, if so, whether 
tolling continues even after the 
receipt of actual notice of the facts 
giving rise to the claim. 
The litigation arises out of the IPQ laddering 
scandal from the dot com era. The plaintiff 
filed fifty-four related derivative complaints 
under Section 16(b) in connection with 54 
IPOs in 1999 and 2000. The gist of the 
plaintiffs allegation is that the supposed 
arrangement whereby the underwriters had 
arranged for post-IPQ stock purchases of the 
issuers' securities at progressively higher 
prices ("laddering") constituted prohibited 
short-swing profits. The plaintiff seeks to 
compel t~e underwriter defendants to 
disgorge their profits. 
The District Court granted the defendants' 
motions to dismiss. As to thirty of the cases, 
the district court granted the dismissal 
motion as to thirty of the companies based 
upon the inadequacy of the derivative 
demand letters the plaintiff had sent to the 
issuer companies. The District Court 
dismissed the remaining twenty-four cases 
on the basis of Section 16(b)' s two year 
statute of limitations. The plaintiff appealed. 
In a December 2, 2010 opinion (as amended 
on January 18, 2011) written by Judge 
Milan Smith a three-judge panel the Ninth 
Circuit affinned the district court's ruling as 
to the demand letters, but reversed the 
district court as to the statute of limitations 
issue. The specific issue the Ninth Circuit 
addl:essed was whether the two-year statute 
of limitations is a strict statute of repose, or 
whether it is a "notice" or "discovery" 
statute that is tolled until the claimant has 
sufficient information to be put on notice. 
The Ninth Circuit, following its own prior 
precedent, held 'that the two-year statute 
operates as a "notice" statute, and the 
running of the statute is tolled until there has 
been adequate disclosure of the trade. 
. Because the statute begins to run only when 
the defendant files a Section'16(a) disclosure 
statement, and because the defendants did 
not file a Section 16(a) statement, the Ninth 
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Circuit held that the claims are not time-
barred. 
In an unusual twist, Judge Smith, the author 
of the opinion for the three judge panel, 
added an additional opinion "specially 
concurring" in the result and expressing his 
view that the two-year statute of limitations 
is a statute of repose, and that were it not for 
the prior Ninth Circuit precedent on which 
the court relied in deciding this case, he 
would have voted that the Section 16(b) 
cases could not be brought more than two . 
years after the short-swing trades took place. 
The defendants affected by the Court's 
ruling on the statute of limit~tion filed a 
petition for a writ of certiorari with the 
United States Supreme Court and on June 
27,2011, the Court granted the petition. 
Discussion 
There was a time when the Supreme Court 
rarely took up securities cases. That time is 
long passed. The Court- is not only routinely 
taking up securities cases, but it is even 
taking up routine matters-this is the second 
securities-related statute of limitations case 
the Court has taken up recently. Just last 
year the Court dealt with statute . of 
limitations issues in the Merck case. 
The Court has only just accepted this case 
and it has not yet been briefed, much less 
argued. The Supreme Court does not explain 
why it takes up the cases it takes up. But I 
have to say that it doesn't seem very likely 
that the Supreme Court toqk up this case to 
affirm the Ninth Circuit's holding. I have no 
idea how five or more votes on this case will 
line up, but if I had to predict I would guess 
that the Court will say that two-year statute 
of limitations in Section 16(b) operates as a 
statute of repose. 
It seems that Judge Smith's unusual 
appended opinion specially concurring in 
the holding but in effect dissenting from the 
Ninth Circuit's precedent operated like an 
entreaty to the Supreme COUli to clean up 
the situation. 
The one wild card is that Chief Justice 
Roberts may not participate in this case. The 
Court's June 27 order specifies that Roberts 
did not participate in consideration of the 
cert petition. He may be conflicted out, 
perhaps as a result of his prior activities 
while in private practice. If Roberts does not 
participate, the conservative majority that 
lined up together this past term on the Janus 
Capital and Wal-Mart Stores case may not 
. be able to put together the five votes to 
control the outcome. In which case, the 
outcome of the Supreme Court review may 
be too close to call. 
But in any event, next October we will enter 
yet another Supreme Court term with at least 
one securities case on the Court's docket. I 
know for sure at least one blog post I will be 
writing somewhere between next October 
and next June. 
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Minneci v. Pollard 
10-1104 
Ruling Below: Pollard v. The GEO Group, Inc., 629 F.3d 843 (9th Cir. 2010) cert. granted .. 131 
S. Ct. 2449, 179 L. Ed. 2d 1208 (U.S. 2011). 
Defendant GEO Group maintains private prisons in contract with the federal government. 
Plaintiff Richard Lee Pollard alleges that while incarcerated at one of the defendant's prisons, he 
fractured both elbows in a slip-and-fall accident. Pollard claims that he was then forced to wear a 
jumpsuit and restraint device that caused him severe pain and that no alternative arrangements 
were made while he was unable to feed or bathe himself in the following weeks. Pollard filed a 
claim against the prison (later removed due the Supreme Court's holding in Correctional 
Services C01p. v. Malesko) and individual prison employees, asserting Eighth Amendment 
violations and seeking money damages under Bivens. The district court dismissed the claim, 
holding that GEO employees did not act under the color of federal law and that the existence of 
alternative state remedies precluded a Bivens action. The Ninth Circuit reversed the lower court 
on this issue, holding that the mere availability of alternative state law remedies does not 
'preclude a Bivens action and that under the public function test, the GEO employees were acting 
. under the color of federal law for the purposes of Bivens. 
Question Presented: Whether the Court should imply a cause of action under Bivens v. Six 
Unknown Named Agents 0/ Federal Bureau o/Narcotics, against individual employees of private 
companies that contract with the. federal government to provide prison services, when the 
plaintiff has adequate alternative remedies for the harm alleged and the defendants have no 
employment or contractual relationship with the government. 
Richard Lee POLLARD, Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
THE GEO GROUP, INC., Erroneously Sued as Wackenhut Corrections Corporation, dba 
Taft Correctional Institution; Margaret Minneci; Jonathan E. Akanno; Robert Spack; Bob 
D. Steifer; Becky Maness, Defendants-Appellees. 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
Filed June 7,2010. Amended December 10,2010. 
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.] 
P AEZ, Circuit Judge: 
Plaintiff-Appellant Richard Lee Pollard, a 
federal inmate, appeals the district court's 
order dismissing his Eighth Amendment 
claims against employees of a private 
corporation operating a federal prison under 
contract with the Bureau of Prisons. This 
appeal presents the question of whether the 
implied damages action first recognized in 
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents 0/ 
Federal Bureau 0/ Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 
91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971), 
allows a federal prisoner to recover for 
violations of his constitutional rights by 
employees of private corporations operating 
480 
federal prisons. We conclude that it does. 
1. BACKGROUND 
The GEO Group, Inc. (GEO), under contract 
with the federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP), 
has operated the Taft Correctional 
Institution (TCI) since December 1997. 
Pollard is a federal inmate who, in 2001 and 
2002, was incarcerated at TCL During his 
imprisonment, Pollard slipped on a cart left 
in a doorway and had to be seen by the. 
prison's medical staff. He was x-rayed, 
diagnosed with possible fractures of both 
elbows, and placed in a bilateral sling. He 
was then referred to an orthopedic clinic 
outside the prison. 
Before transporting Pollard to the clinic, a 
GEO employee directed him to don a 
jumpsuit. Pollard told the employee that 
putting his arms through the sleeves of the 
jumpsuit would cause him excruciating pain, . 
but he was nonetheless required to put it on. 
Two employees also forced Pollard to wear 
a "black box" mechanical restraint device on 
his wrists despite Pollard's complaints about 
severe pain. An outside orthopedist 
diagnosed Pollard with serious injuries to his 
elbows and recommended that his left elbow 
be put into a posterior splint for 
approximately two weeks. Upon returning to 
TCI, Pollard was told that, due to limitations 
in staffing and facilities, his elbow would 
not be put into a posterior splint. Pollard 
claims that, in the following weeks, he was 
unable to feed or bathe himself and that the 
GEO employees failed to make alternative 
arrangements for him.· He further alleges 
that he was required to return to work before 
his injuries had healed and was again forced 
to wear the "black box" restraint when 
returning to the outside orthopedic clinic for 
. a follow-up appointment. 
Pollard subsequently filed a pro se 
complaint in the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of California, 
alleging violations of his Eighth 
Amendment rights and seeking money 
damages under Bivens. His first amended 
complaint named GEO and eight individuals 
as defendants. Seven of these individuals 
were employees of GEO at the time· of 
Pollard's injuries. The eighth, Marshall 
Lewis, was a doctor employed by the Pacific 
Orthopedic Medical Group, which GEO had 
hired to treat Pollard. GEO was 
subsequently dismissed from the suit due to 
the Supreme Court's holding in 
Correctional Services COlp. v. Malesko, 534 
U.S. 61, 122 S.Ct. 515, 151 L.Ed.2d 456 
(2001), that private prison corporations are 
not subject to Bivens liability. 
Pollard's suit against the remaining 
defendants was assigned to a magistrate 
judge for screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1915A(a). The Magistrate Judge issued 
proposed findings and a recommendation 
that Pollard's suit be dismissed under 28 
U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a 
claim. Specifically, the Magistrate Judge 
concluded that a Bivens cause of action was 
not available to Pollard for two reasons: (1) 
state law provided him with alternative 
remedies for his injuries in the form of a tort 
action for negligence or medical 
malpractice; and (2) although under contract 
with the federal government, the GEO 
employees did not act under color of federal 
law. Pollard did not file objections to the 
Magistrate Judge's recommendation, and the 
district court adopted it in full and dismissed 
Pollard's complaint. 
ShOlily thereafter, Pollard, now represented 
by counsel, filed a motion to vacate the 
judgment. That motion requested that the 
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dismissal be vacated for the limited purpose 
of allowing Pollard to assert objections to 
the Magistrate Judge's findings and 
recommendation, thereby preserving his 
right to appeal. The district court did not 
rule on the motion. Pollard ultimately filed a 
timely notice of appeal, which was served 
on the Acting Executive Assistant at TCI, 
but not on any of the individually named 
defendants personally. Before this court, 
only five of the original eight individual 
defendants filed an opposition brief. 
We review de novo a district court's grant of 
a motion to dismiss under 28 U.S.C. § 
1915A. 
II. PROCEDURAL CHALLENGES 
* * * 
III. DISCUSSION 
We tum to the merits of this appeal. The . 
district court dismissed Pollard's suit 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for 
failure to state a claim. Specifically, the 
Magistrate Judge's findings and 
recommendation concluded that a Bivens 
action was not available to Pollard because: 
(1) the GEO employees do not act under 
color of federal law; and (2) Pollard could 
pursue a claim for damages against the GEO 
employees under state tort . law. We address. 
these issues in tum and conclude that (1) the 
GEO employees act under color of federal . 
law for purposes of Bivens liability and (2) 
the availability of a state tort remedy does 
not foreclose Pollard's ability to seek redress 
under Bivens. We recognize that the former 
holding directly conflicts with the Fourth 
Circuit's holding in Holly v. Scott, 434 F.3d 
287, 294 (4th Cir.2006), and the latter 
conflicts with both Holly and the Eleventh 
Circuit's holding in Alba v. Montford, 517 
F.3d 1249, 1254 (11th Cir.2008). We 
discuss our disagreement with our sister 
circuits infra. 
1. Federal Action 
In Bivens, the Supreme Court recognized an 
implied cause of action under the Fourth 
Amendment for injury caused "by a federal 
agent acting under color of his authority ... 
." 403 U.S. at 389, 91 S.Ct. 1999. It is 
widely accepted that Bivens provides a cause 
of action only against an official "acting 
under color of federal law." Thus, the 
threshold question presented here is whether 
the GEO employees can be considered 
federal agents acting under color of federal 
law in their professional capacities. We 
conclude that they can. 
We note at the outset that the one federal 
court of appeal to have directly addressed 
the question-the Fourth Circuit-has held 
that employees of private corporations 
operating federal prisons are not federal 
actors for purposes of Bivens. Holly, 434 
F.3d at 294 .. In Holly, as in this case, the 
defendants were employees of GEO, which 
the Fourth Circuit described as "a wholly 
private corporation in which the federal 
government has no stake other than a 
contractual relationship." Reasoning that 
"[a]pplication of Bivens to private 
individuals simply does not find legislative 
sanction," the Holly majority held that the 
GEO employees were not federal actors for 
purposes of Bivens. 
Neither the Supreme Court nor our court has 
. squarely addressed whether employees of a 
private corporation operating a prison under 
contract with the federal government act 
under color of federal law. That said, we 
have held that private defendants can be 
sued under Bivens if they engage in federal 
action. In determining whether a private 
individual has engaged in federal action, we 
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have looked to "state action" principles 
developed by the Supreme Court in suits 
brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
Other circuits have also recognized the 
similarity of the § 1983 and Bivens 
doctrines. Indeed, even the Supreme Court 
has recognized a connection between the 
two doctrines, although at a high level of 
abstraction. 
In the § 1983 context, we have recognized a 
number of tests for identifying state action. 
F or. our purposes, the most· applicable is. the 
"public function" test: a private entity may 
engage in state action where it exercises 
"powers traditionally exclusively reserved to 
the State." In West v. Atkins, the Supreme 
Court applied a variation of that test in 
concluding that private correctional 
employees under contract with North 
Carolina were amenable to suit under § 1983 
for failing to render constitutionally 
adequate medical care. See 487 U.S. 42, 49-
51, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988). 
The Court found state action present in the § 
1983 action because the defendant exercised 
power "possessed by virtue of state law and 
made possible only because the wrongdoer 
is clothed with the authority of state law." 
Ten years before West, the Court had 
recognized an obligation on the part of state 
correctional emplo'yees "to provide medical 
care for those whom it is punishing by 
incarceration." In finding such an obligation 
under the Constitution, the Estelle . Court 
reasoned that "[a]n inmate must rely on 
prison authorities to treat his medical needs; 
. if the authorities fail to do so, those needs 
will not be met." 
Similarly, in evaluating whether a prison 
physiciail employed as an independent 
contractor was amenable to suit under § 
1983, the West Court stated: 
If [the physician] misused his power 
by . demonstrating deliberate 
indifference to [the prisoner's] 
serious medical needs, the resultant 
deprivation was caused, in the sense 
relevant for state-action inquiry, by 
the State's exercise of its right to 
punish [the prisoner] by 
incarceration and to deny him a 
venue independent of the State to 
obtain needed medical care. 
West, 487 U.S. at 55, 108 S.Ct. 2250. 
In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted 
that "[i]t is only those physicians authorized 
by the State to whom the inmate may turn" 
and that "[u]nder state law, the only medical 
care [the prisoner] could receive for his 
injury was that provided by the State." The 
Court rejected the notion that, because the 
physician was an independent contractor 
rather than a direct employee of the prison, 
the state action analysis would change. 
Instead, the Court held that, "[w]hether a 
physician is on the state payroll or is paid by 
contract, the dispositive issue concerns the 
relationship among the State, the physician, 
and the prisoner." Thus, the Court 
concluded, because the private employee 
was "fully vested with state authority to 
fulfill essential aspects" of the state's duty to 
provide medical care to state prisoners, he 
was fulfilling a public function and was 
therefore amenable to § 1983 liability. 
In our view, there is no principled basis to 
distinguish the activities of the GEO 
employees in this case from the 
governmental action identified in West. 
Pollard could seek medical care only from 
the GEO employees and any other private 
physicians GEO employed. If those 
employees demonstrated deliberate 
indifference to Pollard's serious medical 
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needs, the resulting deprivation was caused, 
in the sense relevant for the federal-action 
inquiry, by the federal government's 
exercise of its power to punish Pollard by 
incarceration and to deny him a venue 
independent of the federal government to 
. obtain needed medical care. On this point, 
West is clear. 
The Fourth Circuit does not share our 
understanding of West. The Holly majority 
concluded that West's reasoning does not 
apply to privately operated federal prisons 
because the relationship among the state, the 
physician and the prisoner is "very different 
in this case, where the conectional facility is 
privately run, than in West . . . , where the 
state itself was directly responsible for 
managing the prison." Curiously, the Fourth 
Circuit's reading of West suggests that 
independent contractors are state actors 
when directly hired by the state, but that 
employees of an independent contractor are 
not state actors because they are not hired by 
the state. 'We cannot subscribe to such an 
illogical reading of West. As Judge Motz 
noted in her conCUlTence in Holly, West 
itself rejected the notion that "by adding an 
additional layer, the government can 
contract away its constitutional duties." 
Instead, West makes clear that 
'" [c ]ontracting out' care 'does not relieve' 
the government of its 'constitutional duty' to 
provide adequate care or 'deprive inmates of 
the means to vindicate their Eighth 
Amendment rights.'" 
Nor do we find convincing the Fourth 
Circuit's reliance on Richardson v. 
McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 117 S.Ct. 2100, 
138 L.Ed.2d 540 (1997). Contrary to the 
Fourth Circuit's holding, that case does not 
stand for the proposition that private prison 
employees never act under color of federal 
or state law. Indeed, the Court in Richardson 
expressly noted that it did "not address[ ] 
whether the defendants are liable under § 
1983 even though they are employed by a 
private firm." Rather; the Court there 
addressed only the question of whether 
private prison guards at state prisons are 
entitled to qualified immunity when sued for 
constitutional violations, not whether those 
guards acted under color· of federal 01' state 
law. As other cases confirm, the immunity 
question is fundamentally distinct from the 
governmental action' question we encounter 
here. 
In Richardson, the Court explained that 
qualified immunity applies only where "a 
tradition of immunity was so firmly rooted 
in the common law ... that Congress would 
have specifically so provided had it wished 
to abolish the doctrine." The Court noted 
that, although private individuals had 
operated correctional facilities ih the 18th 
and 19th centuries, those individuals did not 
historically enjoy qualified immunity. 
Because there was therefore no '''firmly 
rooted' tradition of immunity applicable to 
privately employed prison guards," those 
private guards were not entitled to qualified 
immunity. 
Contrary to the Fourth Circuit's 
understanding, the Richardson Court's 
observation that private individuals "were 
heavily involved in prison management 
during the 19th century," does not mean that 
private prison guards exercise a power that 
is not "traditionally exclusively reserved to 
the State" under the public function test for 
identifying state action. The Holly majority 
looked to the "operation of the prison, not 
the fact of [the prisoner's] incarceration," to 
conclude that private prison guards did not 
perform a traditionally public function. The 
Holly majority, however, does not provide, 
nor can we identify, any support [01; such a 
distinction. The relevant function here is not 
prison management, but rather incarceration 
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of prisoners, which of course has 
traditionally been the State's "exclusive 
prerogative." West reflects this 
understanding that the relevant function is 
incarceration, explaining that a prisoner's 
injury from inadequate medical care would 
be "caused, in the sense relevant for state-
action inquiry, by the State's exercise of its 
right to punish [the prisoner] by 
incarcerati on. " 
Likewise, in the § 1983 context, our sister 
circuits have routinely recognized that 
imprisonment is a fundamentally public 
. function, regardless of the entity managing 
the prison. The Fifth Circuit, for example, 
has held that "confinement of wrongdoers-
though sometimes delegated to private 
entities-is a fundamentally governmental 
function. These [private] corporations and 
their employees are therefore subject to 
limitations imposed by the Eighth 
Amendment." Likewise, the Sixth Circuit 
has held that private prison employees 
"perform[ ] the 'traditional state function' of 
operating a prison." And, in his dissent in 
Richardson, Justice Scalia, joined by three 
other Justices, noted that "private prison 
management firms, who perform the same 
duties as state-employed correctional 
officials, . . . exercise the most palpable 
form of state police power." 
In accord with West and other federal courts 
of appeal, we hold that there is but one 
function at issue here: the government's 
power to incarcerate· those who have been 
convicted of criminal offenses. We decline 
to artificially parse that power into its 
constituent parts-confinement, provision of 
food and medical care, protection of inmate 
safety, etc.-as that would ignore that those 
functions all derive from a single public 
function that is the sole province of the 
government: "enforcement of state-imposed 
deprivation of liberty." Because that 
function is "traditionally the exclusive 
prerogative of the [government]," it satisfies 
the "public function" test under Rendell-
Baker. 
Finally, we note that in Malesko, the 
Supreme Court explicitly left open the 
possibility that private prison employees 
could· act under color of federal law and 
therefore face Bivens liability. The Court, ih 
holding that a corporate entity operating a 
federal prison could not be subject to Bivens 
liability, noted that "the question whether a 
Bivens action might lie against a private 
individual is not presented here." Malesko, 
534 U.S. at 65, 122 S.Ct. 515. The dissent, 
authored by Justice Stevens, confirmed that 
this question remained open: 
The Court recognizes that the 
question whether a Bivens action 
would lie against the individual 
employees of a private corporation 
like Correctional Services 
Corporation (CSC) is not raised in 
the present case. Both CSC and 
[Malesko 1 have assumed Bivens 
would apply to [private. prison 
employees], and the United States as 
amicus maintains that such liability 
. would be appropriate under Bivens .. 
. . [T]he reasoning of the Court's 
opinion relies, at least in part, on the 
availability of a remedy against 
employees of private prisons. 
Id. at 79 n. 6, 122 S.Ct. 515 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (internal citation omitted). 
Thus, despite the contrary holding in the 
Fourth Circuit, we conclude that the GEO 
employees act under color of federal law for 
purposes of Bivens liability. 
2. Availability of a Bivens Remedy 
Even where defendants have engaged in 
federal action, we do not always allow 
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Bivens suits to go forward. We begin with a 
review of the Supreme Court's evolving 
Bivens jurisprudence to help illuminate 
when we will recognize an implied right of 
action against individuals engaged in federal 
action. 
In Bivens, the Supreme Court "recognized 
for the first time an implied private action 
for damages against federal officers alleged 
to have violated a citizen's constitutional 
rights." In the years following Bivens, the 
Court recognized a Bivens cause of action 
on only two occasions. In Davis v. Passman, 
442 U.S. 228, 248-49, 99 S.Ct. 2264, 60 
L.Ed.2d 846 (1979), the Court held that the 
plaintiff stated a cause of action for money 
damages against her former employer, a 
member of the United States Congress, for 
employment discrimination in violation of 
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment. The following year, in Carlson 
v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 24, 100 S.Ct. 1468, 
64 L.Ed.2d 15 (1980), the Court held that a 
federal inmate could bring suit for money 
damages against federal prison officials 
under the Eighth Amendment. 
Since Carlson and Davis, the Supreme 
Court has "consistently refused to extend 
Bivens liability to any new context or new 
category of defendants." Indeed, the Court 
has "rejected invitations to extend Bivens "in 
every new factual and legal context· 
presented after Carlson. Although Bivens 
remains intact, it is apparent that the era 
Justice Scalia referred to as the "heady days 
in which [the Supreme] Court assumed 
common-law powers to create causes of 
action" is no more. 
The COUli's most recent consideration of 
whether to extend Bivens distills its prior 
three decades of jurisprudence into a two 
part test: 
[O]ur consideration of a Bivens 
request follows a familiar sequence, 
and on the assumption that a 
constitutionally recognized interest is 
adversely affected by the actions of 
federal employees, the decision 
. whether to recognize a Bivens 
remedy may require two steps. In the 
first place, there is the question 
whether any alternative, existing 
process for protecting the interest 
amounts to a convincing reason for 
the Judicial Branch to refrain from 
providing a new and freestanding 
remedy in damages. But even in the 
absence of an alternative, a Bivens 
remedy is a subject of judgment: the 
federal cOUlis must make the kind of 
remedial determination that is 
appropriate for a common-law 
tribunal, paying particular heed, 
however, to any special factors 
counselling hesitation before 
authorizing a new kind of federal 
litigation. 
Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 550, 127 
S.Ct. 2588, 168 L.Ed.2d 389(2007) 
(internal quotations and citations omitted). 
Applying Wilkie's two-part test, we hold 
that a Bivens cause of action is available· 
here. 
a. Application of the Wilkie Two-Part Test 
* * * 
(i) Wilkie Part One: Alternative Existing 
Processes 
The GEO employees argue that because 
Pollard can pursue a state law negligence 
action for damages, he has an "alternative, 
existing process" for protecting his interests 
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and thus should not be afforded a Bivens 
remedy. The Magistrate Judge agreed, 
stating in his recommendation and findings 
that "[i]n light of the existing .alternative 
remedies available to [Pollard], the court 
finds that extending Bivens would not 
provide [Pollard] with an otherwise 
nonexistent cause of action." Neither the 
Ninth Circuit nor the Supreme Court has 
ever addressed whether the existence of a 
state remedy, alone, is sufficient to displace 
the Bivens remedy. We conclude that the 
mere availability of a state law remedy does 
not counsel against allowing a Bivens cause 
of action. 
In evaluating whether alternative, potential 
remedies preclude a Bivens action, the Court 
has consistently stressed that only remedies 
crafted by Congress can have such a 
preclusive effect. For example, in Carlson, 
the Court held that where "defendants show 
that Congress has provided an alternative 
remedy which it explicitly declare[s] to be a 
substitute for recovery directly under the 
Constitution and view[s] as equally 
effective," no Bivens remedy is available. 
Likewise, in Bush v. Lucas, the Court held 
that the Bivens remedy for an alleged First 
Amendment violation was precluded by an 
"elaborate remedial system that has been 
constructed step by step" by Congress. 
In Malesko, however, the Court implicitly 
suggested that non-congressionally created 
remedies might displace Bivens. There, the 
Court noted that it had consistently declined 
to extend Bivens except where the extension 
would "provide an otherwise nonexistent 
cause of action against individual officers· 
alleged to have acted unconstitutionally, or 
[would] provide a cause of action for a 
plaintiff who lacked any alternative remedy 
for harms caused by an individual officer's 
unconstitutional conduct." The GEO 
employees, like the Fourth and Eleventh 
Circuits, place great weight on this "any 
alternative remedy" language. They argue 
that it shows that state tort law can preclude 
a . Bivens remedy. Wilkie, however, 
demonstrates that this reads too much into 
the Court's words in Malesko. 
. In Wilkie, the Court made clear that the mere 
existence of an alternative state remedy, 
alone, did not preclude a Bivens action. 
There, the Court noted that the plaintiff had 
"alternative, existing" remedies for the 
alleged violation of his Fifth Amendment 
rights, including state tort remedies, 
administrative claims against the Bureau of 
Land Management, and tort claims under the 
Federal Tort Claims Act. Even though the. 
plaintiff undoubtedly had a "tort remedy" 
available to him, the Court concluded that 
because "the forums of defense and redress 
open to [the plaintiff] are a patchwork, an 
assemblage of state and· federal, 
administrative and judicial benches applying 
regulations, statutes and common law rules," 
"[i]t would be hard to infer that Congress 
expected the Judiciary to stay its Bivens 
hand, but equally hard to extract any clear 
lesson that Bivens ought to spawn a new 
claim." Thus, the mere existence of a 
potential state law claim did not suffice to 
preclude a Bivens action. 
Instead, the Wilkie opinion requires that we 
not simply inquire into the existence of 
alternative remedies generally, but rather 
that we ask whether "any alternative, 
existing process for protecting the interest 
amounts to a convincing reasons for the 
Judicial Branch to refrain from providing a 
new and freestanding remedy in damages." 
For two reasons, state court remedies, alone, 
do not amount to such a "convincing 
reason." 
First, as Wilkie implies and the Court has 
repeatedly recognized, we consider 
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· alternative remedies because the judicially 
created Bivens remedy should yield to 
congressional prerogatives under basic 
separation of powers principles. So too has 
this circuit recognized the importance of 
deferring to Congress in this arena. 
Second, the Court has recognized that the 
policy "obvious[ly]" motivating Bivens was 
"that the liability of federal officials for 
violations of citizens' constitutional rights 
should be governed by unif01m rules." In 
Carlson, the COUli made a point of noting 
that the plaintiff s action would have failed 
under the survivorship law of the forum 
state. The COUli emphasized that "only a 
uniform federal rule of survivorship will 
suffice to redress the constitutional 
deprivation here alleged· and to protect 
against repetition of such conduct." As we 
recently noted in Castaneda v. United 
States, 546 F.3d 682, 701 (9th Cir.2008), 
overruled on other grounds by Hui v. 
Castaneda, - U.S. --, 130 S.Ct. 1845, 
176 L.Ed.2d 703 (2010), "the remedies we 
and the Supreme Court have held to 
preclude Bivens . . . applied uniformly 
throughout the republic." Although 
Castaneda is no longer good law, this 
observation. was not addressed by the 
Supreme Court and comports with our 
analysis of the Court's Bivens jurisprudence. 
If we were to allow state tort law to preclude 
a Bivens action for Pollard and similarly 
situated prisoners, the liability of federal 
officials for constitutional violations would 
no longer be governed by uniform rules. The 
substance, procedural requirements, and 
remedies of state tort law-especially with 
regard to causes of action for negligence and 
medical malpractice-vary widely from 
state to state. For example, assuming Pollard 
were to bring a claim for medical 
malpractice under California law, the cap on 
his non-economic damages would be 
$250,000. But, under Oregon law (where 
Pollard was transferred in the midst of this 
litigation), Pollard's medical malpractice 
claim would not be subject to the state's 
non-economic damages cap. Likewise, the 
statute of limitations for bringing his suit 
under California law would be three years 
after the date· of his injury or one year after 
he discovered the injury, whichever came 
first. But Oregon law would require Pollard 
to bring his suit within two years of 
discovering the injury. We need not belabor 
the obvious point that state tmi remedies are 
anything but "uniform." 
The Bivens inquiry turns in pati on "bedrock 
principles of separation of powers," but 
concluding that a Bivens cause of action 
must yield to state tort law does little to 
demonstrate deference to congressional 
prerogatives. Thus, we conclude that state 
remedies alone are insufficient to displace a 
Bivens remedy under the first prong of the 
Wilkie test. 
(ii) Wilkie Part Two: "Special Factors 
Counselling Hesitation" 
Wilkie's second step requires us to "weigh[ ] 
reasons for and against the creation of a new 
cause of action, the way common law judges 
have always done." In other words, we must 
look to any "special factors counselling 
hesitation before authorizing a new kind of 
federal litigation." The Court has 
emphasized that we must differentiate 
"special" factors from "any" factors. 
Although· the Court has never compiled an 
exhaustive list of these "special" factors, 
some that the· Court has previously 
considered include: (1) whether it is feasible 
to create a workable cause of action, (2) 
whether extending the cause of action would 
undermine Bivens's deterrence goals, (3) 
whether an extension of Bivens would 
impose asymmetric liability costs on 
privately operated facilities as compared to 
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government-operated facilities, and (4) 
whether unique attributes of an area, like the 
military, give reason to infer that 
congressional inaction is deliberate[.] As the 
Court has already recognized a Bivens cause 
of action for inmates in government-run 
federal prisons, it appears that prisons do not 
have the types of unique attributes that 
counseled against recognizing a. Bivens 
action for claims against the military in 
Chappell. Nor did the Court allude to any 
such unique attributes in Malesko. Thus, we 
address only the first three of these 
considerations. 
(aJ Feasibility 
Pollard alleges a basic Eighth Amendment 
cause of action under Bivens. Since Carlson, 
courts have regularly recognized this type of 
action against federal prison officials, and 
the applicable standards are clear. There is 
no need for the district court to craft new 
standards or remedies to address Pollard's 
claims. Accordingly, there are no feasibility 
concerns that would counsel hesitation 
under Wilkie. 
By contrast, the regime the GEO employees 
propose-allowing a Bivens cause of action 
to go forward only where a plaintiff would 
otherwise have no alternative remedy-
would likely be difficult to administer. The 
Eighth Amendment protects against 
conditions of confinement that "involve the 
wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain . . 
. [ or are] grossly disproportionate to the 
severity of the crime warranting 
imprisonment." But many acts meeting that 
standard may not be covered by state. tort 
law. For example, a prison inmate deprived 
of access to a toilet for several days would 
have a strong case against prison officers 
under Bivens. But, although tort law imposes 
a duty on those with custody of another to 
protect that person "against unreasonable 
risk of physical harm," it is unclear whether 
deprivation of a toilet would amount to 
"physical harm." Likewise, it is unclear 
whether a deprivation ·of outdoor exercise 
would amount to a tort violation, despite our 
conclusion that such deprivation constitutes 
an Eighth Amendment violation in certain 
circumstances. 
Nor is it apparent whether a prisoner could 
recover under state law for the denial of 
"basic necessities such as socks, toilet paper, 
and soap." Although a district court 
considering a constitutional claim based on 
such injuries stated that the plaintiff had 
"adequate state tort remedies available . . . 
including, but not limited to, negligence and 
wantonness," we find it somewhat less 
obvious which theory of state tort law, if 
any, would provide the plaintiff in that case 
with an opportunity for relief. A plaintiff 
might also seek to recover under an 
intentional infliction of emotional distress 
theory of recovery, but that cause of action 
has its own problems given that pnson. 
disciplinary measures regularly cause 
emotional distress by design. 
These are not isolated examples, and the 
inquiry becomes even more complicated 
when a prisoner alleges an Eighth 
Amendment violation as the result of a 
combination of factors that may not, on their 
own, constitute a violation of state tort law. 
Indeed, this very problem of identifying 
whether state common law provides a 
remedy is likely to arise any time 
constitutional and· state common law 
regulate similar conduct in different ways. 
The dissent argues that these obvious 
difficulties are irrelevant because Pollard's 
injuries are "certainly . . . covered by state 
tort law." Dissenting Op. at 875. But this 
decision will have implications far beyond 
Pollard's ~uit.Under the GEO employees' 
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proposed framework, as adopted by the 
dissent, in each case a court would need to 
identify whether state remedies provide 
relief for the plaintiff's particular claim. 
While in some instances that may prove an 
easy task, in others, like those identified 
above, it may be quite difficult. For 
questions of first impression, it would 
require a federal court to examine: (1) state 
common law, (2) state statutes, (3) state 
administrative regulations, (4) state 
constitutional provisions, (5) procedural 
requirements attendant to each alternative 
claim (including statutes of limitations, 
exhaustion requirements, etc.), and (6) the 
existence of a cause of action to enforce 
state law. FurthelIDore, under the GEO 
employees' proposed framework, cOUlis 
would potentially need to consider whether a 
plaintiff's claims would be frustrated by any 
viable defenses under state law. For 
example, a privately operated prison might 
asseli the "government contractor" defense 
if sued under state tort law. Thus, unless 
such defenses are assessed prior to 
dismissing a Bivens action because of 
alternative state remedies, a prisoner in a 
privately operated facility may be foreclosed 
from relief, even. though a prisoner housed 
in a govermnentally run prison would have a 
cause of action. But, in the context· of 
prisoner litigation, a court would often be 
required· to make these types of 
determinations before the defendant has 
asserted any defenses or made any filing 
whatsoever (as was the case here). It is also 
worth noting that, in light of the ever-rising 
percentage of federal imnates incarcerated in 
private prison facilities, federal courts would 
be increasingly asked to make these types of 
determinations. 
In sum, a Bivens cause of action for 
prisoners' Eighth Amendment claims would 
be fairly straightforward to apply. By 
contrast, it would be difficult to administer a 
regime where Bivens claims were allowed to 
proceed only when state law would offer no 
remedy. While these observations are by no 
means dispositive of the question here 
presented, under Wilkie we are bound to 
consider them in deciding whether to allow 
a "new" cause of action to proceed, "the 
way common law judges have always 
done." 
(b) Deterrence 
The Court has also looked to whether 
extending Bivens would undermine the 
"core purpose" of an implied cause of 
action: deterring individual officers from 
committing constitutional violations. 
Allowing a Bivens action to go forward here 
would not undermine that core purpose. 
In Meyer, the Court declined to extend 
Bivens to permit suit 'against a federal 
agency, reasoning that plaintiffs could be 
expected to always choose to sue the federal 
agency over an individual who could assert 
qualified immunity as an affirmative 
defense. 510 U.S. at 485, 114 S.Ct. 996. To 
the extent that aggrieved parties would have 
"less incentive to bring a damages claim 
against individuals, 'the deterrent effects of 
the Bivens remedy would be lost. ", Thus, 
Meyer concluded that allowing a Bivens 
claim against federal agencies "would mean 
the evisceration of the Bivens remedy, rather 
than its extension." 
In Malesko, the Court echoed this reasoning 
in concluding that allowing Bivens suits to 
proceed against private prison corporations 
would undermine the deterrent effects of 
Bivens. According to the Court, "if a 
corporate defendant is available for suit, 
claimants will focus their collection efforts 
on it, and not the individual directly 
responsible for the alleged injury." Thus, 
recognizing that corporations would likely 
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bear the lion's share of responsibility for 
. Bivens damages if subject to an implied 
cause of action under the Constitution, the 
COUll concluded that the deterrence goals of 
Bivens would be undermined by such an 
extension. Whatever deterrent effect a suit 
against a corporation may have, the 
Supreme Court explicitly rejected the notion 
that corporate deterrence is relevant to the 
core deterrence goals of Bivens. 
The instant case does not present the same 
problems. It simply cannot be disputed that 
allowing Bivens suits against private prison 
employees would not undermine Bivens's 
goal of deterring unconstitutional acts by 
individuals. The dissent argues that state tmi 
remedies are. "superior" to a Bivens remedy 
here, Dissenting Op. at. 871, and that 
allowing Pollard to bring a Bivens action 
would not serve Bivens' goal of deterrence, 
Dissenting Op. 875-76. We disagree. It is 
true that state tort remedies may often serve 
to deter unconstitutional conduct, and that it 
may be easier to prevail on such a claim 
than on an Eighth Amendment Bivens claim. 
Indeed, in an action to recover damages for 
personal injuries under state tort theories 
such as negligence or medical malpractice, 
the plaintiff would not be required to prove 
deliberate indifference, as required to 
establish an Eighth Amendment violation. 
But while we acknowledge that the elements 
of a state tort claim may not be as 
demanding, we are not prepared to say that 
Bivens .would have no marginal deterrent 
effect against individual employees of GEO. 
For instance, in some states, a prisoner in 
Pollard's position must submit a declaratIon 
by a physician attesting that the suit is not 
frivolous. It is unclear how a prisoner like 
Pollard, who filed this claim in forma 
pauperis, would be able to secure such a 
declaration. The Eleventh Circuit in Alba 
concluded that a similar certification 
requirement in Georgia did not render the 
inmate's state remedies ineffective because 
it merely placed him in "the same shoes as 
anyone else in Georgia filing a professional 
malpractice claim," under "no stricter rules 
than the rest of Georgia's residents." But 
federal courts have long recognized that 
inmates proceeding pro se are not in the 
. "same shoes" as other citizens. 
Additionally, Bivens may allow for recovery 
of greater damages in some cases than a 
state tort law remedy. As discussed infra, 
were Pollard to bring a claim for medical 
malpractice under California law, there 
would be a cap on the amount of non-
economic damages he could recover. There 
is no similar cap on non-economic damages 
under Bivens. Thus, for a truly egregious 
case of neglect or abuse, a medical 
professional at a privately operated prison 
would face significantly greater liability 
under Bivens than state tort law. 
Furthermore, to be entitled to punitive 
damages under California law, a plaintiff 
must demonstrate "oppression, fraud, or 
malice." By contrast, once a plaintiff has 
successfully met the "deliberate 
indifference" standard under the Eighth 
Amendment-requiring that the conduct be 
"wanton," there is little more that such a 
plaintiff would need to· prove to establish a 
convincing argument for an award of 
punitive damages. These significant 
differences in the potential liability faced by 
privately operated federal prisons are prime 
examples of the "marginal deterrence" that 
Bivens offers. Thus, we do not find that this 
"special factor" counsels hesitation. 
(c) Asymmetrical Liability Costs 
The Court has also expressed concerns about 
imposing asymmetric liability costs on 
privately operated facilities as compared to 
government-operated facilities. We are 
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equally concerned about issuing a decision 
that will yield disparate rights and remedies 
among inmates in private and public prisons. 
Unfortunately, under the CUlTent Bivens 
regime, asymmetries may remain 
ilTespective of whether we recognize or 
deny a Bivens cause of action here. 
Unlike officers employed by public prisons, 
the GEO employees may not be entitled to 
qualified immunity, and as a result, 
prisoners asserting claims against them may 
be able to recover more often than their 
counterparts in govel1uuentally run prisons. 
We need not decide the issue of qualified 
immunity here~ 
On the other hand, if we conclude that 
Pollard cannot bring a suit under Bivens, 
then only inmates in public prisons will be 
able to vindicate their constitutional rights. 
Prisoners would thereby have entirely 
different rules governing their rights· 
depending upon whether they are 
incarcerated in a public or private prison 
(and, for that matter, in which state the 
private prison is located). This outcome is 
equally undesirable. As asymmetries will 
persist ilTespective of the outcome of this 
case, this consideration does not counsel 
hesitation in recognizing a Bivens remedy 
here. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
We conclude that Pollard's suitunder Bivens 
against the GEO employees for alleged 
violations of his Eighth Amendment rights 
should be allowed to proceed. We reach that 
conclusion because (1) theGEO employees 
act "under color of federal law" for purposes 
of Bivens liability; and (2) a faithful 
application of . Wilkie's two-part test 
counsels that state tort remedies alone are 
insufficient to displace Bivens and there are 
no "special factors counselling hesitation" in 
allowing Pollard's suit to proceed. We 
therefore reverse and remand to the district 
court for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. To the extent Pollard's appeal 
seeks to challenge the district court's 
dismissal of GEO from the lawsuit, we 
affinn the district court's disposition as to 
that issue. 
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN 
PART, REMANDED. 
RESTANI, Judge, conculTing III part and 
dissenting in part: 
I agree that the district court properly 
dismissed GEO from the lawsuit and that 
employees of a private corporation operating 
a federal prison are federal government 
actors. I conclude, however, that we would 
elT by creating a split in the law of the 
various circuits by holding that a prisoner 
may maintain a cause of action under Bivens 
. . . against such employees where adequate 
state law remedies exist. Until now, the 
federal circuits that have addressed the issue 
have held cOlTectly that a prisoner may not 
maintain such an action. The evolution of 
the U.S. Supreme Court's Bivens 
jurisprudence confinns that this Court 
should follow their lead. 
1. The Supreme Court has limited Bivens to 
cases in which no alternative remedy is 
available against the federal actor who 
committed the wrong. 
The majority overlooks the reality that the 
Supreme Court has recognized Bivens 
causes of action only where federal officials, 
by virtue of their position, enjoy impunity, if 
not immunity, from damages liability 
because of gaps 01' exemptions in statutes or 
in the common law .... 
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The Supreme Court has only extended 
Bivens twiCe,· "to provide an otherwise 
nonexistent cause of action against 
individual officers alleged to have acted 
unconstitutionally, or to provide a cause of 
action for a plaintiff who lacked any 
alternative remedy for harms caused by an 
individual officer's unconstitutional 
conduct." . . . 
[The Court then summarizes Davis and 
Carlson.] 
Thus, the Supreme Court has recognized 
Bivens claims only "for want of other means 
of vindication," as "Davis had no other 
remedy, Bivens himself was not thought to 
have an effective one, and· in Carlson the 
plaintiff had none against Government 
officials." As the majority notes, the Court 
has set forth two-step test 'to determine 
whether to recognize new Bivens actions ... 
Since Carlson, however, the Court has 
"consistently refused to extend Bivens 
liability to any new context or new category 
of defendants." 
II. The justifications for recognizing Bivens 
actions do not apply here. ' 
A. Adequate alternative remedies are 
available to Pollm·d. 
Here, ordinary state tort remedies for 
negligence or medical negligence against the 
GEO employees are an adequate, 
alternative, existing process for protecting 
Pollard's interest. Where, as here, the 
plaintiff has an alternative remedy against a 
federal official alleged· to have acted 
unconstitutionally, the Supreme Court has 
"consistently rejected invitations to extend 
Bivens." Unlike Bivens, in which alternative 
state tort remedies were inadequate because 
the plaintiff s lack of resistance to the 
federal agents foreclosed a trespass action, 
Pollard's "claim of negligence or deliberate 
indifference requires no resistance to official 
action." Additionally, employees of private 
prison corporations do not enjoy impunity or 
immunity as to. damages because of gaps or 
. exemptions in statutes or in the common 
law. 
In fact, as the majority concedes, tort 
remedies for negligence and medical 
negligence may be even more ~asily 
obtained than remedies under Bivens for an 
Eighth Amendment violation "because the 
heightened 'deliberate indifference' standard 
of Eighth Amendment liability would make 
it considerably more difficult for [a plaintiff] 
to prevail than on a theory of ordinary 
negligence." Thus, Pollard does not lack 
effective remedies because his "alternative 
remedies are at least as great, and in many 
respects greater, than anything that could be 
had under Bivens." The state tort remedies 
for negligence or medical negligence are 
therefore a more than adequate alternative, 
existing process for protecting Pollard's 
interest. 
B. The availability of tort remedies is a 
convincing reason to refrain. from 
recognizing a new damages remedy. 
The availability of a superior alternative 
remedy is a convincing reason for the 
Judicial Branch to refrain from providing a 
new, freestanding damages remedy. Courts 
are reluctant to reco'gnize new Bivens 
actions, which are implied without any 
Congressional authority, because "'a 
decision to create a private right of action is 
one better left to legislative judgment in the 
great majority of cases.''' Rather, "[s]o long 
as the plaintiff ha[ s] an avenue for some 
redress, bedrock principles of separation of 
powers foreclose[ ] judicial imposition of a 
new substantive liability." "The dangers of 
overreaching in the creation of judicial 
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remedies are particularly acute where such 
remedies are Ulmecessary." Because a 
Bivens action is unnecessary against the 
employees of a private prison corporation, 
we should not recognize'such an action. 
III. The availability of a state tort remedy 
may preclude a Bivens action. 
The majority's conclusion that the 
availability of state remedies is not a 
convincing reason for the judiciary to refrain 
from recognizing a Bivens remedy is based 
on the faulty premises that remedies that 
preclude Bivens must (1) be crafted by 
Congress and (2) "appl[y] uniformly 
throughout the republic." The first is wrong 
because the Supreme COUli actually has 
considered remedies not crafted by 
Congress, and Malesko itself is one instance 
in which the Court declined to recognize a 
Bivens action because of state remedies. The 
second is wrong because the need for 
uniformity is not partiCUlarly compelling 
where the persons who harmed the plaintiff 
are private employees of a private entity. 
A. The Supreme Court has declined to 
recognize a Bivens action because of state 
remedies. 
,Recent Supreme Court precedent makes 
clear that a state tort remedy may be an 
alternative, existing process that precludes 
recognition of a Bivens action. In Malesko, 
the Court "consider[ ed] availabilitY of state 
tort remedies in refusing to recognize a 
Bivens remedy." The COUli also has 
"rejected the claim that a Bivens remedy 
should be implied simply for want of any 
other means for challenging a constitutional 
deprivation in federal court." Thus, an 
alternative remedy need not be a federal 
remedy. 
There is some tension between Malesko and 
other recent Supreme Court cases, and 
Carlson, which suggested that the only kind 
of alternative remedy that could defeat a 
Bivens claim was one provided by Congress 
"which it explicitly declared to be a 
substitute for recovery directly under the 
Constitution and viewed as equally 
effective." The tension, however, can be 
resolved by understanding the 'Carlson 
formulation as a "test for express Bivens 
preemption" by a statute. Malesko, which 
did not involve any statute, did not discuss 
this test. The Supreme Court has determined 
that alternative remedies that are not 
expressly authorized by Congress and are 
not an, equally effective substitute 
nonetheless may preclude a Bivens remedy. 
More recently, in a case in which express 
statutory preemption was not at issue, the 
Supreme Court has stated that it will not 
recognize a new Bivens action if "any 
alternative, existing process for protecting 
the interest aJ;nounts to a convincing reason 
for the Judicial Branch to refrain." Finally, 
even if Carlson' and Malesko are truly 
irreconcilable, we should follow the most 
recent Supreme COUli precedent, Malesko. 
The majority's statement that in Wilkie, the 
existence of an alternative state, remedy 
alone was not sufficient to preclude a Bivens 
action, Maj. Op. at 861, is misleading. 
Rather, in Wilkie, the Supreme Court 
considered that the plaintiff had "an 
administrative, and ultimately a judicial, 
process for vindiCating virtually all of his ' 
complaints" for torts, improper criminal 
charges, unfavorable agency actions, and 
other offensive behavior by the Bureau of 
Land Management. The Court, however, 
found that the plaintiff functionally did not 
have a remedy for his true complaint 
regarding the agency's course of dealing as 
a whole because "the forums of defense and 
redress open to [the plaintiff] are a 
patchwork, an assemblage of state and 
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federal, administrative and judicial benches 
applying regulations, statutes and common 
law rules." It is too much of a stretch to 
infer, as the majority does, that if the 
plaintiff had merely complained .of one or 
more torts, the Court would have reached 
the same result. To the contrary, the Court 
noted that "when the incidents are examined 
one by one, [the plaintiffs] situation does 
not call for creating a constitutional cause of 
action for want of other means of 
vindication." Further, the Wilkie Court 
concluded that, even where the remedies 
available are a patchwork, the need for a 
Bivens remedy is not particularly 
compelling, as "[i]t would be hard to infer 
that Congress expected the Judiciary to stay 
its Bivens hand, but equally hard to extract 
any clear lesson that Bivens ought to spawn 
a new claim." . 
B. The need for uniformity is not compelling 
here. 
Uniformity of liability is sometimes 
important to a Bivens analysis. In Carlson, 
the Supreme Court stated that "the liability 
of federal officials for violations of citizens' 
constitutional rights should be governed by 
uniform rules" and that "[t]he question 
whether [ an] action for violations by federal 
officials of federal constitutional rights 
should be left to the vagaries of the laws of 
the several States admits of only a negative 
answer in the absence of a contrary 
congressional resolution." Specifically, the 
Court concluded that a uniform federal rule 
of survivorship for Eighth Amendment 
Bivens claims was necessary where one 
state's law would permit survival of the 
claims but another would not. Essentially, 
state law previously had dictated whether 
the prisoner's claim died with him. 
Here, however, the need for uniformity of 
rules is much less compelling. First, 
although employees of a private corporation 
operating a federal prison may be 
government actors, they are not federal 
officials and do not have the same 
immunities as federal officials. Second, 
ordinary negligence and medical negligence 
causes of action are already universally 
available against employees of a private 
corporation operating a federal prison, and 
the elements of such common law-derived 
causes of action are fundamentally the same 
in every state .. 
Unlike in Carlson, no individual state law 
forecloses or extinguishes such actions 
altogether, although many states have 
enacted various procedural hurdles and 
limits on non-economic damages in medical 
malpractice suits. The majority points to the 
differences between the California and 
Oregon statutes of limitations and the fact 
. that Pollard's medical malpractice claim 
would be subject to a non-economic 
damages cap under California law but not 
under Oregon law. Maj. Op. at 862-63. 
These differences, however, should not be 
determinative, as an alternative remedy need 
not provide complete relief for the plaintIff. 
Rather, as the Eleventh 'Circuit has held, 
"[t]hat state procedural rules complicate the 
filing of a lawsuit does not mean that a 
plaintiff lacks any alternative remedy for 
harms caused by an individual officer's 
unconstitutional conduct," and procedural 
hurdles in filing a state action do not "render 
state relief unavailable in the same vein in 
which the Supreme Court held it to be 
unavailable in Bivens. " 
IV. Special factors also counsel hesitation in 
recognizing a new Bivens action. 
The availability of an adequate alternative 
remedy should end the analysis. The court 
need not look at other special factors, such 
as whether extending the cause of action 
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would: (1) be feasible, (2) serve Bivens's 
detenence goals, or (3) impose asymmetric 
liability costs. In any event, these factors do 
counsel hesitation here and certainly do not 
counsel in favor of recognizing . a new 
Bivens action, as the majority suggests. 
A. Case-by-case Bivens determinations are 
feasible. 
First" although a Bivens action under the 
Eighth Amendment for prisoners is a 
workable cause of action that is recognized 
already, allowing a Bivens action to go 
forward only where a plaintiff would 
otherwise have no alternative remedy is not 
unduly complicated. Rather, the Supreme 
Court appears to prefer case-by-case 
determinations of whether adequate 
alternative remedies exist to a blanket 
determination that Bivens is available to an 
entire class of plaintiffs. Thus, the Supreme 
Court has invited federal courts to detel1nine 
whether an alleged Eighth Amendment 
violation has Ii state law analogue and apply 
Bivens only if there is no such state 
analogue. 
Further, the cunent system of determining 
whether a state analogue exists is easy to 
administer because there is unlikely to be an 
instance in. which an Eighth Amendment 
violation by a private prison employee is not 
a tort. An Eighth Amendment violation 
requires a "'sufficiently serious'" condition 
and '''deliberate indifference' to inmate 
health or safety." Tort law similarly imposes 
a duty of care on jailers or prison employees 
to protect the life and health of prisoners in 
their custody and protect the prisoners from 
foreseeable harm or unreasonable risk of 
physical harm. Breach of this duty may give 
rise to a negligence claim. 
The majority does not contend that the acts' 
alleged here fall into the category of acts 
that violate the Eighth Amendment but are 
not covered by state tort law, and that is not 
the case. California, Oregon, and every other 
state recognize the torts of negligence and 
medical negligence. The tort of negligence 
also covers Pollard's allegation that the 
prison employees deprived him of food 
while hi's arms were in casts, as numerous 
cases recognize that the keeper of ajail has a 
common law duty to provide prisoners with 
food. 
There is no reason to thinl<: that either federal 
preemption or the government contractor 
defense, which the majority mentions, is 
applicable here. No federal law expressly or 
impliedly preempts or directly conflicts with 
a state tort of negligence or medical 
malpractice here, and federal law does not 
occupy the field governing private 
cOlTections employees' actions. The 
government contractor defense is not likely 
to apply because there is no indication that 
the United States directed the' GEO 
employees' treatment of Pollard. 
Because the conduct at issue here certainly 
is covered by' state tort law, the other 
examples the majority posits that may 
violate the Eighth Amendment of the 
Constitution but may not be covered by tort 
law are inapposite. In any event,I am not 
convinced that any of these acts-denying a 
prisoner access to a toilet and thus exposing 
the prisoner to human waste for thirty-six 
hours, depriving a prisoner of basic 
necessities, completely depriving a prisoner . 
of outdoor exercise for a period of years, 
and exposing a prisoner to other unhygienic 
conditions-would not be covered by tort 
law. Rather, each act involves a clear breach 
of the duty of reasonable care and would 
unreasonably jeopardize a prisoner's health. 
B. Recognizing a Bivens action here would 
not deter individual officers. 
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Second, as the majority recognizes, state tort 
liability deters private prison officials from 
wrongdoing and may even provide more 
relief for Pollard than the Eighth 
Amendment would because the deliberate 
indifference standard for Eighth Amendment 
claims creates a high bar to hurdle. Maj. Op. 
at 866-67. Ihis undermines the deterrence 
analysis. Because "[t]he purpose of Bivens is 
to deter individual federal officers from 
committing constitutional violations," the 
purpose of Bivens is not served where, as 
here, state law already allows for 
compensatory and punitive damages for the 
same conduct[.] In such an instance, a 
Bivens action is unnecessary. Further, it is 
difficult to see how potential procedural 
differences in state laws or between the state 
and federal law would figure into deterrence 
as a practical matter. As discussed supra, the 
court should hesitate to create an 
unnecessary judicial remedy. 
C. Declining to recognize a Bivens action 
here would avoid concerns about 
asymmetrical liability costs. 
Finally, declining to recognize a Bivens 
action here would avoid the concerns .that 
the Supreme Court has expressed about 
lmposmg asymmetrical liability costs. 
Although declining to recognize a Bivens 
action would perpetuate an existing public-
private asymmetry. because Bivens actions 
are permitted against federal prison 
employees but not private prison employees, 
declining to create a Bivens action would not 
"impose costs on one wrongdoer and not 
another." By contrast, recognizing that a 
plaintiff may pursue both a Bivens action 
and a tort action against private prison 
employees may impose asymmetrical 
liability costs, as a plaintiff currently may 
assert tort claims against private prison 
employees, while Bivens actions allow for 
recovery from federal employees where the 
FICA otherwise bars tort claims against 
them. Indeed, as the majority notes, 
plaintiffs may be able to recover from 
private prison employees more often than 
from federal prison employees because 
private prison employees may not be entitled 
to qualified immunity. 
V. Conclusion 
I . would join with other circuits in 
concluding that a Bivens cause of action is 
not available against employees of privately-
run prison corporations where, as here, state 
tort laws provide a remedy. Accordingly, I 
respectfully dissent in pati:o 
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"New Curb on Bivens Remedy" 
SCOTUSblog 
May 16,2011 
Lyle Denniston 
In the 40 years since the Supreme Court first 
created a right to sue a federal official for a 
violation of someone's constitutional rights, 
it has been very sparing in allowing later 
attempts to expand that right. In fact, it has 
only twice added new options to file such 
lawsuits-and the last of those was 
approved 31 years ago. On Monday, the 
Court took on a new test case on the issue, 
but the chances are, it did so to once more 
stop a further expansion. This time, it will be 
confronting a constitutional claim for 
damages not against a public official, but 
against ,private individuals working under 
government contract-potentially, a far., 
reaching new option to sue. 
The basic decision at issue is the Justices' 
ruling in 1971, in Bivens v. Six Unknown 
Federal- Narcotics Agents, in which the 
Court for the first time opened the federal 
courthouses to a type of lawsuit not 
authorized by any federal statute, but created 
solely by court decree-a right to sue for a 
claimed violation of one's constitutional 
rights, when there was no other available 
remedy. 
In the beginning, in Bivens, the Court 
authorized a constitutional lawsuit seeking 
$15,000 in damages against six narcotics 
agents who forced their way into aNew 
York City apartment without a warrant, 
threatened to arrest the entire family, 
searched the apatiment unit from end to end, 
then took the father into custody and 
subjected him to a "visual strip search." The 
father, Webster Bivens, had no other remedy 
for this alleged Fourth Amendment 
violation, the COUli concluded. 
Eight years later, in Davis v. Passman, the 
COUli allowed a Bivens-type lawsuit against 
a member of Congress for alleged sexual 
harassment of a female staff member. In the 
last such ruling, in Carlson v. Green in 
1980, the Court pennitted a mother to sue a 
public officer of a prison after her prisoner 
son had died, allegedly because prison 
officials failed to provide proper medical 
care for his chronic asthma. The Court has 
had multiple requests since then to add new 
categories of Bivens claims, but regularly 
has refused to do so. 
Last June, the Ninth Circuit Court added a 
new Bivens-type claim: it ruled that a prison 
inmate, Richard Lee Pollard, could sue a 
group of private individuals working under 
contract as prison guards for Wackenhut 
Corrections Corp., the operator of the 
federal prison in Taft, Calif. Pollard 
contended that he broke his elbow in a fall 
after tripping over a cart left in a hallway, 
but that prison guards required him to make 
use of the ann in painful ways in taking him 
to and from an outside clinic for treatment, 
refused to provide a splint for the injury 
though a doctor had prescribed one, and was 
required to return to work at a prison job 
before he had healed fully .. (Wackenhut has 
since become a part ofGEO Corp.) 
The Circuit Court remarked that "neither the 
Supreme Court nor our' court has squarely 
addressed whether employees of a private 
corporation operating a prison under 
contract with the federal government act 
under color of federal law." It went on to 
rule that their' actions were as if they had 
been federal employees, and the fact that the 
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prisoner. could have ~ued under California 
state law did not deprive him of a federal 
constitutional remedy. Over the dissent of 
eight judges, the Circuit Court refused to 
reconsider the ruling en bane. 
On Monday, the Supreme Court agreed to 
review the decision, in the case of Minneci, 
et al., v. Pollard (docket 10':1104). 
At this stage, the Court does not explain 
why it will hear a case, but the ruling by the 
Ninth Circuit conflicts directly with 
decisions of two other Circuit Courts (the 
FOUlih and the Eleventh), and involves the 
creation of a perhaps wide expansion of the 
Bivens decision. The private organization, 
DRI, which seeks to curb civil liability in 
general, told the Court in a separate amicus 
brief that the Ninth Circuit ruling "takes 
Bivens into uncharted telTitory by exposing 
private employees to an unprecedented form 
of personal liability," and potentially may 
extend Bivens-type liability well beyond the 
prison setting, given how common it is for 
private employees to work under contract 
for federal agencies .... 
* * * 
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"Prison Inmate May Sue Employees of 
Private Firm, Says 9th Circuit" 
Lawyers Weekly USA 
June 9, 2010 
Pat Murphy 
A federal prison inmate could seek damages 
for a violation of his constitutional rights 
from the employees of a private company 
that operated the facility, the 9th Circuit has 
ruled in reversing judgment. 
The plaintiff was an inmate at a federal 
prison in California. A private company 
operated the facility under a contract with 
the government. 
The' plaintiff filed a Bivens claim against 
seven employees of the private contractor, 
alleging that his Eighth Amendment rights 
were violated by their failure to provide 
appropriate medical treatment for broken 
elbows he suffered in a fall. 
The defendants argued that a Bivens claim 
cannot be maintained against the employees 
of a private company. 
But the court decided that the employees in 
this case could be considered federal agents 
acting under color of federal law for the 
purPose of a Bivens claim. 
The court said that there was "no principled 
basis" to distinguish the activities of the 
private employees in this case from 
governmental action. 
"[The plaintiff] could seek medical care only 
from the [contractor's] employees and any 
other private physicians [the contractor] 
. employed. If those employees demonstrated· 
deliberate indifference to [the plaintiff s] 
serious medical' needs, the resulting 
deprivation was caused, in the sense relevant 
for the federal-action inquiry, by the federal 
government's exercise of its power to punish 
[the plaintiff] by incarceration and to deny 
him a venue independent of the federal 
government to obtain needed medical care," 
the court said. 
It noted a contrary decision from the 4th 
Circuit. 
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"Should Private Prison Guards Be Liable Under 
Bivens?" 
The CockleBur 
May 27,2011 
Shon R. Hopwood 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari last 
week almost assuredly to reverse a Ninth 
Circuit ruling creating a Bivens action for 
prisoners wanting to sue prison personnel at 
privately-run correctional facilities. The case 
is Milllleci, et al., v. Pollard, No.1 0-11 04. 
After having read the lower court decision 
and cert-stage briefs, I am of the opinion 
that there is a .001 percent chance the 
Supreme Court will uphold the Ninth 
Circuit's judgment. 
Not only does the current Court take a dim 
view of creating implied causes of action, 
SOme members of the Court also generally 
discount claims that prisoners who suffer 
abuse are entitled to any Eighth Amendment 
protection, and they would prefer that the 
federal judiciary stay out of squabbles over 
prison conditions, period. So I am not 
hopeful that the Court will give federal 
prisoners another forum to sue prison 
employees. 
But even I-someone who advocates for 
holding prisoner personnel accountable for 
their wrongdoing-acknowledge that a 
Bivens action in this case makes little sense. 
The prisoner in this case was serving federal 
time in a privately-owned prison and had a 
superior state negligence remedy; one that 
would not involve navigating the difficult 
"deliberate indifference" standard or 
qualified immunity. If I was a prisoner 
plaintiff, I would much rather bring my 
claim in state court. 
Since the prisoner had an alternative 
remedy, there is no chance ... the Court will 
allow an extension of Bivens. Let's just hope 
the Court doesn't feel the need to retreat or 
overrule Bivens because that would have 
drastic consequences for the growing federal 
prison population. 
The privatization of prisons has become a 
recent news item. It appears that Florida is 
closing a deal to privatize the entire state 
prison system. The private prison industry is 
touting the deal as "an important milestone," 
most likely because Florida has the nation's 
third largest prison system. 
I wonder what the incentive is for private 
companies to provide job training and 
rehabilitation programs which would help 
prevent inmates from returning to very 
prisons that make them money. 
In Maine, there is a debate over a bill that 
would allow a private prison company to 
construct a 100 million dollar prison. When 
one of the State· Senators was asked to 
defend the bill, he forthrightly pronounced: 
"I don't know much about prisons, 
but I do know about jobs and I know 
that the people I represent need more 
and better jobs. I could pretend this 
bill is all about prisons, but it is 
really a jobs bill. It is time those of 
us in Augusta stopped pretending 
that everything is all right and started 
doing more to create a climate where 
the jobs we need can be created." 
Creating jobs by incarcerating his 
constituents? It sounds like a solid policy to 
me. 
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Thankfully there are two sides to this 
argument: "Opponents argued that a prison 
should not be used as an economic 
development tool and- cited studies that 
reportedly show private prisons do not save 
states money. Religious leaders opposed the 
bill on moral grounds." 
Even the number one argument for 
privitizing prisons is being questioned, this 
time in a story by the New York Times. 
"There's a perception that the private 
sector is always going to do it more 
efficiently and less costly," said Russ 
Van Vleet, a former co-director of 
the University of Utah Criminal 
Justice Center. "But there really isn't 
much out there that says that's 
correct." 
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Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. 
10-1491 
Ruling Below: Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010) reh 'g denied, 
642 F.3d 268 (2d Cir. 2011). 
The Plaintiffs in this case are individuals seeking to hold a series of corporations civilly liable 
under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) for alleged human rights violations in Nigeria. Plaintiffs 
claim defendant corporations aided and abetted the Nigerian governinent's violations of 
international law. The district court dismissed the claims as falling outside the subject matter 
jurisdiction of the ATS. The Second Circuit affirmed, holding that corporations, as juridical 
rather than natural persons, cannot be subject to suit under the ATS. The majority noted that suits 
. under the ATS require liability under international law and defined international law as 
essentially a universal norin observed by all nations. They observed that nothing in the history of 
international law, authoritative treaties, or scholarly works suppOlis the idea that corporate 
liability is a universally approved notion and thus falls outside of international law and therefore 
the ATS. The concurrence characterized the issue differently, finding the international 
community to be purposely silent on the issue of corporate liability. Judge Leval reasoned that 
this silence is a result of international law being structured to define broad prohibitions and leave 
enforcement of these prohibitions up to individual nations. Judge Leval regarded the ATS as a 
decision by the United States' to enforce international law by allowing civil suits against 
persons, which under U.S. legal doctrine include corporations. 
Questions Presented: (1) Whether the issue of corporate civil tort liability under the Alien Tort 
Statute ("ATS"), 28 U.S.C. § 1350, is a merits question, as it has been treated by all courts prior 
to the decision below, or an issue of subject matter jurisdiction, as the court of appeals held for 
the first time. (2) Whether corporations are immune from tort liability for violations of the law of . 
nations such as torture, extrajudicial executions or genocide, as the court of appeals decisions 
provides, or if corporations may be sued in the same manner as any other private party defendant 
under the ATS for such egregious violations, as the Eleventh Circuit has explicitly held. 
Esther KIOBEL, individually and on behalf of her late husband, Dr. Barinem Kiobel, 
Bishop Augustine Numene John-Miller, Charles Baridorn Wiwa, Israel Pyakene Nwidor, 
Kendricks Dorle Nwikpo, Anthony B. Kote-Witah, Victor B. Wifa, Dumle J. Kunenu, 
Benson Magnus Ikari, Legbara Tony Idigima, Pius Nwinee, Kpobari Tusima, individually 
and on behalf of his late father, Clement Tusima, PlaintiffS-Appellants-Cross-Appellees, 
v. 
ROYAL DUTCH PETROLEUM CO., Shell Transport and Trading Company PLC, 
Defendants-Appellees-Cross-Appellants, Shell Petroleum Development Company Of 
Nigeria, Ltd., Defendant. 
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
Decided September 17, 2010 
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.] 
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JOSE A. CABRANES, Circuit Judge: 
Once again we consider a case brought 
under the Alien Tort .Statute ("ATS"), 28 
. U.S.C. § 1350, a jurisdictional provision 
unlike any other in American law and of a 
kind apparently unknown to any other legal 
. system in the world. Passed by the first 
Congress in 1789, the ATS lay largely 
dormant for over 170 years. Judge Friendly 
called it a "legal Lohengrin"-"no one 
seems to know whence it came." Then, in 
1980, the statute was given new life, when 
our Court first recognized in Film'tiga v. 
Pena-Irala that the ATS provides 
jurisdiction over (1) tort actions, (2) brought 
by aliens (only), (3) for violations of the law 
of nations (also called "customary 
international law,,3 including, asa general 
matter, war crimes and crimes against 
humanity-crimes in which the perpetrator 
can be called "hostis humani generis, an 
enemy of all mankind." 
Since that time, the ATS has given rise to an 
abundance of litigation in U.S. district 
courts. For the first fifteen years after 
Film'tiga-that is, from 1980 to the mid-
1990s-aliens brought A TS suits in our 
courts only against notorious foreign 
individuals,' the first A TS case alleging, in 
effect, that a corporation (or "juridical" 
person) was an "enemy of all mankind" 
apparently was brought as recently as 1997. 
Such civil lawsuits, alleging heinous crimes 
condemned by customary international law, 
often involve a variety of issues unique to 
ATS litigation, not least the fact that the 
events took place abroad and in troubled or 
chaotic circumstances. The resulting 
complexity and unceliainty-cbmbined with 
the fact that juries hearing A TS claims are 
capable of awarding multibillion-dollar 
3 In this opinion we use the tenns "law of nations" 
and "customary international law" interchangeably. 
verdicts-has led many defendants to settle 
ATS claims prior to trial. Thus, our Court 
has published only nine significant decisions 
on the ATS since 1980 (seven of the nine 
coming in the last decade), and the Supreme 
Court in its entire history has decided only 
one ATScase . 
Because appellate review of A TS suits has 
been so uncommon, there remain a number 
of unresolved issues lurking in our ATS 
jurisprudence-issues that we have simply 
had no occasion to address in the handful of 
cases we have decided in the thirty years 
since the revival of the ATS. This case· 
involves one such unresolved issue: Does 
the jurisdiction granted by the ATS extend 
to civil actions brought against corporations 
under the law of nations? 
Plaintiffs are residents of Nigeria who claim 
that Dutch, British, and Nigerian 
corporations engaged in oil exploration and 
production aided and abetted the Nigerian 
government in committing violations of the 
law of nations. They seek damages under the 
ATS, and thus their suit may proceed only if 
the ATS provides jurisdiction over tort 
actions brought agaitist corporations under 
customary international law. 
A legal culture long accustomed to imposing 
liability on corporations may, at first blush, 
assume that corporations must be subject to 
tort liability under the ATS, just as 
corporations are generally liable in tort 
under our domestic law (what international 
law calls "municipal law"). But the 
substantive law that determines our 
jurisdiction under the A TS is neither the 
domestic law of the United States nor the 
domestic law of any other country. By 
conferring subject matter jurisdiction over a 
limited number of offenses defined by 
customary international law, the A TS 
requires federal courts to look beyond rules 
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of domestic law-however well-established 
they may be-to examine the specific and 
universally accepted rules that the nations of 
the world treat as binding in their dealings 
with one another. As Judge Friendly 
carefully explained, customary international 
law includes only "those standards, rules or 
customs (a) affecting the relationship 
between states or between an individual and 
a: foreign state, and (b) used by those states 
for their common good and/or in dealings 
inter se." 
Our recognition of a norm of liability as a 
matter of domestic law, therefore, cannot 
create a norm of customary international 
law. In other words, the fact that 
corporations are liable as juridical persons 
under domestic law does not mean that they 
are liable under international law (and, 
therefore, under the ATS). Moreover, the 
fact that a legal norm is found in most or 
even all "civilized nations" does not make 
that norm a part of customary international 
law. As we explained in Filartiga: 
[T]he mere fact that every nation's 
municipal [i.e., domestic] law may 
prohibit theft does not incorporate' 
"the Eighth Commandment, 'Thou 
Shalt not steal' . . . into the law of 
nations." It is only where the nations 
of the world have demonstrated that 
the wrong is of mutual, and not 
merely several, concern, by means of 
express international accords, that a 
wrong generally recognized becomes 
an international law violation within 
the meaning of the [ATS].14 
Accordingly, absent a relevant treaty of the 
United States-and none is relied on here-
we must ask whether a plaintiff bringing an 
14 630 F.2d at 888 (quoting Vencap, 519 F.2d at 
1015) (alteration omitted). 
ATS suit against a corporation has alleged a 
violation of customary international law. 
The singular achievement of international 
law since the Second World War has come 
in the area of human rights, where the 
subjects of customary international law-
i. e., those with international rights, duties, 
and liabilities-now include not merely 
states, but also individuals. This principle 
was most famously applied by the 
International Military Tribunal at 
Nuremberg .... 
From the beginning, however, the principle 
of individual liability for violations of 
international law has been limited to natural 
persons-not "juridical" persons such as 
corporations-because the moral 
responsibility for a crime so heinous and 
unbounded as to rise to the level of an 
"international crime" has rested solely with 
the individual men and women who have 
perpetrated it. As the Nuremberg tribunal 
unmistakably set forth in explaining the 
rationale for individual liability. for 
violations of international law: "Crimes 
against international law are committed by 
men, not by abstract entities, and only by 
punishing individuals who commit such 
crimes can the provisions of international 
. law be enforced." 
After Nuremberg, as new international 
tribunals have been created, the customary 
international law of human rights has 
remained focused not on abstract entities but 
on the individual men and women who have 
committed international crimes universally 
recognized by the nations of the world. This 
principle has taken its most vivid form in the 
recent design of the International Criminal 
Court ("ICC"). Although there was a 
proposal at the Rome Conference to grant 
the ICC jurisdiction over corporations and 
other ''juridical'' persons, that proposal was 
soundly rejected, and the Rome Statute, the 
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ICC's constitutive document, hews to the 
tenet set forth in Nuremberg that 
international norms should be enforced by 
the punishment of the individual men and 
women who violate them. 
In short, because customary international 
law imposes individual liability for a limited 
number of international crimes-including 
war crimes, crimes against humanity (such 
as genocide), and torture-we have held that 
the ATS provides jurisdiction over claims in 
tort against individuals who are alleged to 
have committed such crimes. As we explain 
in detail below, however, customary 
international law has steadfastly rejected the 
notion of corporate liability for internatiomil 
crimes, and no international tribunal has 
ever held a corporation liable for a violation 
of the law of nations. 
We must conclude, therefore, that insofar as 
plaintiffs bring claims under the A TS 
against corporations, plaintiffs fail to allege 
violations of the law of nations, and 
plaintiffs' claims fall outside the limited 
jurisdiction provided by the ATS. 
We emphasize that the question before us is 
,not whether corporations are "immune" 
from suit under the ATS: That fOlIDulation 
improperly assumes that there is a norm 
imposing liability in the first place. Rather, 
the question before us, as the Supreme Court 
has explained, "is whether international law 
extends the scope of liability for a violation 
of a given norm to the perpetrator being 
sued, if the defendant is a private actor such 
as a corporation or individual." Looking to 
international law, we find a jurisprudence, 
first set forth in Nuremberg and repeated by 
every international tribunal of which we are 
aware, that offenses against the law of 
nations (i.e., customary international law) 
for violations of human rights can be 
charged against States and against individual 
men and women but not against juridical 
persons such as. corporations. As a result, 
although customary international law has 
sometimes extended the scope of liability for 
a violation of a given norm to individuals, it 
has never extended the scope of liability to a 
corporation. 
We pause briefly to acknowledge and reply 
to the separate opinion of our colleague, 
Judge Leval. As an initial matter, we are 
perplexed by Judge Leval's repeated 
insistence that there is no "basis" for our 
holding because "[n]o precedent of 
international law endorses" it. See, e.g., 
Concurring Op. 151. In an ATS suit, we 
may apply only those international norms 
that are "specific, universal, and obligatory." 
As a result, the responsibility of establishing 
a norm of customary international law lies 
with those wishing to invoke it, and in the 
absence of sources of international law 
endorsing (or refuting) a norm, the norm 
simply cannot be applied in a suit grounded 
on customary international law under the 
ATS. Thus, even if there were, as Judge 
Leval claims, an absence of sources of 
international law addressing corporate 
liability, that' supposed lack of authority 
would actually support our holding. By 
contrast, to support Judge Leval's proposed 
rule, there would need to be not only a few, 
but so many sources of international law 
calling for corporate liability that the norm 
could be regarded as "universa1." As it 
happens, no corporation, has ever been 
subject to any form of liability under the 
customary international law of human rights, 
and thus the ATS, the remedy Congress has 
chosen, simply does not confer jurisdiction 
over suits against corporations. 
Although Judge Leval condemns our 
holding, he in fact agrees with much of our 
opinion. He concedes, for example, that "[i]t 
is true that international law, of its own 
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force, imposes no liabilities on corporations 
or other private juridical entities." 
Concurring Op. 186[.] He similarly has "no 
quarrel" with the "premise [ ]" that 
international law is "the place to look" to 
determine whether corporations can be held 
liable for violations of international law. He 
concludes, however, that international law 
does not supply an answer to that question. 
In his view, the question of corporate 
liability is merely a matter of "remedy" that 
"international law leaves . . . to the 
independent determination of each State." 
We agree with Judge Leval that whether to 
enact a civil remedy for violations of 
customary international law is a matter to be 
determined by each State; the United States 
has done so in enacting the ATS. But the 
ATS does. not specify who is liable; it 
imposes liability only for a "violation of the 
. law of nations,"and thus it leaves the 
question of the nature and scope of 
liability-who is liable for what-to 
customary international law. As we explain 
in detail below, therefore, whether a 
defendant is liable under the A TS. depends 
entirely upon whether that defendant is 
subject to liability under customary 
international law. It is inconceivable that a 
defendant who is not liable under customary 
international law could be liable under the 
ATS. 
We will not embark on a lengthy tangent in 
response to Judge Leval' s many 
"hypothetical cases," ConcurringOp. 159, in 
which corporations would not, under our· 
holding, be liable under the ATS. We note 
only that nothing in this opinion limits or 
forecloses suits under the ATS against the 
individual perpetrators of violations of 
customary international law-including the 
employees, managers, officers, and directors 
of a corporation-as well as anyone who 
purposefully aids and abets a violation of 
customary international law. Nor does 
anything in this opinion limit or· foreclose 
criminal, administrative, or civil actions 
against any corporation under a body of law 
other than customary international law-for 
example,. the domestic laws of any State. 
And, of course, nothing in this opinion 
limits or forecloses legislative action by 
Congress. 
* * * 
BACKGROUND 
These cross-appeals come to us from the 
United States District Court for the Southern 
District of New York (Kimba M. Wood, 
Judge ). At this stage of the proceedings, we 
accept as true all nonconclusory factual 
allegations relevant to this decision. 
1. Factual Background 
Plaintiffs, who are, or were, residents of the 
Ogoni Region of Nigeria, allege that 
defendants Royal Dutch Petroleum 
Company ("Royal Dutch") and Shell 
Transport and Trading Company PLC 
("Shell"), tln·ough a subsidiary named Shell 
Petroleum Development Company of 
Nigeria, Ltd. ("SPDC"), aided and abetted 
the Nigerian government in committing 
human rights abuses directed at plaintiffs. 
Royal Dutch and Shell are holding 
companies incorporated respectively in the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom. SPDC 
is incorporated in Nigeria. All defendants 
are corporate entities-that is, "juridical" 
persons, rather than "natural" persons. 
[The Court described local resistance to 
SPDC's activities and the alleged assistance 
SPDC rendered to the government III 
violently quelling that resistance.] 
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Plaintiffs brought claims against defendants 
under the A TS for aiding and abetting the 
Nigerian government in alleged violations of 
the law of nations. Specifically, plaintiffs 
brought claims of aiding and abetting (1) 
extrajudicial killing; (2) crimes against 
humanity; (3) torture or cruel, inhuman, and 
degrading treatment; (4) arbitrary arrest and 
detention; (5) violation of the rights to life, 
liberty, security, and association; (6) forced 
exile; and (7) property destruction. 
< 
II. Procedural History 
* * * 
DISCUSSION 
* * * 
As we have explained above, this appeal 
presents a question that has been lurking for 
some time in our ATS jurisprudence. Since 
our first case upholding claims brought 
under the·ATS in 1980, our Court has never 
directly addressed whether our jurisdiction 
under the A TS extends to civil actions 
against corporations[.] We have, in the past, 
decided ATS cases involving corporations 
without addressing the issue of corporate 
liability. But that fact does not foreclose 
consideration of the issue here. As the 
Supreme Court has held, "when questions of 
jurisdiction have been passed on in prior 
decisions sub silentio," the Court "has never 
considered itself bound when a subsequent 
case finally brings the jurisdictional issue 
before [it]." The same rule applies here. 
In answering the question presented we 
proceed in two steps. First, we consider 
which body of law governs the question-
international law or domestic law-and 
conclude that international law governs. 
Second, we consider what the sources of 
international law reveal with respect to 
whether corporations can be subject to 
liability for violations of customary 
international law. We conclude that those 
sources lead inescapably to the conclusion 
that the customary international law of 
human rights has not to date recognized 
liability for corporations that violate its 
. norms. 
1. Customary International Law Governs 
Our Inquiry 
The A TS grants federal district courts 
jurisdiction over claims "by an alien for a 
tort only, committed in violation of the law 
of nations or a treaty of the United States." 
28 U.S.C. § 1350. In 2004, the Supreme 
Court held in Sosa that the A TS is a 
jurisdictional statute only; it creates no cause 
of action, Justice Souter explained, because 
its drafters understood that "the common 
law would provide a cause of action for the 
modest number of international law 
violations with a potential for personal 
liability at the time." Indeed, at the time of 
its adoption, the ATS "enabled federal 
courts to hear claims in a very limited 
category defined by the law of nations and 
recognized at common law." These included 
"three specific offenses against the law of 
nations addressed' by the criminal law of 
England [and identified by Blackstone] : 
violation of safe conducts, infringement of 
the rights of ambassadors, and piracy"-
each a rule "binding individuals for the 
benefit of other individuals[, which] 
overlapped with the norms of state 
relationships. " 
The Supreme Court did not, however, limit 
the jurisdiction of the federal courts under 
the ATS to those three offenses recognized 
by the law of nations in 1789. Instead, the 
Court in Sosa held that federal courts may 
recognize claims "based on the present-day 
law of nations" provided that the claims rest 
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on . "norm [ s] of. international character 
accepted by the civilized world and defined 
with a specificity comparable to the features 
of the 18th-century 'paradigms [the Court 
had] recognized." 
The Supreme Court cautioned that "the 
determination whether a norm is sufficiently 
definite to support a cause of action should 
(and, indeed, inevitably must) involve an 
element of judgment about the practical 
consequences of making that cause available 
to litigants in the federal courts." The. Court 
also observed that "a related consideration is 
whether international law extends the scope 
of liability for a violation of a given norm to 
the perpetrator being sued, if the defendant 
is a private actor such as a corporation or an 
individual." We conclude-based on 
international law, Sosa, and our own 
precedents-that. international law, and not 
domestic law, governs the scope of liability 
for violations of customary international law 
under the ATS. 
A. International Law Defines the Scope of 
Liability for Violations onts Nonns 
International law is not silent on the 
question of the sub} eets of international law-
that is, "those that, to varying extents, have 
legal status, personality, rights, and duties 
under international law and whose acts and 
relationships are the principal concerns of 
international law." Nor does international 
law leave to individual States the 
responsibility of defining those subjects. 
Rather, "[t]he concept of international 
person is . . . derived from international 
law." 
That the subjects of international law are 
detelmined by international law, and not 
individual States, is evident from the 
decisions of the International Military 
Tribunal at Nuremberg ("Tribunal") in the 
aftermath of the Second World War. The 
significance of the judgment of the Tribunal-
and of the judgments of the tribunals 
established by the Allied Control Council 
pusuant to Council Control Law No. 10 
(Dec. 20, 1945), was. not simply that it 
recognized genocide and aggressive war as 
violations of international law , The defining 
legal achievement of the Nuremberg trials is 
that they explicitly recognized individual 
liability for the violation of specific, 
universal, and obligatory norms of the 
customary international law of human rights. 
* * * 
B. Sosa and Our Precedents Require Us to 
Look to International Law to Determine the 
Scope of Liability 
In Sosa the Supreme Court instructed the 
lower federal courts to consider "whether 
international law extends the scope of 
liability for a violation of a given norm. to 
the perpetrator being sued, if the defendant 
is a private actor such as a corporation or . 
individual." That language requires that we 
look to international law to determine our 
jurisdiction over A TS claims against a 
particular class of defendant, such as 
corporations. That conclusion is reinforced 
by Justice Breyer's reformulation of the 
issue in his concurring opinion: "The norm 
[of international law ] must extend liability to 
the type ofperpetrator (e.g., a private actor) 
the plaintiff seeks to sue." 
The Supreme Court's instruction to look to 
international law to determine the scope of 
liability under the ATS did not involve a 
revolutionary interpretation of the statute-
in fact, it had long been the law of this 
Circuit. In Filartiga, we had looked to 
international law to determine our 
jurisdiction and to delineate the type of 
defendant who could be sued. Likewise, in 
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Kadic v.· Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d 
Cir.1995) (Newman, J.), and in Judge Harry 
T. Edwards's notable concurring opinion in 
Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 
774, .775 (D.C.Cir.1984) (Edwards, J., 
concurring)-both cited with approval by the 
Supreme Court in Sosa-international law 
provided the rules by which the court 
decided whether certain conduct violated the 
law of nations when committed by non-state 
actors. In Kadic, we held that a private actor 
could be liable under the law of nations for 
genocide, war crimes, and crimes against 
humanity, 70 F.3d at 239-41, but in Tel-
Oren, Judge Edwards expressed the view 
that a private actor could not be liable for 
torture under the ATS, 726 F.2d at 791-95 
(Edwards, J., concurring); see also, e.g., 
Flores, 414 F.3d at 254-66 (looking to 
customary international law for the 
applicable norms). 
Since Sosa, we have continued to adhere to 
the method prescribed in Sosa footnote 20 
by looking to customary international law to 
determine both whether certain conduct 
leads to ATS liability and whether the scope 
of liability under the A TS extends to the 
defendant being sued. As recently as our 
decision of 2009 in Presbyterian Church, 
this same panel (including Judge Leval) 
declared that "footnote 20 of Sosa, while 
nominally concerned with the liability of 
non-state actors, supports . the broader 
principle that the scope of liability for A TS 
violations should be derived from 
international law." 582 F.3d at 258 (footnote 
omitted)[.] In Presbyterian Church, we 
looked to international law to determine the 
circumstances in which aiders and abettors 
could be liable for violations of the 
customary international law of human rights. 
We did so because "[r]ecognition of 
secondary liability is no less significant a 
decision than whether to recognize a whole 
new tort in the first place." Thus, our 
holding today is consistent with 
Presbyterian Church, where we looked to 
international law to determine not only what 
conduct is cognizable under the ATS, but 
also the identity of the persons to whom that 
conduct is attributable (in that case, aiders 
and abettors). 
Our interpretation of Sosa is also consistent 
with Judge Katzmann's separate opinion in 
Klnilumani, 504 F.3d at 264 (Katzmann, J., 
concurring), which this same panel 
(including Judge Leval) adopted as the law 
of the Circuit in Presbyterian Church[.] In 
Khulumani, Judge Katzmann observed that 
aiding and abetting liability-much like 
corporate liability-"'does not constitute a 
discrete criminal offense but only serves as a 
more particularized way of identifying the 
persons involved' in the underlying 
offense." Judge Katzmann further explained 
that "[w]hile [footnote 20 of Sosa] 
specifically concerns the liability of non-
state actors, its general principle is equally 
applicable to the question of where to look 
to determine whether the scope of liability 
for a violation of international law should 
extend to aiders and abettors." He therefore 
concluded that "to assure itself that it has 
jurisdiction to hear a claim under the [ATS], 
[a court] should first detelmine whether the 
alleged tort was in fact 'committed in 
violation of the law of nations,' and whether 
this law would recognize the defendants'. 
responsibility for that violation. " 
Significantly, it was only because we looked 
to international law that we were able to 
recognize a nonn of aiding and abetting 
liability under the ATS. In Khulumani, 
Judge Katzmann declined to rely on the 
usual presumption against aiding and 
abetting liability that applies in the 
interpretation of domestic statutes. See Cent. 
Bank of Denver, NA. v.' First Interstate 
Bank of Denver, NA., 511 U.S. 164, 182, 
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114 S.Ct. 1439, 128 L.Ed.2d 119 (1994) 
("[W]hen Congress enacts a statute under 
which a person may sue and recover 
damages from a private defendant for the 
defendant's violation of some statutory 
norm, there is no general presumption that 
the plaintiff may also sue aiders and. 
abettors."). Instead,· Judge Katzmann 
concluded that Central Bank had no bearing 
on aiding and abetting liability under the 
ATS because, "[u]nder the [ATS] the· 
relevant norm is provided· not by domestic 
statute but by the law of nations, . and that 
law extends responsibility for violations of 
its norms to aiders and abettors." 
In sum, we have little difficulty holding that, 
under international law, Sosa, and our three 
decades of precedent, we are required to 
look to international law to determine 
whether corporate liability for a "violation 
of the law of nations," is a norm "accepted 
by the civilized world and defined with a 
~pecificity" sufficient to provide a basis for 
jurisdiction under the ATS[.] We have 
looked to international law to determine 
whether state officials, private individuals, 
and aiders and abettors, can be held liable 
under the ATS. There is no principled basis 
for treating the question of corporate 
liability differently. Like the issue of aiding 
and abetting liability, whether corporations 
can be liable for alleged violations of the 
law of nations "is no less significant a 
decision than whether to recognize a whole 
new tort in the first place." It is, therefore, a 
decision properly made only by reference to 
customary international law. 
Having concluded that international law 
controls our inquiry, we next consider what 
the sources of international law reveal with 
respect to the existence of a norm of 
corporate liability under customary 
international law. 
II. Corporate Liability Is Not a Norm of 
Customary International Law 
To attain the status of a rule of customary 
international law, a norm must be "specific, 
universal, and obligatory." Defining such 
norms "is no simple task," as "[ c ]ustomary 
international law is discerned from myriad 
decisions made in numerous and varied 
international and domestic arenas." The 
sources consulted are therefore of the utmost 
importance .... 
* * * 
In this Circuit we have long recognized as 
authoritative the sources of international law 
identified in Aliicle 38 of the Statute of the 
International . Court of Justice ("ICJ 
Statute"). Article 3 8 provides in relevant 
part: 
1. The Court, whose function is to 
decide in accordance with 
international law such disputes as are 
submitted to it, shall apply: 
a. international conventions, whether 
general or particular,· establishing . 
rules expressly recognized by the 
contesting states; 
b. international custom, as evidence 
of a general practice accepted as law; 
c. the general principles of law 
recognized by civilized nations; 
d. subject to the provisions of Article 
59, judicial decisions and the 
teachings of the most highly 
qualified publicists [i.e., scholars or 
"jurists"] of the various nations, as 
subsidiary means for the 
determination of rules of law. 
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ICJ Statute, art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 
1055, 1060, 33 D.N.T.S. 993 (emphasis 
added). 
With those pril1ciples in mind, we consider 
whether . the sources of international law 
reveal that corporate liability has attained 
universal acceptance as a rule of customary 
international law. 
A. International Tribunals 
Insofar as international tribunals are 
established for the specific purpose of 
imposing liability on those who violate the 
law of nations, the history and conduct of 
those tribunals is instructive. We find it 
particularly significant, therefore, that no 
international tribunal of which we are aware 
has ever held a corporation liable for a 
violation of the law of nations. 
1. The Nuremberg Tribunals 
[The Court discussed the London Charter's 
grant of jurisdiction only over natural 
persons and its grant of the authority to 
declare a corporation criminal for 
. evidentiary purposes.] 
Echoing the London Charter's imposition of 
liability on natural persons only, the 
subsequent United States Military Tribunals, 
established under Control Council Law No. 
10, prosecuted corporate executives for their 
role in violating customary international law 
during the Second World War, but not the 
corporate entities themselves. This approach 
to liability can be seen most clearly in the 
tribunal's treatment of the notorious LG. 
Farben chemical company ("LG. Farben"). 
[The Court described Farben's partnership 
with the Nazi state, how that partnership 
made possible many of the Nazi war crimes 
and crimes against humanity, and how the 
Fat'ben corporation was expressly declared 
not before the tribunal and not subject to 
criminal penalties.] 
In declining to impose corporate liability 
under international law in the case of the 
most nefarious corporate· enterprise known 
to the civilized world, while prosecuting the 
men who led LG. Farben, the military 
tribunals established under Control Council 
Law No. 10 expressly defined liability under 
the law of nations as liability that could not 
be divorced from individual moral 
responsibility. It is thus clear that, at the 
time of the Nuremberg trials, corporate 
liability was not recognized as a "specific,· 
universal, . and obligatory" norm of 
customary international law. 
We tum now to international tribunals 
convened since Nuremberg to determine 
whether there is any evidence that the 
concept of corporate liability has coalesced 
into a "specific, universa~, and obligatory" 
norm. 
2. International Tribunals Since Nuremberg 
Since Nuremberg, international tribunals 
have continually declined to· hold· 
corporations liable for violations of 
customary international law. For example, 
the charters establishing both the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia ("ICTY") and the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 
or ("ICTR") expressly confined the 
.tribunals' jurisdiction to "natural persons." 
The commentarY contained in the Report of 
the Secretary-General of the United Nations 
on the ICTY reveals that jurisdiction over 
corporations was considered but expressly 
rejected: "[T]he ordinary meaning of the 
telID 'persons responsible for serious 
violations of international humanitarian law' 
would be natural persons to the exclusion of 
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juridical persons." Moreover, unlike the 
International Military Tribunal at 
Nuremberg, the ICTY lacked the authority 
to declare organizations "criminaL" Thus, to 
the extent that the International Military 
Tribunal at Nuremberg possessed some 
limited authority to declare corporations 
criminal-which, as explained above, 
operated merely as an evidentiary rule for 
later trials imposing liability on 
individuals-subsequent tribunals have not 
retained that procedure. 
More recently, the Rome Statute of the ICC 
also limits that tribunal's jurisdiction to 
"natural persons." Significantly, a proposal 
to grant the ICC jurisdiction over 
corporations and other "juridical" persons 
was advanced by the French delegation, but 
the proposal was rejected. As commentators 
have explained, the French proposal was 
rejected in part because "criminal liability of 
corporations is still rejected in many· 
national legal orders" and thus would pose 
challenges for the ICC's principle of 
"complementarity." 39 The history of the 
Rome Statute therefore confirms the absence 
of any generally recognized principle or 
consensus among States concerning 
corporate liability for violations of 
customary international law. 
In sum, modem international tribunals make 
it abundantly clear that, since Nuremberg, 
the concept of corporate . liability for 
violations of customary international law 
has not even begun to "ripen[ ]" into a 
universally accepted norm of internatiorial 
law. 
B. International Treaties 
39 "Complementarity" is the principle, embodied in 
the Rome Statute, by which the ICC declines to 
exercise jurisdiction over a case that is 
simultaneously being investigated or prosecuted by a 
State having jurisdiction over it. 
Treaties "are proper evidence of customary . 
international law because, and insofar as, 
they create legal obligations alan to· 
contractual obligations on the States parties 
to them." Although all treaties ratified by 
more than one State provide some evidence 
of the custom and practice of nations, "a 
treaty will only constitute sufficient proof of 
a norm of customary international law if an 
overwhelming majority of States have 
ratified the treaty, and those States 
uniformly and consistently act in accordance 
with its principles." Moreover, as one 
distinguished scholar of international law 
has explained: 
The ordinary treaty by which two or 
more states enter into engagements 
with one another for some special 
object can very rarely be used even 
as- evidence to establish the existence 
of a rule of general law; it is more 
probable that the very reason of the 
treaty was to create an obligation 
which would not have existed by the 
general law, or to exclude an existing 
rule which would otherwise have 
applied. 
Brierly, ante, at 57 (emphases added). 
That a provision appears in one treaty (or 
more), therefore, is not proof of a well-
established norm of customary international 
law. 
One district court in our Circuit erroneously 
overvalued the importance of a number of 
international treaties in finding that 
- corporate liability has attained the status of 
customary international law. None of the 
treaties relied upon in the district court's 
2003 Presbyterian Church opinion have 
been ratified by the United States, and most 
-of them have not been ratified by other 
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States whose interests would be most 
profoundly affected by the treaties' terms. 
Those. treaties are therefore insufficient-
considered either individually or 
collectively-to demonstrate that corporate 
liability is universally recognized as a norm 
of customary international law. 
Even if those specialized treaties had been 
ratified by an "overwhelming majority" of 
states,-as some recent treaties providing for 
corporate liability have been-. the fact that 
those treaties impose obligations on 
corporations in the context of the treaties' 
particular subject matter tells us nothing 
about whether corporate liability for, say, 
violations of human rights, which are not a 
subject of those treaties, is universally 
recognized as a norm of customary 
international law. Significantly, to find that 
a treaty embodies or creates a rule of· 
customary international law. would mean 
that the rule applies beyond the limited 
subject matter of the treaty and to nations 
that have not ratified it. To construe those 
treaties as so-called "law-making" treaties-
that is, treaties that codifY existing norms of 
customary international law or crystallize an 
emerging rule of customary international 
law-would be wholly inappropriate and 
without precedent. 
As noted above, there is no historical 
evidence of an existing or even nascent 
norm of customary international law 
imposing liability on corporations for 
violations of human rights. It cannot be said, 
therefore, that those treaties on specialized 
questions codifY an existing, general rule of 
customary international law. Nor can those 
recent treaties, in light of their limited 
number and specialized subject matter, be 
viewed as crystallizing an emerging norm of 
customary international law. Furthermore, 
even if, as a general rule, treaties on a 
specialized subject matter could be viewed 
as crystallizing a norm of customary 
international ·law (which they generally 
cannot), it would be inappropriate to do so 
in this case in light of the recent express 
rejection in major multilateral treaties of a 
norm of corporate liability in the context of 
human rights violations. 
Finally, the few specialized treaties 
imposing liability on corporations have not 
had such influence that a general rule of 
corporate liability has become a norm of 
customary international law .... 
* * * 
For a treaty provision to attain the status of a 
norm of customary international law, the IeJ 
[has] explained, "[i]t would in the first place 
be necessary that the provision concerned 
should, at all events potentially, be of a 
fundamentally norm-creating character such 
as could be regarded as forming the basis of 
a general rule of law." Provisions on 
corporate liability in a handful of specialized 
treaties cannot be said to have a 
"fundamentally norm-creating character." 
Moreover, as the history of the Rome Statute 
demonstrates, "still unresolved controversies 
as to the exact meaning and scope of this 
notion" of corporate liability "raise further 
doubts as to the potentially norm-creating 
character of the rule." Accordingly, 
provisions imposing corporate liability in 
some recent specialized treaties have not 
established corporate liability as a norm of 
customary international law. 
In reaching the contrary conclusion in 
Presbyterian Church, the judge to whom the 
case was originally assigned in the district 
court acknowledged that "most treaties do 
not bind corporations" hut reasoned that 
"[i]f corporations can be liable for 
unintentional torts such as oil spills or 
nuclear accidents, logic would suggest that 
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they can be held liable for intentional torts 
such as complicity in genocide, slave 
trading, or torture." In addition to the 
reasons discussed above, the district court's 
conclusion was flawed by its use of an 
improper methodology for discerning norms 
of customary international law: customary 
international law does not develop through 
the "logical" expansion of existing norms. 
Rather, as the Supreme COUli has explained, 
it develops, if at all, through the custom and 
practice "among civilized nations . 
gradually ripening into a rule of 
. intematio·nallaw." 
* * * 
We conclude, therefore, that the relatively 
few international treaties that impose 
particular obligations on corporations do not 
establish corporate liability as a "specific, 
. universal, and obligatory" norm of 
customary international law. Although those 
treaties suggest a trend towards imposing 
corporate liability in some special contexts, 
no trend is detectable outside such nalTOW 
applications in specialized treaties, and there 
is nothing to demonstrate that corporate 
liability has yet been recognized as a norm 
of the customary international law of human 
rights. 
C. Works of Publicists 
Although the works of publicists (i.e., 
scholars or "jurists") can be a relevant 
source of customary international law, 
"[s]uch works are resorted to by judicial 
tribunals, not for the speculations of their 
authors concerning what the law ought to be, 
but for trustworthy evidence of what the law 
really is." 
In light of the evidence discussed above, it is 
not surprising that two renowned professors . 
of international law, Professor James 
Crawford and Professor (now Judge) 
Christopher Greenwood, forcefully declared 
in litigation argued before this panel on the 
same day as this case that customary 
internatioI).allaw does not recognize liability 
for corporations that violate its norms. 
According to Professor . Crawford, "no 
national court [outside of the United States] 
and no international judicial tribunal has so 
far recognized corporate liability, as 
opposed to individual liability, in a civil or 
criminal context on the basis of a violation 
of the law of nations or customary· 
international law." Even those who favor 
using the A TS as a means of holding 
corporations accountable for human rights 
violations reluctantly acknowledge that "the 
universe of international criminal law does 
not reveal any prosecutions of corporations 
per se." 
Together, those authorities demonstrate that 
imposing liability on corporations for 
violations of customary international law 
has not attained a discernible, much less 
universal, acceptance among nations of the 
world in their relations inter se.· Because 
corporate liability is not recognized as a 
"specific, universal, and obligatory" norm, it 
is not a rule of customary international law 
that we may apply under the ATS. 
Accordingly, insofar as plaintiffs in this 
action seek to hold only corporations liable 
for their conduct in Nigeria (as opposed to 
individuals within those corporations), and 
only under the ATS, their claims must be 
dismissed for lack of· subject matter 
jurisdiction. 
III. The ConculTing Opinion 
Judge Leval concedes that "international 
law, of its own force, imposes no liabilities 
on corporations or other private juridical 
entities." ConculTing Op. 186. In other 
words, despite his perplexing but forceful 
contentions otherwise, Judge Leval does not 
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disagree with Part II of our opinion. What he 
disputes is our conclusion in Part I that 
customary international law supplies the rule 
of decision. 
Judge Leval admits that international law is 
"the place to look" to "determine whether a 
corporation can beheld civilly liable for a 
violation of international law," but he 
maintains that we must accept corporate 
liability based on principles of domestic law 
unless "the law of nations [has] spoke[ n] oli 
the question [and] provid[ ed] that acts of 
corporations are not covered by the law of 
nations[.]" He then contends that the law of 
nations has not, in fact, spoken on the 
question and that corporate liability is 
therefore a matter of "remedy" that 
"international law leaves . . . to the 
independent determination of each State." In 
doing so· Judge Leval dismisses as a source 
of authoritative guidance the fact that no 
international tribunal has ever been accorded 
jurisdiction over corporations because those 
tribunals have been charged only with the 
prosecution of crimes. Finally, Judge Leval 
accuses us of rejecting corporate civil 
liability under the ATS merely because there 
is no norm of corporate civil liability in 
customary international law, and he argues 
that this reasoning is inconsistent with our 
endorsement of individual liability under the 
ATS. 
Judge Leval's criticisms distort our holding 
and betray several fundamental 
misunderstandings of customary 
international law. First, Judge Leval 
attempts to shift to us· the burden of 
identifying· a nOlID of customary 
international law that supports our "rule." 
But it is entirely inappropriate to begin, as 
Judge Leval apparently begins, with a 
presumption that a violation of customary 
international law can be attributed to any 
defendant unless, and until, a nOlID of 
customary international law declares 
otherwise. This reasoning turns customary 
international law on its head. Customary 
international law arises from the customs 
and practices "among civilized nations . . . 
gradually ripening into a rule of 
international law." Accordingly, the 
responsibility lies with those who seek to 
demonstrate that "international law extends 
the scope of liability for a violation of a 
given norm to the perpetrator being sued." 
Judge Leval produces· no evidence that 
international law extends the scope of 
liability to corporations, and, in fact, he 
concedes that it does not. Concurring Op. 
186 ("It is true that international law, of its 
own force, imposes no liabilities on 
corporations or other private juridical 
entities."). In any event, although it is not 
our burden, we have little trouble 
demonstrating the absence of a norm of 
corporate liability in customary international 
law. 
Second, Judge Leval dismisses the fact that 
international tribunals have consistently 
declined to recognize corporate liability as a 
norm of customary international law; he 
does so by inventing a distinction between 
civil and criminal liability in customary 
international law, that is contrary to our A TS 
jurisprudence. As Judge Katzmann 
explained in his separate opinion in 
Khulumani, "[t]his distinction finds no 
support in our case law, which has 
consistently relied on criminal law nOlIDS in 
establishing the content of customary 
international law for purposes of the 
[ATS]." 504 F.3d at 270 n. 5. Unlike U.S. 
domestic law, "international law does not 
maintain [ a] kind of hermetic seal between 
criminal and civil law." Indeed, Judge 
Katzmann was able to conclude that the 
scope of customary international law 
reaches those who aid and abet violations of 
international law only by looking to the 
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charters of-and the law applied by-the very 
same international tribunals that Judge Leval 
ignores. Judge Leval explicitly endorsed 
Judge Katzmann's reasoning in Khulumani 
by joining the unanimous panel opinion in 
Presbyterian Church, which expressly 
adopted Judge Katzmann's rule as the law of 
our Circuit. Presbyterian Church, 582 F.3d 
at 258. Apparently, Judge Leval would have 
us look to international criminal tribunals 
only when they supply a norm with which 
he agrees. 
Third, Judge Leval distorts our analysis by 
claiming that we hold "that the absence of a 
universal practice among nations of 
imposing civil damages on corporations for 
violations of international law means that 
under international law corporations are not 
liable for violations of the law of nations." 
Concurring Op. 152 (emphasis added). That 
is not our holding. We hold that corporate 
liability is not a norm that we can recognize 
and apply in actions under the ATS because 
the customary international law of human 
rights does not impose any form of liability 
on corporations (civil, criminal, or 
otherwise). 
Finally, and most importantly, Judge Leval 
inconectly categorizes the scope of liability 
under customary international law-that is, 
who can be liable for violations of 
international law-as merely a question of 
remedy to be determined independently by 
each state. As we explained above, the 
subjects of international law have always 
been defined by reference to international 
law itself. Judge Leval is therefore wrong to 
suggest that "international law takes no 
position" on the question of who can be 
liable for violations of international law. 
Although international law does (as Judge 
Leval explains) leave remedial questions to 
States, the. liability of corporations for the 
actions of their employees or agents is not a 
question of remedy. Corporate liability 
imposes responsibility for the actions of a 
culpable individual on a wholly new 
defendant-the corporation. In the United 
States, corPorate liability is determined by a 
body of rules determining which actions of 
an employee or agent are to be imputed to 
the corporation. In this important respect, 
corporate liability is akin to accessorial 
liability, which is a subject of international 
law not left to individual States. 
The potential for civil damages under the 
ATS arises only if customary international 
law recognizes that a particular class of 
defendant is' a subject of international law in 
the first place. Contrary to Judge Leval's 
suggestion, therefore, individual liability 
under the ATS is wholly consistent with our 
holding today. Congress chose in the ATS to 
grant jurisdiction over torts committed "in 
violation of the law of nations," and since 
the Nuremberg trials, customary 
international law has recognized individual 
liability for the violation of international 
human rights. Thus, the ATS merely permits 
courts to recognize a remedy (civil liability) 
for heinous crimes universally condemned 
by the family of nations against individuals 
already recognized as subjects of 
international law. To permit courts to 
recognize cOlporate liability under the ATS, 
however, would require, at the very least, a 
different statute-one that goes beyond 
providing jurisdiction over torts committed 
"in violation of the law of nations" to 
authorize suits against entities that are not 
subjects of customary international law. 
CONCLUSION 
The A TS provides federal district courts 
jurisdiction over a tort, brought by an alien 
only, alleging a "violation of the law of 
nations or a treaty of the United States." 
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When an ATS suit is brought under the "law 
of nations," also known as "customary 
international law," jurisdiction is limited to 
those cases alleging a violation of an 
international norm that is "specific, 
universal, and obligatory." 
No corporation has ever been subject to any 
form of liability (whether civil, criminal, or 
otherwise) under the customary international 
law of human rights. Rather, sources of 
customary international law have, on several 
occasions, explicitly rejected the idea of 
corporate liability. Thus, corporate liability 
has not attained a discernable, much less 
universal, acceptance among nations of the 
world in their relations inter se, and it 
cannot not, as a result, form the basis of a 
suit under the ATS. 
Acknowledging the absence of corporate 
liability under customary international law is 
not a matter of conferring "immunity" on 
corporations. It is, instead, a recognition that 
the States of the world, in their relations 
with one another, have determined that 
moral and legal responsibility for heinous 
crimes should rest on the individual whose 
conduct makes him or her. '" hostis humani 
generis, an enemy of all mankind. '" Nothing 
in this opinion limits or forecloses suits 
under the ATS against a corporation's 
[individuals] or any other person who 
commits, or purposefully aids and abets, 
violations of international law. Moreover, 
nothing in this opinion limits or forecloses 
corporate liability under any body of law 
other than the ATS-including the domestic 
statutes of other States-and nothing in this 
opinion limits or forecloses Congress from 
amending the ATS to bring corporate 
defendants within our jurisdiction. 
Corporate liability, however, is simply not 
"accepted by the civilized world and defined 
with a specificity comparable to the features 
of the 18th-century paradigms" recognized 
as providing a basis for suit under the law 
prescribed by the ATS-that is, customary 
international law. 
We do not know whether the concept of 
corporate liability will "gradually ripen[ ] 
into a rule of international law. " It can do so, 
however, only by achieving universal 
recognition and 'acceptance as a norm in the 
relations of States inter se. For now, and for 
the foreseeable future, the Alien Tort Statute 
does not provide subject matter jurisdiction 
over claims against corporations. 
To summarize, we hold as follows: 
(1) Since Filartiga, which in 1980 marked 
the advent of the modern era of litigation for 
violations of human rights under the Alien 
Tort Statute, all of our precedents-and the 
Supreme Court's decision in Sosa, 542 U.S. 
at 732 n. 20 [124 S.Ct. 2739]-require us to 
look to international law to determine, 
whether a particular class of defendant; such 
as corporations, can be liable under the 
Alien Tort Statute for alleged violations of 
the law of nations. 
(2) The concept of corporate liability for 
violations of customary international law 
has not achieved universal recognition or 
acceptance as a norm in the relations of 
States with each other. See Vencap, 519 F.2d , 
at 1015. Inasmuch as plaintiffs assert claims 
against corporations only, their complaint 
must be dismissed for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction. 
Accordingly, the September 29, 2006 order 
of the District Court is AFFIRMED insofar 
as it dismissed some of plaintiffs' claims 
against the corporate defendants and 
REVERSED insofar as it declined to dismiss 
plaintiffs' remaining claims against the 
corporate defendants. 
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LEVAL, Circuit Judge, concurring only in 
the judgment: 
The majority opinion deals a substantial 
blow to international law and its undertaking 
to protect' fundamental human, rights. 
According to the rule my colleagues have 
created, one' who earns profits by 
commercial exploitation of abuse of 
funda)TIental human rights can successfully 
shield those profits from victims' claims for 
compensation simply by taking the 
precaution of conducting the heinous 
operation in the corporate form. Without any 
supp01i in either the precedents or the 
scholarship of international law, the majority 
take the position that corporations, and other 
juridical entities, are not subject to 
international law, and for that reason such 
violators of fundamental human rights are 
'free to retain any profits so earned without' 
liability to their victims. 
[Characterizes the majority as creating' a 
rule, in opposition to the objectives of 
international law, that shield corporations 
from liability for human rights abuses.] 
Since Film'tiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 
(2d Cir.1980), was decided in 1980, United 
States courts, acting under the Alien Tort 
Statute (ATS), which was passed by the 
First Congress in 1789, have been awarding 
compensatory damages to victims of human 
rights abuses committed in violation of the 
law of nations. Many supporters of the cause 
of human rights have celebrated the 
Filartiga line of cases as an important 
advance of civilization. Not all, however, 
have viewed those cases with favor. Some 
see them as unwarranted meddling by U.S. 
judges in events that occurred far away, 
applying a body of law that we did not 
malee, in circumstances carrying a potential, 
furthermore, to interfere with the President's 
'conduct of foreign affairs. In 2004, a 
substantial minority of the Supreme Court, 
in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 
124 S.Ct. 2739, 159 L.Ed.2d 718, would 
have essentially nullified the ATS and 
overturned the Filartiga line, by ruling that 
the ATS did no more than give courts 
jurisdiction, and that, absent further 
legislation establishing a legal claim, courts 
acting under A TS had no authority to grant 
any substantive relief. The majority of the 
Supreme Court, however, rejected that 
argument. The Court ruled that under the 
ATS, federal courts could award damages 
for violations of the Jaw of nations. For 
those who believe the Filartiga - Sosa line 
represents a meaningful advance in the 
protection of human rights, the majority's 
decision here marks a very bad day. 
To understand this controversy, it is 
important to understand exactly what is the 
majority's rule, how it functions, and in 
what circumstances. To begin, their rule 
relates to the most abhorrent conduct-those 
acts that violate norms of the international 
law of human rights. The ATS gives U.S. 
courts jurisdiction to award tmi damages to 
aliens who are victims of such atrocities. 
According to the majority, in cases where 
the norms of the law of nations were 
violated by a corporation (or other juridical 
entity), compensatory damages' may be 
awarded under the ATS against the 
corporation's employees, natural persons 
who acted in the corporation's behalf, but 
not against the corporation that commanded 
the atrocities and earned profits by 
committing them. The corporation, 
according to my colleagues, has not violated 
international law, and is indeed incapable of 
doing so because international law does not 
apply to the conduct of corporations. 
Accordingly, a corporation which has earned 
profits by abuse of fundamental human 
rights-as by slave trading-is free to retain 
those profits without liability. 
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* * * 
... No precedent of international law 
endorses this rule. No court has ever 
approved it, nor is any international tribunal 
structured with a jurisdiction that reflects it. 
(Those courts that have ruled on the 
question have explicitly rejected it.) No 
treaty or international convention adopts this 
principle. And no work of scholarship on 
international law endorses the majority's 
rule. Until today, [the majority's] concept 
had no existence in international law. 
The majority contend, nevertheless, that 
unambiguous jurisprudence "lead[ s] 
inescapably" to their conclusion. Maj. Op. 
125. However, the reasoning that supports 
the majority's argument is, in my view, 
illogical, misguided, and based on 
misunderstandings of precedent. 
The argument depends on its observation 
that international criminal tribunals have 
been . established without jurisdiction to 
impose criminal punishments on 
corporations for their violations of 
international law. From this fact the majority 
contend an inescapable inference arises that 
international law does not govern 
corporations, which are therefore free to 
engage in conduct prohibited by the rules .of 
international law with impunity. 
There is no logic to the argument. The 
reasons why international tribunals have 
been established without jurisdiction to 
. impose criminal liability on corporations 
have to do solely with the theory and the 
objectives of criminal punishment, and have 
no bearing on civil compensatory liability. 
The view is widely held among the nations 
of the world that criminal punishments 
(under domestic law, as well as internatIonal 
law) are inappropriate for corporations. This 
VIew derives from two perceptions: First, 
that criminal punishment can be 
theoretically justified only where the 
defendant has acted with criminal intent-a 
condition that cannot exist when the 
defendant is a juridical construct which is 
incapable of having an intent; and second, 
that criminal punishments are pointless and 
counterproductive when imposed on a 
fictitious juridical entity because they fail to 
achieve the punitive objectives of criminal 
punishment. For these reasons many nations 
in their domestic laws impose criminal 
punishments only on natural persons,. and 
not on juridical ones. In contrast, the 
imposition of civil liability on corporations 
serves perfectly the objective of civil 
liability to compensate victims for the 
wrongs inflicted on them and is practiced 
. everywhere in the world. The fact that 
international tribunals do not impose 
criminal punishment on corporations in no 
way supports the inference that corporations 
are outside the scope of international law 
and therefore can incur' no civil 
compensatory liability to victims when they 
engage in conduct prohibited by the norms 
of international law. 
The majority next contend that international 
law does not distinguish between criminal 
and civil liability. This is simply incorrect. 
International law. distinguishes clearly 
between them and provides differently for 
the different objectives of criminal 
punishment and civil compensatory liability. 
The majority then argue that the absence of 
a universal practice among nations of 
imposing civil damages on corporations for 
violations of international law means that 
under international law corporations are not 
liable for violations. of the law of nations. 
This argument is as illogical as the first and 
is based on a misunderstanding of the 
structure of international law. The position 
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of international law on whether civil liability 
should be imposed for violations of its 
norms is that international law takes no 
position and leaves that question to each 
nation to resolve. International law, at least 
as it pertains to human rights, consists 
primarily of a sparse body of norms, 
adopting widely agreed principles 
prohibiting conduct universally agreed to be 
heinous and inhumane. Having established 
these norms of prohibited conduct, 
international law says little or nothing about 
how those norms should be enforced. It 
leaves the manner of enforcement, including 
the question of whether there should be 
private civil remedies for violations of 
international law, almost. entirely to 
individual nations. While most nations have 
not recognized tort liability for violations of 
international law, the United States, through 
the ATS, has opted to impose civil 
compensatory liability on violators and 
draws no distinction in its laws between 
violators who are natural persons and 
corporations. The majority's argument that 
national courts are at liberty to award civil 
damages for violations of international law 
solely against natural persons and not 
against corporations has no basis in 
international law and, furthermore, nullifies 
the intention of international law to leave the 
question of civil liability to be decided 
separately by each nation. 
The majority;s asserted rule is, furthermore, 
at once internally inconsistent and 
incompatible with Supreme Court authority 
and with our prior cases that awarded 
damages for violations of international law. 
The absence of a universally accepted rule 
of international law on tort damages is true 
as to defendants who are natural persons, as 
well as to corporations. Because 
international law generally leaves all aspects 
of the issue of civil liability to individual 
nations, there is no rule or custom of 
international law to award civil damages in 
any form or context, either as to natural 
persons or as to juridical ones. If the absence 
of a universally accepted rule for the' award 
of civil damages against corporations means 
that U.S. courts may not award damages 
against a corporation, then the same absence 
of a universally accepted rule for the award 
of civil damages against natural persons 
must mean that U.S. courts may not ilward 
damages against a naturai person. But the 
majority opinion concedes (as it must) that 
U.S. courts may award damages against the 
corporation's employees when a corporation. 
violates the rule of nations. Furthelmore, our 
circuit and others have for decades awarded 
damages, and the Supreme Court in Sosa 
inade clear that a damage remedy does lie 
under the ATS. The majority opinion is thus 
internally inconsistent and is logically 
incompatible with both Second Circuit and 
Supreme Court authority. 
If past judges had followed the majority's 
reasoning, we would have had no 
Nuremberg trials, which for the first time 
imposed criminalliabilitj on natural persons 
complicit in war crimes; no subsequent 
international tribunals to impose criminal 
liability for violation of international law 
norms; and no judgments in U.S. courts 
under the ATS, compensating victims for 
the violation of fundamental human rights. 
The rule in cases under the ATS is quite 
simple. The law of nations sets worldwide 
norms of conduct, prohibiting certain 
universally condemned heinous acts. That 
body of law, however, takes no position on 
whether its norms may be enforced by civil 
actions for compensatory damages. It leaves 
that decision to be separately decided by 
each nation. The ATS confers on the U.S. 
courts jurisdiction to entertain civil suits for 
violations of the law of nations. In the 
United States, if a plaintiff in a suit under 
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the A TS shows that she is the victim of a 
tort committed in violation of the norms of 
the law of nations, the court has jurisdiction 
to hear the case and to award compensatory 
damages against the tortfeasor. That is what 
the Supreme Court explained in Sosa. No 
principle of domestic or international law 
supports the majority's conclusion that the 
norms enforceable through the A TS-such as 
the prohibition by international law of 
genocide, slavery, war crimes, piracy, etc.-
apply only to natural persons and not to 
corporations, leaving corporations immune 
from suit and free to retain profits earned 
through such acts. 
I am in full agreement that this Complaint 
must be dismissed. It fails to state a proper 
legal claim of entitlement to relief. The 
Complaint alleges that the Appellants-the 
parent holding companies at the apex of the 
huge Royal Dutch Shell international, 
integrated oil enterprise-are liable under the 
ATS on the theory that their actions aided 
the government of Nigeria in inflicting 
human rights abuses on the Ogoni peoples in 
the jungles of Nigeria. The allegations fall 
short of mandatory pleading standards. We 
recently held in Presbyterian Church of 
Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 
244 (2d Cir.2009), that liability under the 
ATS for aiding and abetting in a violation of 
international human rights lies only where 
the aider and abettor acts with a pUlpose to 
bring about the abuse of human rights. 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court ruled in . 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, --U.S. --, 129 S.Ct. 
1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009), that a 
complaint is insufficient as a matter of law 
unless it pleads specific .facts supporting a 
plausible inference that the defendant 
violated the plaintiff s legal rights. Putting 
together these two rules, the complaint in: 
this action would need to plead specific facts 
that support a plausible inference that the 
Appellants aided the government of Nigeria 
with a purpose to bring about the Nigerian 
government's alleged violations of the 
human rights of the plaintiffs. As explained 
in greater detail below, see infra Part VII, 
the allegations of the Complaint do not 
succeed in meeting that test. I therefore 
agree with the majority that the claims 
against the Appellants must be dismissed, 
,but not on the basis of the supposed rule of 
international law the' majority' have 
fashioned. 
* * * 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, I agree with the 
majority that all of the claims pleaded 
against the Appellants must be dismissed. I 
cannot, however, join the majority's creation 
of an unprecedented concept of international 
law that . exempts juridical persons from 
compliance with its rules. The majority's 
rule conflicts with two centuries of federal 
precedent on the ATS, and deals a blow to 
the efforts of international law to protect 
human rights. 
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"Major New Corporate Case at Court" 
SCOTUSblog 
June 7, 2011 
Lyle Denniston 
Lawyers for 12 individuals seeking to hold 
major oil companies legally responsible for 
human rights abuses in Nigeria in the 1990s 
have asked the Supreme Court to overturn a 
federal appeals court's ruling that 
corporations are immune to. such claims in 
U.S. courts. The new petition, in the high 
visibility case of Kiobel, et al., v Royal 
Dutch Petroleum, et al., raises what may be 
the hottest international law issue now 
affecting business firms. 
In essence, the case is a kind of ultimate test 
of what Congress meant when, as part of the 
first federal courts law in 1789, it gave U.S. 
courts the authority to hear claims by 
foreign nationals that they were harmed by 
violations of international law. The case also 
seeks to test what the Supreme Court 
understood the law to mean in its ruling 
seven years ago in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 
an international abduction case. 
The law at issue is the Alien Tort Statute, a 
law that dates from the first Congress but 
has grown in impOliance at the center of a 
wave of lawsuits over the past three 
decades-lawsuits that were originally 
aimed at individuals, and then began 
targeting corporations in 1997. 
The Second Circuit Court, in a ruling last 
September that aroused hard feelings among 
the judges on the panel and on the en bane 
Court, became the first court to rule that 
ATS does not apply at all to corporations, 
but only to individuals. The panel split 2-1, 
and the en bane Court divided 5-5 in 
refusing to reconsider the panel result. 
Challenging that outcome, the new appeal 
argued: "Corporate tort liability was part of 
the common law landscape in 1789 and is 
firmly entrenched in all legal systems today. 
The notion that corporations might be 
excluded from liability for their complicity 
in egregious human rights violations is an 
extraordinary and radical concept." 
Invoking the grievous memory of atrocities 
by the I.G. Farben industrial complex in 
Nazi Gerrilany, the petition asserted that 
"there is nothing in the ATS' s history or 
purpose, the common law of the 18th 
Century, or international law that supports" 
the Second Circuit conclusion. 
While many lawyers and legal scholars 
interpret the Supreme Court's 2004 ruling in 
Sosa . to mean that the Court drew no 
distinction between corporations and 
individuals sued under ATS, the Sosa 
decision itself was a primary source of 
authority claimed by the Second Circuit 
panel for its conclusion that corporations are 
immune. The other main authority for the 
panel's ruling was its perception of the 
absence of corporate defendants m 
international crimes tribunal cases. 
The Kiobel petition seeks to put two 
questions· before the Justices. It is 
conceivable that,· if the Court were to grant 
the first of the two questions, it might not 
reach the ultimate question of corporate 
liability, at least in an initial round of 
review. That is because the first issue is 
whether the Circuit Court should have 
reached the issue of corporate immunity at 
all. 
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In fact, the petition suggested that the 
Justices should consider summarily 
overturning the Circuit Court on a basic 
procedural point, and then send the case 
back to the Circuit Court to decide on the 
. legal issues· of liability that the Nigerian 
challengers had raised in what was a pre-
trial appeal. 
As the case moved up from a federal District 
Court, neither side had raised the issue of 
whether ATS applied to corporations. That 
question was not decided by the District 
judge, and was not an issue that the judge 
sent up to the Circuit Court. But the Circut 
. Court panel majority,. without deciding any 
of the issues sent up on appeal, opted on its 
own to conClude that it had no jurisdiction to 
decide the case because A TS simply did not 
apply to corporations. 
Challenging that conclusion in arguing the 
first question in. the new petition, the 
Nigerians' counsel contended that the 
question of A TS' s reach is an issue on the 
legal merits, not a jurisdictional question. If 
it is treated as a jurisdictional question, the 
petition predicted, virtually every significant 
issue in an A TS case from now on will be . 
turned into a question of the court's 
authority, "enabling any Circuit panel to 
render decisions on virtually any issue 
without prior notice, briefing, or decision in 
the district court." Moreover, it said, every 
corporation sued under such a legal 
understanding would seek to make every 
question one of jurisdiction. 
The second question posed in the petition is 
what it describes as the merits question: 
whether corporations are immune from tort 
liability for war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, and other human rights abuses 
perhaps even amounting to genocide, or are 
they as liable as any private indvidual would 
be under ATS. 
On that point, the petition said, there is a 
direct conflict between rulings of the Second 
Circuit and the Eleventh Circuit. In addition, 
it argued, other Circuit Courts have 
considered ATS suits against corporations 
without questioning whether they are 
covered. 
Moreover, according to the petition, the 
issue of corporate liability under A TS is 
now under review in three other federal 
appeals courts-the D.C., Seventh and Ninth 
Circuits. 
"Today," the petition said, "corporations 
may be sued under the A TS for their 
complicity in egregious international human 
rights violations in Miami or Atlanta, but not 
in New York or Hartford. This is contrary to 
the congessional intent that the A TS ensure· 
uniform interpretation of itnernationallaw in 
federal courts in cases involving violations 
of the law of nations." 
The three companies involved in the case-
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., Shell Transport 
and Trading Co., and Shell Petroleum 
Development Co. of Nigeria Ltd.-will have 
a chance to respond to the petition before the 
Justices act on it. It is also possible that the 
Justices may seek the views of the federal 
government before acting. 
There is no set timetable for the Court to act 
on the case, but it is a certainty that no 
action will come until the next Term, 
starting in October. 
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"Corporate Executives: Get Ready for a Billion 
Dollar Lawsuit" 
Buffington Post 
December 2, 2010 
Ben Kerschberg 
I recently spoke with the Managing Counsel 
of a publicly traded multinational 
corporation with a market cap well over 
$150 billion and operations on every 
continent. Although he had read a i:ecent 
federal court of appeals opinion about the 
Alien Tort Statute ("ATS"), he admitted that 
he had little idea what it meant for his 
company in either the short or long term. In 
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, the 
Second Circuit held that corporations cannot 
be held liable for violations of customary· 
international law under the ATS, thereby 
reversing a well-established trend of aliens 
suing corporate entities in U.S. federal 
courts fQr alleged human tights violations. 
However, Kiobel is hardly, as some 
observers have incorrectly hailed it, the 
blockbuster opinion that spells the end of the 
multi-billion dollar ATS litigation industry. 
On the contrary, those same suits will still 
proceed, but their cross-hairs will shift from 
corporations to the individuals who serve 
them. 
A Look Back: How Corporations Came to 
Be Sued by Aliens in Federal Court 
The ATS is a relic of the Federal Judici~ry 
Act of 1789 that was intended to allow non-
U.S. citizens to seek redress in American 
courts for violations of the law of nations 
(i.e., customary international law) such as 
piracy, attacks on ambassadors, and 
violations of rights of safe passage. The 
A TS remained dormant for 200 years until 
1980, when the Second Circuit revived it in 
Filartiga v. Penalrada, a sweeping opinion 
that held that the A TS confers jurisdiction 
over tort actions brought by aliens (only) for 
violation of customary international law 
including war crimes against humanity. 
Filartiga gave rise to an abundance of 
litigation in federal district courts limited to 
suits against individuals, thereby reflecting 
one of the major trends in the international 
human rights movement of the post -WWII 
era. In 1999, however, federal courts began 
to allow hundreds of A TS suits alleging that 
a corporation-a "juridical" person-could 
also be an enemy of mankind. 
Kiobel and the Resurgence of Individual 
Liability uQ.der the ATS 
The Second Circuit's recent opmlOn in 
Kiobel has closed for now the window used 
by plaintiffs to sue corporations under the 
ATS. However, it simultaneously turned the 
clock back 30 years by encouraging 
plaintiffs once again to target corporate 
directors and executives for such billion 
dollar suits. These suits will now become the 
norm among groups and plaintiffs' lawyers 
putatively advocating under the aegis of 
human rights. 
In Kiobel, residents of Nigeria claimed that 
Dutch, British, and Nigerian corporations 
that were engaged in oil exploration aided 
and abetted the Nigerian government in 
committing violations of customary 
international law. They sought damages 
under the ATS. The federal district court 
allowed their claims with respect to aiding 
and abetting arbitrary arrest and detention; 
crimes against humanity; and torture or 
cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment. 
These claims were fair game. In light of the 
importance of the issues at stake, the trial 
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court voluntarily certified its entire order for 
interlocutory (i.e., provisional) appeal to the 
Second Circuit. 
The Second Circuit held that corporations 
cannot be held liable for violations of 
customary international law. . The comi 
reasoned that the scope of liability-"who is 
liable for what"-must be determined by 
"specific, universal, and obligatory" norms 
of international (not domestic) law and that 
"corporate liability is not a discernible-
much less a universally recognized-norm 
of customary international law." At the same 
time, the Court explicitly reminded both 
plaintiffs and individual corporate officers 
and directors alike that "nothing in [its] 
opinion limits or forecloses suits under the 
ATS against the individual perpetrators of 
violations of customary international law-
including the employers, managers, officers, 
and directors of a corporation. . . ." Indeed, 
no one questions that individual liability for 
alleged violations of human rights-
including for violations committed by those 
individuals' corporations-is precisely the 
sort of "specific, universal, and obligatory" 
norm that the Second Circuit and other 
federal courts recognize. 
The Nuremberg Trials: The Root of 
Individual Liability in the International 
Human Rights Movement 
The comi accorded particular weight to no 
less than the Nuremberg Tribunals. The 
Tribunals explicitly refused to hear any 
claims against corporate defendant I.G. 
Farben, which, in close participation with 
the Nazi State, manufactured Zykon B, an 
insecticide knowingly used as a lethal 
asphyxiating agent in the gas chambers at 
Auschwitz, yet charged its individual 
executives with war crimes. The principle 
invoked by the Second Circuit in Kiobel was 
stated poignantly by Justice and U.S. Chief 
Prosecutor at Nuremberg Robert H. Jackson 
75 years ago: "Crimes against international 
law are committed by men, not by abstract 
entities, and only by punishing individuals 
who commit such crimes can the provisions 
of international law be enforced." 
Some suits brought under the A TS are 
legitimate. Yet corporate counsel generally 
deem the jurisdictional reach of the statute 
as having given rise to little more than a 
cottage industry of thousands of frivolous 
suits filed in often successful attempts to 
obtain 9-figure verdicts rather than face the 
uncertainty of complex, newsworthy trials 
with the specter of billion dollar jury 
verdicts. 
A Final Word of Caution: Re-Aiming 
Litigation Cross-Hairs on Individual 
Directors, Officers, Managers, and 
Employees 
Kiobel does nothing to deter the trend 
described above. On the contrary, the 
Second Circuit guides plaintiffs to their 
new-yet very old and once familiar-
targets of choice: individual directors, 
officers, managers, and employees of those 
same corporations. Corporate executives and 
genyral counsel must institute proactive 
policies based on a detailed understanding of 
the ATS and relevant precedent in order to 
keep their companies far from suspicion 
while doing business abroad-and thereby 
keeping themselves from being named as 
individual defendants in lengthy cases with 
devastating costs. 
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"Further Thoughts on Today's Second Circuit ATS 
Decision on Corporate Liability" 
The Volokh Conspiracy 
. September 17,2010 
Kenneth Anderson. 
I've now had a chance to read a little more 
closely the decision, majority and 
concurrence, in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum (issued today by a 2nd Circuit 
panel of Judge Cabranes writing for himself 
and Judge Wood, and a concurrence in the 
judgment by Judge Leval). On second 
reading, it still looks to me like a 
blockbuster opinion, both because of the 
ringing tone of the Cabranes decision and 
the equally strong language of a concurrence 
that, on the key point of corporate liability, 
amounts to a dissent. With circuits having 
gone different directions on this issue, this 
perhaps tees up a SCOTUS review that 
would revisit its last, delphic pronouncement 
on the Alien Tort Statute in Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain. Here are a few thoughts that add 
to, but also partly revise and extend, things I 
said in my earlier post today. 
Let me start by trying to sum up the gist of 
the majority opinion and its reasoning. (I 
am reconstructing it in part, in my own 
. terms and terminology, and looking to basic 
themes, rather than tethering myself to the 
text of the opinion here.) The Cabranes 
opil1ion sets out the form of the ATS, that 
single sentence statute, as having a threshold 
part, which is established by international 
law (treaties of the United States and the law 
of nations, or customary international law), 
and a substantive part, which is the 
imposition of civil tort liability as a matter 
of US domestic law. It does not use quite 
those terms, but it seems to me to set up the 
statute in a way that I've sometimes 
characterized as a "hinge," in which 
something has to "swing" between the 
threshold and the substantive command once 
the threshold is met. The question has been 
whether the threshold that serves as a hinge 
to swing over to connect and kick start the 
substantive part of the ATS, so to speak, the 
US domestic tmi law substance, must be 
international law. 
The ATS cases in various district courts and 
circuit cOUlis have gone various directions 
on this, and indeed some of the early cases· 
did not seem to recognize that there is a 
. threshold pati and a substance part. One 
sizable group of more recent cases have 
gone the direction of saying that even if the 
threshold has to be the law of nations or 
treaties of the United States, it is satisfied if 
there is some body of conduct that 
constitutes a violation of it (and further 
meets the requirements under Sosa). Call 
this conduct the "what" of this threshold 
requirement in the ATS. But what about the 
"who" of the conduct? Do the legal qualities 
of the aileged perpetrator of the violative 
conduct matter? Two possible answers are: 
One is: if there is conduct, then the status 
under international law of whoever is 
alleged to have done it is not relevant. The 
existence of a "what" is enough, and the 
"who" is merely. to show that this named 
defendant did it; further consideration of the 
juridical qualities of the defendant is 
irrelevant. 
Alternatively, but to the same result of 
allowing a claim to go forward, even if it 
does matter, it is answered by looking to US 
domestic law in order to determine that it is 
an actor that can be held liable under the 
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ATS. Thus, under this latter view, a 
corporation could be such a pmiy alleged to 
have engaged in conduct' violating 
international law (and further meeting the 
Sosa standard). Why? Because it is enough 
that US civil law recognizes that a 
corporation is a legal person that can be held 
to legal accountability. So, for example, 
Judge Weinstein declared flatly in the Agent 
Orange litigation that notwithstanding 
weighty opinion that corporations are not 
subjects of liability in international law, 
well, as a matter of policy, they are so 
subject in US domestic law and that fact 
about US law will be enough to meet the 
threshold of the ATS international law 
violation. Put in my terminology, the 
"hinge" to an ATS claim can be met by an 
actor determined to be liable under US, 
rather than international law, standards. If 
there is· conduct-the "what" under 
international law, such as genocide or 
slavery, meeting the Sosa standard-the 
question of "who" is subject to the ATS will 
be determined by the rules of US domestic 
law. The US domestic rules accept the 
proposition of a corporation being so 
subject, hence a claim will lie under the 
ATS. 
The Second Circuit majority shm-ply rejects 
that view. It says that in order. for the 
threshold of the ATS to be met,. there must 
bea violation of international law. Conduct 
might very well violate international law, 
but for there to be a violation, it must be 
conduct by something that is recognized as 
being subject to liability in international law. 
If it is not something that is recognized or 
juridically capable of violating international 
law and being liable for it, then the 
conduct-whatever else it might be-is not 
actually a violation of international law by 
that party. States can violate international 
law, are subjects of international law, and 
can be liable under international law. 
Individuals under some circumstances can 
violate (a relatively nan-ow list of things in) 
international law, can be subjects. of it, and 
can be liable under international law. But 
what about juridical persons, artificial 
persons-corporations? The opinion says 
flatly that corporations are not liable under 
international law-not even to discern a 
rule, let alone a rule that would meet the 
standards of Sosa. To reach this conclusion, 
the opinion walks through the history of 
arguments over corporate liability since 
WWII, ranging from Nuremberg to the 
considered refusal of the states-pmiy to 
include corporations in the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court. 
By that point, the cOUli has done two things. 
One, it has rejected the view that it is 
enough to find that US domestic law accepts 
corporate liability, and that it can be used to 
satisfy the threshold of an international law 
violation in the ATS. The hinge has to be 
international law; the threshold must answer 
both "what" and "who" as a matter of 
international law, with no reach to US 
domestic law. Hence, given that you can't 
rely on US domestic law to reach it, then to 
satisfy the threshold, you have to show that 
it exists in international law as a treaty or 
customary norm (and then add to that the 
further burden of Sosa). Two, then, as to that 
latter requirement, the court says, no, it is 
not the case that a corporation meets the 
requirements of liability under the cun-ent 
state of customary international law or treaty 
law. The majority opinion accepts that if the 
international law threshold is met, then US 
domestic law in the A TS itself flips . into 
civil tort mode.· But you can't get there 
without an international law violation on its 
own terms-and that means that there must 
be a "what" of conduct that violates 
international law and a "who" in the sense of 
an actor that, on international law's own 
terms, is regarded as juridically capable. of 
violating it. 
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It is important to note that this is all 
logically prior to Sosa's requirements. What 
the Second Circuit has held here regarding 
corporate liability is not driven by Sosa at 
all. Sosa says that even if a claim satisfies 
the requirement of a violation of 
international law, the nature of the violation 
must meet a set of additional criteria-
criteria that are established not as a matter of 
international law, but as matter of US 
Constitutional law imposed by the Court 
upon international law as considered in US 
courts to ensure, for domestic law reasons, 
that these ATS claims are, so to speak, really 
serious ones. The Second Circuit holding on 
corporate liability does not rest on the .Sosa 
criteria; it never gets to them because it says 
that, quite apart from being "really serious" 
kinds of international law violations, the 
party alleged to have violated them must in 
the first place be a. party capable in 
international law itself of violating them, in 
the sense of bearing legal liability. Only if' 
the "who" is met, in other words, do the 
Sosa requirements come up as a further, 
domestic-law burden on the "what" of the 
. claims. 
This leaves an important point, however-
one that is not so relevant to this case, but 
which will presumably be deeply relevant in 
other settings, perhaps in a SCOTUS case on 
this. On this I am somewhat less certain as 
to the court's meaning, and will re-read the 
case and perhaps revise my views. At this 
point however, I'd say this. As the opinion 
observes, the nature of the ATS is to create 
in US domestic law a civil action in tort, 
premised upon meeting an international law 
threshold. However, it is a liability in tort-
a remedy in tort-for violations that have to 
be international law violations themselves. 
We are now back at the "what." The 
violations have to be international law 
violations (done by a "who" capable of 
being liable); once those violations of 
international law are met (and then further 
meeting the Sosa burdens as a kind of 
further threshold requirement in domestic 
law), then a tort remedy is available. 
Even if the "who" is an individual person- . 
capable of violating at least some actionable 
things in international law, including 
meeting the Sosa standard-as a matter of 
international law today, all the violations are 
criminal. They are, all international crimes. 
International law recognizes no regime of 
civil liability in international law imposed 
upon persons; the violations that exist are 
such criminal acts as war crimes, crimes 
against humanity, genocide, and a few 
others that would meet the Sosa 
requirements. 
To cut to the chase, the point is that nowhere 
in this list is there anything that looks like an 
environmental tort, because there is no 
international law of tort. And what many 
ATS cases seek to do is create out of the 
putty of American tort law 'a regime of 
international civil liability that, alas, does 
not exist. The court seems to recognize this 
implidtly, I think, although the holding 
about corporate liability does not turn on it. 
Let me step beyond the case, however, to the 
implication of this second point in practical 
terms. 
Where A TS plaintiffs' seek to state a claim 
(and even leaving aside the question of 
"who") there is a large and logically 
independent problem, in many instances, of 
how plaintiffs can succeed in plausibly 
pleading a "what," given the short list of 
things for which. individuals can be liable. 
First off, they are all criminal. Particularly 
following Sosa, they are all criminal and all 
at the approximate level of serious war 
crimes and genocide. Whereas the actual ' 
substantive acts that plaintiffs wish to sue 
over, if they could be honest about it in the 
pleadings, are environmental torts-perhaps 
very serious ones, but not genocide or war 
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crimes. The only way into the ATS, given 
that the threshold "what" are all the most 
serious international crimes in the canon, 
has the perverse result that plaintiffs or, 
anyway, their lawyers, today utterly and 
routinely submit pleadings alleging war 
crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity, 
etc., at every turn. 
Speaking for myself, anyway, this is not a 
good thing from the standpoint of 
convincing anyone outside the US civil tort 
process that the US is serious about these 
crimes. Trying to leverage the A TS into a 
global civil liability system in a sort of jelTY-
rigged, spliced together, bits of US and bits 
of international law, arrangement that has 
precedential value only in US District 
Courts, and only by citing each other-well, 
it seems like a bad idea. I'm no fan of 
creating such a global system of civil tort 
. liability, heaven knows, but if I were, I'd 
think this perhaps the worst of all worlds as 
a way of going about it. 
But given the "whats" that can be plead, the 
result is inevitably a foim of defining 
deviancy down. Defendants in these suits 
from outside the United States in particular 
seem often stunned that American courts so 
freely entertain allegations of the most 
serious crimes possible. In my personal 
experience, corporate defendants, in 
particular, often believe that they must fight 
to the wall even for things that in other 
circumstances they might be willing to 
negotiate as "ordinary" issues of labor 
rights, environmental claims, etc. Part of it is 
simply calculation-if they settle, they risk 
being forever characterized as having settled 
claims of '" genocide, crimes against 
humanity, etc., in what was actually a fairly 
routine labor rights dispute in the developing 
world. But pat1 of it, again in my 
experience, is that senior executives take 
this really personally; it is a slur on them 
. and they won't settle, not if the claims are 
war crimes rather than at'gument over 
ground water contamination. I agree with 
them and think that those who see the ATS 
as somehow promoting the universal rule of 
law should consider the many ~ays in which 
it instead promotes cymclsm about 
international human rights claims in their 
most serious form, or at least the meaning of 
human rights claims in US courts. 
That said on my own part, the Cabranes 
opinion is careful to emphasize that the 
Second Circuit has accepted that in 
appropriate cases, there can be aiding and 
abetting and secondary liability. The 
standard is a demanding one, to be sure, 
under the Second Circuit's own holdings. In 
addition, the opinion emphasizes that 
individuals are, of course, liable in 
international law for certain serious crimes. 
Which goes to a question that Kevin Jon 
Heller posed in the comments, and on which 
I do not regard myself as expert. What is the 
big deal about this decision on corporate 
liability, if the same claims can simply be 
refiled against corporate officers and 
executives and other individuals? Why is the 
loss of corporate level liability such a big 
deal? I don't regard myself as sufficiently 
expert in litigation to say definitively, and I 
welcome expert answers. However, for what 
it is worth, everyone I've dealt with with-
plaintiff side or· defendant side-in these 
cases thinks it.is a very big deal, in terms of 
what has to be proved as well as damages. I 
leave this to those more knowledgeable than 
I-but I have never had any sense that 
anyone in this practice area thought it was a 
red helTing, although perhaps people will re-
think it. . . 
The majority opmlOn as· well as Judge 
Leval's concurrence both say quite a lot 
about the parlous issue of authority in 
answering the vexed questions of what 
constitutes customary international law. The 
role of experts, scholars, and "publicists" in 
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the traditional term is discussed in both 
OpllllOns. Certainly in the majority, 
professors do not come off so well, despite 
the fact that the Cabranes opinion leans 
heavily on declarations by Professor James 
Crawford and then-Professor (now Justice) 
Christopher Greenwood in speaking to the 
. content of customary international law. 
Without saying so in so many words, it 
seems clear that the court took into account 
that these are both globally important 
defenders of "international law" in its 
received sense, and not merely American 
academics; the court seemed implicitly to 
use them as an anchor for suggesting that 
international law needed to be tested, not 
merely within the parochial precincts of the 
US District Courts, citing each other in a 
gradually upward cascade of precedents, 
increasingly sweeping but also increasingly 
removed from sources of "international" law 
outside themselves, but against something 
genuinely international. 
One can, of course, dispute whether 
Crawford and Greenwood are the right 
sources for that. But the opinion perhaps 
seemed to· sense that ATS doctrines are 
increasingly sweeping but increasingly 
issued in a hermetically sealed US ATS 
system with less and less recourse to· 
international law as the rest of the world 
sees it. I don't know how else one takes a 
magisterial declaration by Judge Weinstein 
that it would simply be against public policy 
not to have corporate liability in a US court, 
irrespective of the authority for the 
proposition, or not, in actual international 
law. Maybe that is just me seeing what I 
want, to be sure; I think it is a correct 
concern, In any case. 
Ironically, then, for those who would argue 
that the Cabranes opinion undermined 
"international law," I would say that a view 
held more widely than one might guess 
(looking only to the sympathies that often lie 
with these claims) among international law 
experts outside the United States is that ATS 
jurisprudence actually undermines 
international law by contributing to its 
fragmentation among "communities of 
authority and interpretation," as I've 
sometimes called it. International law is 
fracturing into churches and sects that 
increasingly do not recognize the existence 
or validity of others. The existence of more 
and more courts and tribunal systems 
contributes greatly to this fragmentation, I 
believe, because. unlike the traditional ways 
of seeing international law as a pragmatic 
fusion of diplomacy, politics, and law in a 
loose sense-with the implied ability to see 
other points of view and accept them in a 
pluralist way-tribunals thrive in large part 
by asserting their own authority, on their 
internal grounds, in ways that achieve 
maximum authority inside -their own 
systems precisely by denying the validity ·of 
other views. After all, if you're going to lock 
up some defendant at the ICC, you have 
maximum claims to legitimacy for the 
holding if you take zero account of any other 
community. of interpretation that thinlcs there 
is no ground to do so. The authority of 
courts, by contrast to the authority of 
Ministries of Foreign Affairs, is very much 
one that maximizes legitimacy by going 
"inside." I've talked about this a lot in my 
own work-the fractious question of "Who 
owns international law?" 
I do not want to try and characterize Judge 
Leval's eloquent and passionate opinion; I 
don't understand it as well at this point, and 
being less sympathetic to its point of view, I 
fear that without more careful·study, I would 
characterize it unfairly. But I would note 
that the disputes between his opinion and 
that of the majority over experts and 
professors might best be settled by getting 
rid of us professors pretty much in toto. I am 
pleased to say that I said so in my own 
expert declaration in the Agent Orange case; 
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I thought it incumbent on me to tell Judge 
Weinstein that I didn't think that professors' 
opinions merited much weight if any, 
including my own. 
And now a final thought, one that reaches 
far outside the case. It seems to me that this 
Second Circuit opinion is moving toward a 
much more confined ATS. There were other 
ways in which the court reserved on ways in 
which it might be curtailed still further-in 
passing, the court noted but declined to take 
a view on whether the ATS might have no 
extraterritorial application, limiting it to 
conduct 'within the United States. Once 
corporations were understood as targets, 
once everyone understood that neither 
plaintiff nor defendant required any 
traditional connection to the United States, 
as parties, in conduct, nothing, and once the 
plaintiffs bar saw opportunities to join forces 
with the NGOs and activists, the trend of the 
ATS has been to turn into a kind of de facto 
tort forum for the world. Whatever else it 
might be legally, politically this is a role 
suited for a hegemonic actor able to make 
claims against corporations stick on a 
worldwide basis. What happens if the 
hegemon goes into decline? 
What· happens, that is, when plaintiffs in 
Africa decide to start using the ATS to sue 
Chinese multinationals engaged in very, 
very bad labor or environmental practices in 
some poor and far away place? Does anyone 
believe that China would not react-in ways 
that others in the world might like to, but 
can't? Does anyone believe that the current 
State Department would not have 
concerns-or more precisely, the Treasury 
Department? So let. me end by asking 
whether a possible long run effect of this 
Second Circuit opinion, if followed in other 
circuits, and by SCOTUS, and perhaps other 
things that confine the ATS, is not over the 
long run an ATS for a post-hegemonic 
America? 
Update: An international lawyer friend in 
Europe sent me an email commenting on 
this. This lawyer, who preferred not to be 
identified, said that despite agreeing with the 
opinion on corporate liability, both majority 
and concurrence once again exhibited that 
peculiarly American tendency to rely far too 
much on Nuremberg cases. Even if a 
Nuremberg panel had held that some 
German finn could be held liable, 
international lawyers generally would not 
take that as very weighty evidence of the 
content of customary international law 
today. Rathel', one should look to the way in 
which things had evolved over a long period 
of time to see what states did as a customary 
practice from a sense of legal obligation. A 
finding that a court long ago had ruled this 
or that was a peculiarly American way of re-
configuring an inquiry into the content of 
customary international law into a common 
law inquiry. 
Americans thought that was okay; not very 
many international lawyers outside the US 
agreed with that, said my friend, as a method 
of inquiry into customary international law. 
And they thought that American lawyers 
almost always overemphasized Nuremberg 
cases, treated them as hallowed ground-
rather than looking to the path of treaties and 
state practice in the sixty years since. Even 
if a Nuremberg case had held there was 
corporate liability, nothing else since then 
sUPPOlied the idea, and far more relevant, 
this lawyer friend concluded, was the 
affinnative consideration and rejection of 
the proposition in the ICC negotiations. 
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